Applied Formal Methods for Elections by Wang, Jian
Applied Formal Methods for Elections
Jian Wang
Advisor: Carsten Schu¨rmann
Submitted: March 2016

iii
Abstract
Information technology is changing the way elections are orga-
nized: In many countries voters are nowadays voting with electronic
voting machines, some countries even offer internet elections as al-
ternative voting channels, and it is to be expected that information
technology will change the way ballots are tabulated and parliaments
are elected. There are many reasons explaining why election com-
missions around the world pursue an agenda of digitizing elections.
Indeed, technology renders the electoral process more efficient, but
things could also go wrong: Voting software is complex, it consists of
thousands of lines of code, which makes it error-prone. Software and
hardware problems may cause delays at polling stations, or even de-
lay the announcement of the final result. This thesis describes a set
of methods to be used, for example, by system developers, admin-
istrators, or decision makers to examine election technologies, social
choice algorithms, and voter experience.
Technology: Verifiability refers to voting software producing evi-
dence so that can be retroactively analyzed, in case that something
went wrong, or there is a suspicious of foul play. Although veri-
fiability is an elegant concept, it is by no means easy to judge, if
an implementation implements verifiability correctly. There are two
ways to analyze implementations for verifiability, first statically, i.e.
before the technology is deployed, which gives the developers the
opportunity to fix issues during development time, or second dy-
namically, i.e. monitoring while an implementation is used during an
election, or after the election is over, for forensic analysis.
This thesis contains two chapters on this subject: the chapter An-
alyzing Implementations of Election Technologies describes a tech-
nique for checking verifiability properties directly on the source code
of e-voting systems using modern code scanning tools. Verifiability
properties are expressed in linear temporal logic, then translated into
Bu¨chi automata and checked using off the shelf static analyzers that
compute all possible execution paths. We demonstrate the technique
using a particular tool, the Coverity static analyzer. In the chapter
Epistemic Policies for Voting Systems, we turn our attention to the
logs generated by e-voting systems for policy compliance checking.
The novel contribution is that we use epistemic linear time logic to
express properties about distributed e-voting systems that then be
checked by model-checkers.
iv
Algorithms: The advances in technology open the possibility that
the very algorithms and social choice functions we use in elections are
going to evolve. Besides first-past-the-post, there are many variants
of D’Hondt, Sainte-Lague¨ and single transferable vote (STV), and
these algorithms continue to be adjusted, evolved, and refined.
This thesis contains a chapter Verifying Voting Schemes that
focuses on the use of formal methods to ensure that these algorithms
have the intended meaning and conform to the desired democratic
principles. As a case study, we define two semantic criteria for STV
schemes, formulated in first-order logic over the theories of arrays and
integers, and show how bounded model-checking and satisfiability
modulo theories (SMT) solvers can be used to check whether these
criteria are met.
Voter Experience: Technology profoundly affects the voter expe-
rience. These effects need to be measured and the data should be
used to make decisions regarding the implementation of the electoral
process.
This thesis contains a chapter Measuring Voter Lines that de-
scribes an automated data collection method for measuring voters’
arrival and waiting time, and discusses statistical models designed to
provide an understanding of the voter behavior in polling stations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
An election is a decision making process that allows voters choose to express
their preferences via ballots. Elections enable voters to participate in the
democratic process in a representative democracy. Examples for elections
include parliamentary elections, local elections, association elections, pri-
vate organization elections and so on. The electoral cycle [78, 73] is a visual
planning and training tool for assisting the organization of elections. The
electoral cycle is divided in three periods, and each includes many processes,
• the pre-electoral period, including planning, training, voter registra-
tion, etc.
• the electoral period, including vote casting, ballot counting, result
verification, etc.
• the post-electoral period, including audits and evaluations, legal re-
form, etc.
The aim of this thesis is to show that formal methods can be used
to check and to improve the application of election technology and the
voter experience in polling places. In this thesis, we use formal methods to
analyze the properties of two processes in the electoral period - vote casting
and ballot counting.
Vote Casting. There are various vote casting forms, including paper
voting, mail voting and electronic voting (e-voting). Voters can either cast
their ballots in polling stations (via e-voting, paper voting) or remotely (via
internet e-voting, mail voting). Information technology is changing the way
elections are organized: as a modern ballot casting method, e-voting has
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gained popularity alongside the rapid prevalence of computers and smart-
phones. In some countries [51] voters are nowadays voting with e-voting
machines in polling places such as the direct-recording electronic (DRE)
systems in the US and the vVote system in Victorian State (Australia)
election. Voters can even vote remotely in a few countries, such as Estonia
and Norway. E-voting systems can be very complicated, and they usually
run on even more complicated operating systems, both of which can easily
have glitches and bugs, which could be exploited by attackers and adversely
affect the election quality. Besides the vote casting forms, technology also
profoundly affects the voter experience in polling stations. These effects
also need to be measured and the data should be used to make decisions
regarding the implementation of the electoral process.
Ballot Counting. Proportional representation and plurality voting are
the two major methods for allocating seats in parliamentary elections. In
proportional representation electoral systems, divisions in an electorate are
reflected proportionately by the application of voting schemes (ballot count-
ing methods). There are many voting schemes, which turn ballots into de-
cisions of distributing mandates seats, used around the world. The ballot
content for a proportional representation system can be either a single choice
or a preferential rank of multiple choices of candidates. Seats distribution
computing methods (voting schemes) for single choice voting include the
largest remainder method like Hare quota and the highest average method
like D’Hondt method. Voting schemes for ranked voting include the instant-
runoff voting, Borda count, single transferable vote (STV) and so on.
In this thesis, we use formal methods to analyze the electoral cycles, in
particular the vote casting process and ballot counting process. We focus
on three topics, properties of election technology, criteria of voting schemes
and user experience in polling stations.
1.1 Properties and Model Checking
We make use of time and temporal descriptions in election requirement,
such as ”the election should be held in two weeks after the prime minister
declared it”, ”a voter’s ID should be checked before he/she is allowed to
vote”, ”a voter can not vote again after he/she has voted”. We use words
like ”after”, ”in two weeks” to show that something will or should happen
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in the future, and we use ”before” to describe things in the past. There is
a type of formal logic, temporal logic, which is designed to represent and
reason about time and temporal information.
As an extension of classical logic, temporal logic includes the opera-
tors, such as the conjunction (∧) and disjunction (∨) of two formulas,
the negation (¬) of a formula. In addition, temporal logic enriches clas-
sical logic by the temporal operators like #, ♦, , which represents ”at
next state in time”, ”at some future state in time” and ”at all future (in-
clude current) states in time” respectively. For example, when it is re-
quired that ”whenever a send message action happens, then some time
later there should be a receive message action take place.”, the formula
(send message → ♦receive message) describes this policy. These tem-
poral properties usually can be a safety property, which states that nothing
should go wrong, or a liveness property, which states that the right thing
should finally happen. [2]
The notion of security policy and security model was introduced in 1982
by Goguen and Mesequer [66]. We call these requirements of system states
system properties (or security policies). Note that there is a subtle different
between system properties and security policies in some scenarios, however,
we consider them interchangeable in this thesis. Temporal logic can be used
to express the requirements of systems states, and it plays an important role
in system verification.
In this thesis we will use temporal logic to describe system properties,
and use model checking method to verify them. Model checking started
from the early works [37, 101] and has been a widely used method for
system property verification. Model checking refers to exhaustively and
automatically checking if the model meets a specification, in our case the
temporal formulas. For checking some properties, the model checker con-
tinues until all possible states are checked. A good overview of the model
checking can be found [9].
Instead of enumerating reachable states in model checking, symbolic
model checking considers a large set of possible states at one time. Sym-
bolic model checking with Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) has been suc-
cessfully used for formal verification of finite state machine, but BDDs may
grow exponentially for the verification. To solve this problem, a method
called Bounded Model Checking (BMC) is introduced by Biere [23]. It was
an attempt to replace BDDs with SAT and SMT solvers in symbolic model
checking, and to find counter examples with a SAT-solver.
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1.2 Election Technology
1.2.1 Code Checking
Verifiability is a key feature of e-voting technology, as it allows voters and
auditors using evidence, such as a ballot receipt, to verify the correctness
of the result. Verifiability entails that a voter or administrator can inspect
evidence that is generated during the run-time of the election technology,
and judge, beyond some level of doubt, that the process is correct. The
concept of end-to-end verifiability [83, 82, 33] has emerged as a valuable
mechanism for accountability of e-voting technology, and it includes three
properties, cast as intended, stored as cast and counted as stored. For
each of these properties, it is time intensive to check for implementations,
and those properties for end-to-end verifiable systems normally are only
checked in system design level. Although there has been a considerable
amount of work on devising and checking verification procedures for vot-
ing systems on the design specification (see related work section), there is
relatively little work has been done in the fine-tuned checking in software
implementation of election technologies. In Chapter 2, we are exploiting
the possibility of applying software model checking to election technologies
by using off-the-shelf static code analysis tools (Coverity 7.7.0) to verify
whether an e-voting implementation actually produces evidence correctly
for the verification procedure.
In our application, we focus on the code scanning based method for ev-
idence flow analysis. Evidence flow is the flow of generating the evidence
from starting point to an ending point in the middle of ballot processing.
Taint analysis is an important branch for data flow analysis, which can
be used to track the evidence flow. It can trace the data flow throughout
the program paths through symbolic execution, which provide an impor-
tant tool for evidence checking in voting systems, because the interaction
between the server (voting center) and the client (voting machine).
We show that it is possible to carry out the checks in two modes. Mode
1, we can track the forward flow of the ballot from input, to the place in the
source code where the evidence such as a ballot receipt for later checking
is generated. By mode 1 checking, we are able to verify that the evidence
is generated correctly. And mode 2 is the backward flow analysis, in which
we can check that every evidence generated in the end should correspond
to some input, which means the evidence should be able to be traced back
to the input source. For example, a ballot receipt should be able to trace
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back to to a starting point, where the ballot is cast.
In the method we use, a Bu¨chi automaton is built from a property ex-
pressed by temporal logic, which is then checked with the implementation’s
function call paths generated by flattening function calls following the idea
from taint analysis. We prove that our abstraction method is a TI ab-
straction, which means we can replace the source code property checking
problem by checking the property in the function call path. TI abstrac-
tion [62], as defined in Definition 1.2.1, can be used to achieve a fast check
of the complex systems in a high level description of the source code, and
yet be able to check the properties for the original model.
Definition 1.2.1 (TI Abstraction). f is TI abstraction iff, for all formulas
p if p in Th(S) then f(p) in Th(f(S)), where f is an abstraction between a
pair of formal systems. Th(S) is the theorems in formal system S.
1.2.2 Log Checking
A log refers to a document that records relevant events in the order they
occurred. The purpose of logs are numerous, including retroactive forensic
analysis in the case that something went wrong, providing evidence that
assigned tasks have been conducted responsibly, and conducting statistical
analysis about the system operation. A poll book is a classic example, where
the distribution of ballots is carefully recorded and used to estimate voter
participation at the end of voting day. But this is not everything. There is
an extra feature of these kind of logs that is worth highlighting: Complete
logs can create trust in those who read them, in particular because they
often allow the reader to reconstruct the steps in between and therefore
retrace all steps of a process and to gain confidence in whatever the process
set out to execute.
Besides the traditional usage, logging is also highly recommended in
software system engineering security standards [100]. There are many log-
ging standards or guides created for a variety of systems. These standards
define the log structure and log content, like the NIST’s “Guide to Com-
puter Security Log Management” [84] and the “NCSA Common log for-
mat” [76]. ”Secure programming with static analysis” [28] advocates some
basic requirements for good logging: time-stamped log entries, consistent
logging of all important actions, and controlled access to log data. With-
out the time-stamp, the forensic value will be much less important, since
time-stamps can help to reconstruct the sequence of logged events.
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When we turn our attention to logging systems that are prevalently
used in computer systems, it is clear that those kind of logs aim to achieve
very similar outcomes. Web-server access logs record who connected to the
server and from which IP address, and in the case of a break-in (that has to
be noticed by other means like intrusion detection system), often provides
some evidence revealed by forensic analysis. The messages log file in a Linux
system, for example, contains information about which process did what,
and if a problem was detected or an exception was raised. Finally, logs can
serve to provide statistical information, as how many connection requests
were received or how many pages were served. There is one thing, however,
that distinguishes computer logs from traditional logs. They do not aim to
be as complete as the traditional book keeping, because there are simply
too many steps that could be logged. Thus nobody would expect a log to
generate trust into the correctness of an entire application.
When a system fails during run time due to some errors, these errors are
reproducible with enough information logged. By following the log entries,
a system administrator can reconstruct the sequence of events leading to
the errors. In addition, logs can be used for analysis like collecting data for
voting sessions and voters [69]. The role of logging and logs for electronic
voting systems, which is a necessary step towards a trustworthy e-voting
system, is presented and studied in Chapter 3.
Though log checking is different from the dynamic execution states
checking of a system, it is still possible to track some information from
the system execution with proper deployment of logging and log monitor-
ing components, and it can also be checked dynamically at run-time. Log
handling always starts with installation of a logging framework in a system,
which records system events log entries during the operation of the system.
After or during recording, logs can be used for checking adherence of system
properties with model checking methodology.
A lack of information in the logs may lead to the negligence of some
problems, as some properties may not be able to check due to missing in-
formation. Too few entries will lead to the omission of some important
information, and when doing automatic log analysis, it slows the log check-
ing program’s efficiency. Thus a certain amount of data from the logs is
always required before running the aforementioned checking and analysis.
So some systems log as much information as possible. In scenarios like
e-voting, extensive logging may adversely affect the confidentiality and pri-
vacy of the voter. However, the log information leakage analysis is not
covered in this thesis.
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1.3 Voting Schemes
Voting schemes in elections are functions that compute the seat distribution
from a set of preferences recorded on ballots. In the study of social choice
functions, various new voting systems are created and pre-existing schemes
are adjusted and refined constantly. Voting schemes are designed to fol-
low certain social choice criteria like the Condorcet criterion [114], defined
as ”the candidate who wins against each other candidate in a one-on-one
contest should be the election winner”. Voting schemes can be analyzed
according to many different criteria. For example, the Condorcet criterion
is satisfied by the Schulze and Copeland voting schemes, but not the single
transferable vote (STV) and its variants.
However, no voting scheme exists that would satisfy all reasonable gen-
eral criteria simultaneously. In the case of preferential voting, Arrow’s im-
possibility theorem [6] states that no scheme can be designed to satisfy all
of the three fairness criteria simultaneously:
Unanimity. If all voters prefer candidate A over candidate B, then A is
ranked over B in the election result.
Independence of irrelevant options. If some voters change their ballot
but keep the relative position of candidates A and B on their bal-
lot, then the relative position of A and B remains unchanged in the
election result.
Non-dictatorship. There is no single voter whose preferences always pre-
vail in the election result.
The possibility to use computers for counting ballots allows us to design
new voting schemes that are arguably fairer than existing schemes designed
for hand-counting. In Chapter 4, we study the applicability of formal meth-
ods for the purpose of criteria checking of voting schemes. We argue that
formal methods can and should be used to ensure that such schemes behave
as intended and conform to the desired democratic properties. Specifically
as examples, we define two semantic criteria for STV schemes, which are
used in the Victoria State election and many others, and formulate them
in first-order logic over the theories of arrays and integers, and show how
bounded model-checking and SMT solvers can be used to check whether
these criteria are met. As a case study1, we then analyze an existing voting
1In this thesis we use case study interchangeably with practical experiment
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scheme for electing the board of trustees for a major international con-
ference and discuss its deficiencies. We also show in Chapter 4 that the
variant of STV implements the majority rule instead of the proportional
rule as intended, which violates the original design intention of the social
choice algorithm.
1.4 Voter Experience
When talking about voter experience, we are referring to the impact of
choices that the election officials make on the voter during the electoral
cycle. These includes for example, the voter registration, the location and
design of polling places, the management of voter flow, voting technology,
etc. [16]
These effects need to be measured and quantified, and the insight gained
can be used to help organizing the elections. For example, the voters may
balk if there is a long queue ahead, even though the queue may actually
move fast, which will affect the quality of the voter experience. Shortening
the queues in polling stations and providing the expected waiting time for
the voters are two possible solutions of the balk-out problem. In Chapter 5
of the thesis, we will look at the voter experience of an election, more
specifically, queues in the polling stations.
In Chapter 5, we present an automated data collection technique called
white boxes-technique, which is designed
• to analyze the voter behavior in polling stations including the mea-
surement of arrival and waiting times and the determination of arrival
frequency;
• to assist the management of polling places to make decisions regarding
the distribution of resources and to identify areas for future improve-
ment;
• and to provide hard data to guide the political decision making process
with respect to the choice of voting technologies.
We describe the technology that we used, analyze its security, give an
empirical analysis how the technique compares to traditional manual data
collection techniques, such as the ones proposed for US elections 2 by the
2http://web.mit.edu/vtp/
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CalTech/MIT Voting project, using data collected during the 2015 Danish
parliamentary election. We record the voters‘ arrival and departure times
and analyze the average time in five polling places in the context of queueing
theory [41].
1.5 Related Work
This section gives a general survey of the related work with respect to
different topics mentioned above.
Properties and Model Checking. Policy languages are usually tai-
lored to their application domains. There are languages that capture time
and time-outs [13], access control [60], and aggregation [12]. Much related
work has been done in the field of security policy formalization and security
policy checking. Perhaps most closely related to our work is the work of
Basin that covers metric first-order temporal logic (MFOTL) [14], which
supports security policy that refer to “real-time”, and its generalization to
aggregates [12]. The application of epistemic temporal logic to security in-
formation flow analysis is discussed in [10], and there has also been some
work regarding the aximatization of epistemic temporal logic [20]. In recent
years, information-flow security properties were studied in systems as Hy-
perLTL and HyperCTL∗ [38] express information-flow policies by explicit
quantification over multiple traces.
An introduction to temporal logic and its application can be found
in [55]. [88, 90, 55] show examples how temporal logic can be used in
program specification, and [9, 52, 74] show that temporal logic can be used
for system verification. Some application of temporal logic in multi-agent
systems are discussed in [56, 7].
As to the translation from LTL to Bu¨chi Automata, we use the LTL2BA
program created by Gastin [61] in Chapter 2. There are some other trans-
lation methods, such as [74, 47, 107, 105, 8]. Holzmann [74] in the model
checker Spin also introduced a translation method, and LTL2BA uses the
same modeling language as SPIN. [65] also shows a method of model check-
ing for programming languages. More algorithms for the translation are
listed on the SPOT wiki3.
An introduction to bounded model checking using SAT solving is pro-
vided in [36, 5]. [79] discusses a methodology for formal analysis of software
3http://spot.lip6.fr/wiki/LtlTranslationAlgorithms
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programs via SAT-based bounded model checking. More discussion about
SAT based bounded model checking is given in [59, 23, 22]
[34] presents the idea of using finite automaton to check securities for
piece of source code. It uses a pushdown automaton to represent the pro-
gram, and a finite automaton for the policy. Our method is similar to this
one but we formalize the properties and the generating of the paths. [94]
introduces a tool to find some security problems in file reader socket Java
code, like resource injection, path manipulation. Another useful tool for
Java project analysis is the Java path finder [113], which requires extra an-
notation to the source code to run non-functional property checking. A list
of source code analysis tools are listed in OWASP website4.
Logging and Log Analysis. Much work has been done in the area of
logging and log analysis. We focus only on some relevant related work.
The logging topic has been studied in the aspects like replayable logs [42],
the integrity of logs [43], and usage of logs for process mining [112]. The
model-checking based log auditing is discussed in [103], which introduces
the idea of using temporal logic model checking for logs.
AccuVote Optical Scan (AV-OS) terminal event log analysis derived
from an abstract finite state model is presented in [4]. In “Automated
Analysis of Election Audit Logs” [17], a method to analyze logs from Di-
rect Recording Electronic (DRE) voting machines is discussed, in which a
web application and toolset for uploading and analyzing DRE voting logs
and ballot image files are built. As a continued work from [4], “A System-
atic Approach to Analyzing Voting Terminal Event Logs” [96] introduces
a forensics tool based on context-free grammars, which also focuses on the
AV-OS terminal logs. Voting logs for Estonia’s I-Voting analysis is pre-
sented in [69] and [70].
E-Voting and Verification. E-voting systems’ report and analysis can
be found in [68, 71] for I-Voting system Estonian elections, for the Norwe-
gian system [64, 63], for the Australian vVote project [31, 45, 44, 46] and
others [35, 106]. The analysis of the remote e-voting systems is discussed
in [87], and a world map that depicts the world wide use of e-voting and
new voting technologies is provided by E-voting.CC [51].
There is some previous work on the formal analysis of voting schemes
using methods and tools from the computer aided verification and auto-
4https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Source_Code_Analysis_Tools
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mated deduction communities in our sense, such as the formal analysis of
actual implementations of such schemes [92, 85, 39]. Methods regarding E-
voting system verification can be found in [85, 40, 111, 86], most of which
focus on the system design level. In McGaley’s thesis [93], the ballot secrecy
and the voter verified traits are discussed, and also in Aida’s thesis [1], the
cryptographic techniques for e-voting are presented.
Voting Schemes. Voting schemes have been investigated by social choice
theorists for many decades. These tend to be mathematical analyses which
prove various (relative) properties of different voting schemes: see [98, 6].
Such work tends to concentrate on what we have referred to as theoretical
schemes and is often couched in terms of a formal theorem and its proof in
natural language.
Many general criteria that voting schemes preferably should satisfy have
been proposed in [26]. There is also a significant body of research on various
properties of vote-casting schemes, particular security properties [110, 67,
102].
Voting Lines and Queueing Data Collection. The MIT/CalTech
project [109] has conducted research in the general area of voter line for-
mation and queuing behavior. A study conducted during the 2008 US
presidential primary election compares the formation of lines in polling sta-
tions that use DRE voting machines to those using non-DRE voting systems
by analyzing manually collected data [108]. An alternative way to study
voter lines is by a post-election survey involving local election officials as
documented in [3]. [16] provides the report and recommendations on the
voter experience of American presidential elections, in which the long queue
problem is also discussed.
With respect to the automatic collection of queueing data, [30] describes
a smartphone app for collecting waiting times via crowdsourcing informa-
tion of client side actively uploading location information from GPS and
Wi-Fi to a server. This technique requires active participation of those
waiting, which distinguishes it from our study. A related way of monitoring
waiting times for public transit is provided in [117] predicting bus arrival
times by data analysis of cell tower signals and audio recordings, and similar
work has been done in [54].
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1.6 Structure and Contribution
This thesis is a collection of manuscripts and published papers. It con-
sists of three parts, which covers the three aforementioned topics, election
technology, voting schemes and voter experience.
The first part contains two chapters, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, which
discuss the verifying properties of e-voting system technologies through code
scanning and log checking respectively. Chapter 2 is a joint work with
Carsten Schu¨rmann, and Chapter 3 is a joint work with Carsten Schu¨rmann
and Daniel Gustafsson. For both chapters, I contributed to the theory and
the experiments for code checking and log checking.
The second part is Chapter 4, and it focuses on voting scheme criteria
and their verification. It is a paper published in Journal of Information
Security and Applications (JISA) 2014, and it is a joint work with Bernhard
Beckert, Rajeev Gore´, Carsten Schu¨rmann and Thorsten Bormer. Bormer
and I were in charge of the SMT solver and bounded model checking part,
in addition I added some extra examples of the property formulating.
The last part is Chapter 5, which talks about the voter experience. It
provides a way of collecting voter behavior data, voters’ arrival and depar-
ture time, for the voter experience analysis. This paper will appear in In-
ternational Conference for E-Democracy and Open Government (CeDEM)
2016, and it is a joint work with Carsten Schu¨rmann. I mainly contributed
to the design and implementation of the white box-technique experiments,
and I also processed and analyzed the collected data. In addition, I took
part in the manual data collection.
The tools and implementations mentioned in this thesis can be found
on http://itu.dk/people/jwan/.
1.7 Conclusion and Future Work
This thesis aims on improving the current election quality, and it provides
and demonstrates possible methods to do so from both technical and theo-
retical point of views. With all the work discussed in this thesis, we reach
a conclusion that election procedure can be checked and improved with ap-
plied formal methods. We tested and showed that there are ways to make
the election and e-voting an even better way to serve democracy by making
the e-voting move towards verifiability and making the experience in polling
places better.
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The future work of this thesis can be carried out in the following di-
rections with respect to each chapter. First, the code scanning chapter
can be continued by extending from just function names to variables and
data flows after we obtain the license to do taint analysis. and also can
be continued by dealing with the complexity problem. When we test our
method in the Victorian vVote system, complexity is not considered since
the system is relatively small, but efficiency needs to be considered when
we want to make it universally applicable. For the log checking chapter,
the long term goal is to formalize end to end verifiability, as described in
Section 1.2, with log checking. For the voting schemes part, the future
work is to improve the reach and the efficiency of SMT-based analysis as
described in Section 4.4. This will allow us to investigate larger classes of
voting schemes and to use more complex criteria. We also plan to extend
our analysis to criteria that measure the quality of election results based
on difference measures [95] in addition to yes/no criteria. The future work
for the white box chapter is the automatic online data collection, which
means we need to solve the problem of a reliable secure way of transferring
the data to a server that offers online real time information of the polling
stations. Besides these chapters, the continued work of this thesis can also
be the analysis of processes in the electoral cycle not covered, such as the
voter registration process and the result verification process.

Chapter 2
Analyzing Implementations of
Election Technologies1
2.1 Introduction
Software verification is a difficult endeavor. Given a program and a spec-
ification, we try to argue, that when executed, the program behaves as
specified. Even with all the progress in the field, software verification of
production quality software is still an elusive goal. There are several rea-
sons for this. (1) Production quality software systems are complex, they
use different programming languages, build on large bodies of libraries, and
require configurations. (2) The specification of a program can be expressed
in a logic; different logics require different levels of support, like source code
annotation. (3) It is possible to find specifications for small programs, but
this task becomes increasingly difficult the larger and the more complex a
program becomes. (4) Software verification is extremely time intensive, and
verified software proofs are often bridle to changes of the program that is
being checked. Small changes in an implementation may require large parts
of the system to be reverified.
For election technologies, a trend has emerged to require that voting
software, used for example in kiosk based voting machines or internet vot-
ing solutions, is verifiable. Verifiability entails that a judge (or in many
cases the voter) can inspect evidence that is generated during the execu-
tion (run-time) of the election technology and judge, beyond some level
of doubt, that the result is correct. Examples of such evidence include
cryptographic proofs, such as proofs of knowledge, logical proofs, such as
1Joint work with Carsten Schu¨rmann
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formal certificates and log files, and statistical proofs, for example through
auditing paper evidence (which are less important for this chapter). The
advantage of evidence based computation is that it will be (at least in the-
ory) checkable by others, using their own evidence checking tools, such as
zero-knowledge proof checkers, certificate checkers, or log analyzers. Trust
in election technologies therefore does not rely solely on the correctness
proof of an implementation (that is hard to come by as election technology
solutions are huge), but is instead diversified by offering control mechanisms
for post-election analysis.
This means that instead of full-fledged analysis using software verifica-
tion (which would provide the highest levels of quality assurance, but at
enormous cost), we may, at least in this very specific settings where soft-
ware systems run only for limited amount of time, conduct meaningful and
more lightweight analyses on the source code by checking that the flow of
evidence is correct. Evidence flow analysis combined with the post-mortem
check on the correctness of the evidence, yields a much more appealing
argument for the correctness and thus also trustworthiness of an election
technology than software verification alone ever could.
Contributions: This chapter makes the following contributions.
• Evidence analysis. We use LTL as a policy language to express the
property of evidence flow. Here, we assume that there is a set of
functions used to generate evidence. Evidence analysis consists of
two parts. First, we check that the designated sources of information
to compute evidence flow into the designated function that computes
the evidence, and second we check that the evidence generated flows
to the designated sinks, for example, a bulletin board, a SMS delivery
service, or a log file.
• We use standard code scanning technologies, in our case Coverity, but
any other customizable code scanning product would work, to com-
pute the set of all abstract execution paths. The advantage of using
such tools is that they work with the real programming language, and
not just a toy subset of it. We work only with TI abstractions [62], tak-
ing advantage of the fact that if the abstract version of the execution
path violates the policy, then the real execution path also violates it.
We use standard LTL model checking techniques to validate abstract
execution path.
• We apply the proposed technique to a real world example, the vVote
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system 2, an end-to-end voter verifiable kiosk based voting system that
was used in the state elections of the state of Victoria in Australia.
2.2 Evidence Flow
Evidence in this chapter refers to the proof that the e-voting system imple-
mentation processes the ballot correctly, and flow means a starting point
(source) and an ending point (sink) exist for the processing of the ballot. As
required by end-to-end verifiability, the ballot should be cast as the voter
intended, recorded in the server as the voter cast, and counted as recorded.
There are corresponding evidences for each of these three verifiability prop-
erties. For example, the SMS text return message proves that the ballot
has been received by the service correctly, and a ballot receipt generated
after the voter has voted in a kiosk voting machine provides an evidence
for checking the ballot be correctly counted. It’s also possible to composite
evidence flow, so the source and sink flow can be plugged together. For
example, once the source and sink evidence flow is checked for an e-voting
server for different procedures, it’s possible to claim some properties for
the whole system, such as that the end-to-end verifiability contains three
individual requirements.
We propose two modes to check the evidence flow. Mode 1 tracks the
forward flow of the ballot from initial input, until the generating of the final
evidence such as the SMS return code or a ballot receipt. Through mode
1 checking, we are able to verify that the evidence has been generated cor-
rectly following the e-voting system’s procedures, such as ballot validation,
ballot storing, receipt generation, etc. Mode 2 is the backward flow anal-
ysis, in which we want to show that evidence generated in the end should
correspond to a certain input, which means the evidence should be able to
be traced back to the input of a ballot. For example, a ballot receipt should
correspond to a starting point, where the ballot is entered.
There are different flavors of evidence flow in the e-voting implementa-
tion, such as function calls, data flows and class hierarchy. In this chapter,
we assume all critical handling of the evidence, such as ballot validation,
happens in functions, therefore we use the path of function calls to ver-
ify the evidence flow. However, our method is not restricted to functions,
and it can be extended with variables for data flow analysis, which will be
covered in future work.
2https://bitbucket.org/vvote/, version 2014-09-17 5fea6
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2.3 Policy Language
When the e-voting system is designed, the behaviors of the system are
predefined in the specification. Such behaviors are usually of the form that
one action step leads to another. Temporal logic is often used to formalize
this kind of properties. According to Gabbay [57], specifications in temporal
logic can be re-written into the executable form, which states “If A holds in
the past, then do B”, where A and B are some system actions. Unlike [57],
in which the states in the system models are treated different according to
the current time point, the past are considered declarative and the future
are imperative, we consider the whole system model as declarative, and
check the properties in the model, because the system implementation is
already available when we apply the checking method.
We present here the standard linear temporal logic for expressing the
properties of the system behaviors. This linear temporal logic has two frag-
ments, one is the past linear temporal logic (PLTL), and the other is the
future linear temporal logic (FLTL), each with different temporal modal-
ities. In the rest of the chapter, we refer the future linear temporal logic
as linear temporal logic (LTL) for reasons of simplicity, unless specifically
described.
2.3.1 Linear Temporal Logic
The syntax and semantics of linear temporal logic with past and future
modalities are given in Definition 2.3.1 and Definition 2.3.2 respectively.
An atomic formula is either p from the propositional variables or the
constant true. For any formula ϕ, we can negate it with ¬ and get a new
formula ¬ ϕ, read as “not ϕ”. Two formulas ϕ, ψ can be conjuncted with
the operator ∧ to ϕ ∧ ψ, read as “ϕ and ψ”.
The above part forms the non-temporal part, and is used in both FLTL
and PLTL. There are two temporal operators for PLTL and two corre-
sponding ones for FLTL. For FLTL, # is read as ”next”, and U is read
as ”until”. This can be used to describe properties like “the ballot casting
machine stays locked until a voter inserts the smartcard and enters the cor-
rect PIN code”  is read as ”previous”, and S is read as ”since”, which
can be used to describe requirement such as “since the incorrect PIN code
was entered twice, the smart could not be used anymore”.
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Definition 2.3.1 (Syntax of Future Linear Temporal Logic).
ϕ, ψ ::= true | p | ¬ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | #ϕ | ϕ U ψ
Definition 2.3.2 (Syntax of Past Linear Temporal Logic).
ϕ, ψ ::= true | p | ¬ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ |  ϕ | ϕ S ψ
Next, the standard path semantics [75] for the logic is provided. We
denote pi = pi0, pi1, . . . , pin as a path, and L as a function mapping from a
path node pii to a set of atomic propositions L(pii). The model relation is
defined as pi, i |= ϕ, where 0 ≤ i ≤ n and ϕ is a future/past linear temporal
formula. We denote the language of ϕ as L(ϕ) defined as the set of all pi
such that pi, 0 |= ϕ.
Definition 2.3.3 (Semantics of Future Linear Temporal Logic).
pi, i |= true iff TRUE
pi, i |= p iff p ∈ L(pii)
pi, i |= ¬ ϕ iff pi, i 6|= ϕ
pi, i |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff pi, i |= ϕ and pi, i |= ψ
pi, i |= #ϕ iff i < n and pi, i+ 1 |= ϕ
pi, i |= ϕ U ψ iff ∃j ≥ i.∀i ≤ k < j.pi, k |= ϕ and pi, j |= ψ
Definition 2.3.4 (Semantics of Past Linear Temporal Logic).
pi, i |= true iff TRUE
pi, i |= p iff p ∈ L(pii)
pi, i |= ¬ ϕ iff pi, i 6|= ϕ
pi, i |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff pi, i |= ϕ and pi, i |= ψ
pi, i |=  ϕ iff pi, i− 1 |= ϕ
pi, i |= ϕ S ψ iff ∃0 ≤ j ≤ i.∀j < k ≤ i.pi, k |= ϕ and pi, j |= ψ
Definition 2.3.5 (Syntactic sugar for Linear Temporal Logic).
ϕ ∨ ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ϕ→ ψ ≡ (¬ϕ) ∨ ψ
false ≡ ¬true ♦ϕ ≡ true U ϕ
ϕ ≡ ¬(♦¬ϕ) ϕ R ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ U ¬ψ)
It’s easy to see that properties in mode 1 and mode 2 correspond to
PLTL and FLTL respectively. For example, ”After the server receives a
ballot message from the voter, the sever should validate it” is a property in
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Mode 1, and it can be formulated as receiveBallot→ ♦validateBallot, ”If
a sever validates a ballot, then the ballot must came from a message from
the voter” is a mode 2 property.
Past-time modalities do not add expressiveness to future-time linear
temporal logic [58], but past-time modalities are used to express properties
more succinctly, and [91] shows the gap of the transition between LTL
and FLTL is at least single exponential. In addition, for our purpose of
application, the succinct expression is important for formalizing properties.
Before we move to the translation from LTL to automaton, we show
that the model relation of PLTL can be translated into the model relation
FLTL. Next we show an important feature between the past and future
LTL. A function {| · |} is provided to map PLTL formula to LTL formula,
and it is defined in Definition 2.3.6
Definition 2.3.6 (Converse Formula from PLTL to FLTL).
{|true|} if P is true
{|p|} if P is p
{|¬ ϕ|} if P is ¬ {|ϕ|}
{|ϕ ∧ ψ|} if P is {|ϕ|} ∧ {|ψ|}
{| ϕ|} if P is #{|ϕ|}
{|ϕ S ψ|} if P is {|ϕ|} U {|ψ|}
We use the symbol {||} for path pi as well, {|pi|} = pin, pin−1, . . . , pi0,
where pi = pi0, . . . , pin−1, pin
Theorem 2.3.1 shows that for all PLTL formula checking can be done
via LTL checking, thus we only need to focus on the method of checking
LTL formulas.
Theorem 2.3.1 (Symmetricity between PLTL and FLTL)
For any PLTL formula ϕ and its FTLT converse ϕ′ = {|ϕ|}, the checking of
a path pi for ϕ yields the same result as checking pi’s reversed path pi′ = {|ϕ|}
with ϕ′, which means pi, i |= ϕ if and only if pi′, (n− i) |= ϕ′
Proof idea. By induction on the formula ϕ. For example, it’s easy to show
that pi, i |=  ϕ if and only if pi′, (n− i) |= #{|ϕ|} provided that pi, (i−
1) |= ϕ if and only if pi′, (n− i+ 1) |= {|ϕ|}.
2.3.2 Bu¨chi Automata
The linear temporal logic formula can be translated to Bu¨chi Automaton.
A Bu¨chi Automaton is defined as A = (Q,Σ, I, T, F ), where Q is a finite
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set of states, Σ is the input (alphabet), I ⊆ Q is the set of initial states,
T ⊆ Q× Σ×Q is the set of transitions, and F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting
states.
Linear temporal logic with future-time operators has been studied inten-
sively. As discussed in the related work section, there are many algorithms
that have been proposed in study of the relation between temporal logic
and Bu¨chi automata. We describe briefly the future-time linear temporal
logic algorithm from [61] by Gastin and Oddoux. There have been more
efficient solutions like [49], but they are not within the scope of this chapter.
Gastin’s translation algorithm consists of three steps.
1. Pre-processing the original formula to negation normal form ϕ
The pre-processing consists of two steps, one is rewrite formulas into
negation normal form, in which the negation is only directly applied to
predicates. Based on the equivalence relation of the syntactic sugar,
the negation normal form of the formulas can push the negation op-
erator until the predicate level.
2. Translate ϕ into a generalized Bu¨chi automaton A′ϕ with the help of
Very Weak Alternating Automata (VWAA).
From a pre-processed formula ϕ, a generalized Bu¨chi automaton (GBA)
A′ϕ can be constructed. This construction has two steps, LTL to
very weak alternating automata (VWAA), and VWAA to generalized
Bu¨chi automata.
3. Post-processing A′ϕ, simplify and translate it into a Bu¨chi automaton
A′ϕ.
The proof of the correctness theorem of the translation, Theorem 2.3.2,
can be found in [61]. The theorem states that the accepted input for the
automaton are the same as that which models the formula. We use L(A) to
denote the accepted language of the automaton. This is the fundamental
correctness theorem for our method discussed in the next section. With
this theorem, we can translate the model relation problem into the Bu¨chi
automaton acceptance problem. Later we will show how the finite sate in
Bu¨chi automaton helps to reduce the checking spaces.
Theorem 2.3.2
The Bu¨chi automaton Aϕ accepts precisely the models of ϕ, i.e.
L(Aϕ) = L(ϕ)
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Definition 2.4.1 (An Abstraction Language).
Method ::= Identifier(Expression (, Expression)*) | Identifier()
Expression ::= Expression (&&, ||, ==, >, <, +, -, *, /) Expression
| Method | Identifer | IntegerLiteral | true | false
Statement ::= if (Expression) Statement else Statement
| while (Expression) Statement
| MethodMethod;
| Expression=Expression;
| {(Statement) ∗ }
2.4 An Abstraction Language
2.4.1 Language
Checking programs using automata has to make use of two components, the
automaton and the input for the automaton. In this section, we show how
to extract the input to the automaton from the system that needs to be
verified. We give the grammar of an abstraction language which represents
the content of a function, and then show the abstract input to the automa-
ton can be represented by a set of paths. This abstraction language is an
abstraction from practical programming languages including only some es-
sential components, which means the representation is suitable for many
programming languages. But we will show later that this abstraction lan-
guage requires more effort to apply then those with more details.
An identifier is a sequence of letters, digits, and underscores, starting
with a letter. An integerliteral is a sequence of decimal digits that denotes
the corresponding integer value, including negative sign. Reserved symbols
are denoted in red. “*” means repetition, and “()” groups items together.
There are some restrictions in this grammar. In object-oriented lan-
guages, this simplified grammar doesn’t differentiate method (function)
calling in classes with “.”, and these calls will only be recognized as a
special identifier. So we need to use an external way to handle classes and
other types, which will be discussed in Section 2.5.2. Other loops, like for
loop and do ... while loop can be reformed in to the while loop without
any difficulty.
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Next, we define the path generated from that abstraction language. We
focus on the function calling (method invocation) part of the language, and
we also assume the input to the Bu¨chi automaton is a list of method names
(identifiers), which means there’s a mapping between the logic predicate
and the function names. We assume that both branch of if statement are
covered, which means there should be no dead code in the if branch. The
path can later be extended to path with variables and data sensitivity.
Definition 2.4.2 (Function Path).
F ::=Identifier F | Nil
S, S’ ::=ifl F S
| ifr F S
| whl F S
| F
| S S ′
In order to obtain the paths, we define an auxiliary function J·K, which
maps the program code (either Statement, Expression or Method) to the
path S (also denoted as pi) defined above. By keeping the only type of
terminal symbols (method identifier), we get a set of paths as input for the
automaton.
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Definition 2.4.3 (Path Generating Function JP K =).
Method
{Identifier Nil} if P is Identifier()
{Identifier JE0K ...} if P is Identifier(E0, ...)
Expression
JMethodInvocationK if P is a MethodInvocationJE1K× JE2K if P is E1(&&, ...)E2
{Nil} if P is other Expressions
Statement
{ifl JEK JS1K; ifr JEK JS2K} if P is if (E) S1 else S2
{whl JEK JSK} if P is while (E) SJMethodInvocationK if P is MethodInvocation ;JE1K× JE2K if P is E1=E2 ;JS0K× JS1K× ... if P is {S0;S1; ...}
JS0K × JS1K is a path concatenation in the style of Cartesian product,
for example {p1; p2} × {p3} is {p1 p3; p2 p3}. It is easy to check that the
branching of path only happens in the if statement.
For the whl path node, we have to check all possible numbers of loops,
because there’s no way to determine the number of runs correctly in all
possible while statement without further analysis on the semantic level.
We prove in Theorem 2.4.1 that the maximum number for looping is bound
by the number of states in the automaton. So the {whl E S} paths set
becomes {E; E S E; E S E S E; E S E S E S E; ...} which repeats S E until
the number of states in the automaton Aϕ.
Theorem 2.4.1
For the unrolling of the {whl E S} statement, the maximum iterations is
the number of states in the automaton A.
Proof idea. This proof is based on the pigeon hole principle. First, we group
input within the whl statement as a single transition together, because when
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the program runs the while statement, all inputs are executed as a group.
Here we only consider the case that the automaton will not end up stuck
due to the input leading to no transition at all, otherwise the automaton
will surely not end up in an accepting state. From any state in A after the
total number of state transitions, there will be a state which has already
appeared in its previous transition. Therefore, any further unrolling will
have a same result shown with less number of unrolling.
After the unroll of the whl statement, all paths are branching and loop
free. The checking function takes in all the paths, and runs each of them
as an input to the Bu¨chi automaton. The result of this checking is true if
it ends in an accepting state otherwise false, unless the rejected path has
another path which is unfolded from the same loop that was accepted. This
means we are checking the existence of the correct path.
Theorem 2.4.2
The set of paths Π = JP K captures the abstraction program P ’s all method
calls (identifier).
Proof. This can be proved by induction on the program P . Because the
method calls will only appear in Method according to the grammar, and
all Method is captured by J·K, all method calls (identifiers) are captured in
the paths Π = JP K.
2.4.2 Properties
There are several abstraction levels: from the implementation source code to
the abstraction language program, from the abstraction language program
to the class path. The correctness and termination of the abstraction from
the implementation language to the abstraction language heavily depends
on the code scanner tool that is used, and more is discussed in Section 2.5.2.
The second part of the abstraction is discussed here, and some theorems
for termination and abstraction of this checking method are presented.
Theorem 2.4.3 (Termination of Path Generation)
The checking of an automaton A will terminate with generated path pi as
input.
Proof. The idea of the proof is that, trees of the program execution path
are at most finite branching with if statement, but (possibly) with infinite
depth through while loop. Theorem 2.4.1 has proved the infinite depth
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in while loop can be unrolled into finite paths without losing any trace of
checking the program paths. Thus the total number of paths for the input
will be finite, and all these paths are finite, which means the checking is
actually the finite input for an automaton, then leads to the termination.
Definition 2.4.4 (Path Acceptance). A path pi is accepted by the automa-
ton if and only if at least one of the path’s unrolled (by unrolling whl loop)
paths is accepted by the automaton.
Theorem 2.4.4 (Abstraction Theorem)
If the specification policy ϕ is followed in program P up to the abstraction
level, i.e. only function calls are considered, then paths generated from
program P are accepted by the automaton Aϕ.
Proof. The idea of the proof is that, all possible execution paths of the
program are checked if they follow the policy ϕ. The only difference between
the execution paths and the abstract paths is the whl loop, which is checked
for existence based on Theorem 2.4.1. If the ϕ is followed in the source code
up to the function call level, then path pi generated by JK should accepted
by L(ϕ). Then by theorem 2.3.2, we have pi is also accepted in Aϕ.
Theorem 2.4.4 shows that our abstraction is TI abstraction [62]. We
would like to remark that our techniques works for any TI abstraction,
which means, that more information the generated paths contain, the more
precise the analysis will.
2.5 Application
2.5.1 Source Code Analyzer
The typical way the source code analyzers may be used for static analysis
consists of the following steps. The source code is first translated into an
abstract model, which is optimized for further analysis. During this trans-
lation, the code scanner tool generates an abstract model from the source
code. In the traditional setting of a source code analyzer, like Coverity,
some security policies are predefined, and users can use the checker to an-
alyze the software, for example via pattern matching, to these predefined
behaviors in the source code. For example, after a resource is required,
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there should always be a release happening for this resource after it’s re-
quired. If a hazardous behavior pattern shows up in the source code, such
as the release of a resource never happens, the analyzer will generate some
error or warning messaging.
These patterns predefined in the analyzer are also called non-functional
properties, which means software systems should generally should follow
these guidelines to avoid some common mistakes in software engineering.
These patterns and checks includes inputs handling, buffer overflow, error
and exception handling, and so on. For the purpose of our evidence flow
analysis, we focus on the functional properties. The functional properties
are system specific, such as the properties defined in the system specifica-
tion. With different code scanning tools, multiple programming languages
are supported, which means our application is not restricted to one single
programming language.
After specifying the properties, the problem now lies in the building
of the model. The abstraction level of the model heavily influences the
complexity and the result of the checking. We use a very high level of ab-
straction, function calls only, for the modeling as shown above. When the
abstract syntax tree is built, the execution path of the implementation is
also provided as the traversal from root to end nodes. This opens opportu-
nities to design and create our own checker on top of many off the shelf code
and functionalities. The paths can be very helpful to check some system
properties. In this chapter, we use the Coverity analyzer to generate the
needed input for us.
2.5.2 Coverity
We conduct our test with the SDK extension from Coverity, and use the
LTL2BA [61] tool to generate the Bu¨chi automaton from LTL properties.
The syntax of the automaton is in PROMELA, a modeling language intro-
duced by Gerard J. Holzmann in SPIN [74]. We build the automaton from
the PROMELA file, as shown in Section 2.6.1, in Coverity SDK (Version
7.7.0), and checking the properties by feeding the paths as input.
There are two possible ways to run the model checking, one is the orig-
inal property, and the other is the negation. Though, the negation one can
sometime be faster and terminate earlier than checking the original formula
directly. For simplicity reason, we show the original one as example.
The evidence flow as we discussed is closely related to taint analysis.
Taint analysis usually does the following: it tracks a sensitive data and
28 Chapter 2. Analyzing Implementations of Election Technologies
runs the data flow analysis to see if the tainted data ends up in a hazardous
state. Some related actions can be defined for the evidence, including define
the source (starting point of the evidence) and the sink (end point of the
evidence), add the pass through action (passing the evidence to another
function or variable) and the cleanse action (after which, the data is con-
sidered non sensitive). These actions can be mapped to the function call
handling, for example, the source can be defined as the message receive
action, and the sink can be the signature or error send back action. The
pass through action can be seen as the variable containing the sensitive
data (e.g. a ballot) passing to another variable (e.g. ballot signature). We
have not obtained the license to use Coverity’s taint analysis, therefore we
had to cut corner and to implement our method with the idea from taint
analysis.
Coverity’s code scanning is based on the abstract syntax tree, and its
store based checking and type based checking. The abstraction from the
source code to the abstract language, and further the path are also imple-
mented in Coverity SDK. The store based checking is path sensitive, but can
not expend between different function calls. However, the type based check-
ing can be used to propagate function calls path by flatten some functions.
Each path in the abstract syntax tree is considered as an input path for
the automaton for the property checking. The auxiliary function discussed
in Section 2.4.1 is implemented in Coverity SDK. In the implementation,
we extract the path by pattern matching function calls, also check if they
are in loops or not. All loops will be unrolled in the end according to the
number of states in the automaton generated from the property.
2.5.3 Practical Considerations
We make use of Coverity for getting the abstract path from the Java source
code for vVote, but there are several problems needed to be handled. The
Coverity SDK provides a path sensitive way to extract function paths and
a set pattern matching functions to retrieve the method names. But when
we want to get a complete execution path, instead of a single path in one
function, we will need to flatten some of the function calls to its execution
path by replacing the function call with the set of paths that function
contains.
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Flatten out method calls
We flatten the method call up to the level that the function name is also
used as a predicate, and set a maximum number for unnecessary flattening.
For unique declaration, this should not be any problem, but for the case
with method override and abstract method, this is more complicated. The
flatten method is based on the type of the function, and the type information
is generated from the type based checking in Coverity, which generates the
parent class and methods of each method. We used Coverity to generate
the necessary type information, and flatten the functions with the help of
the type information from the functions.
Multi Threads
Our method does not cover the multi thread case, which means that the
interaction between threads will not be captured automatically. So we
handle each thread manually with hard coded checking information, such
as checking the “run” method in the related thread. More detail is given in
the Victoria example in Section 2.6.2.
2.6 Case Study
2.6.1 A Simple Example
Actions have some dependency on each other in a temporal order, and we
show here how it can be expressed in LTL and then checked. We present a
property, as a simple example, that is close to the Victorian case study in
Section 2.6.2.
Example 2.6.1. Formula ϕ = (checkV ote → ♦sendConfirm) means
whenever a check vote action happened, a confirmation should be send
back. Formula ψ = (sendConfirm → checkV ote), means whenever
a confirmation is sent, there should be a check vote that happened before.
We provide details of checking ϕ, and the formula ψ can be checked using
the converse method discussed in Section 2.3.
First, formula ϕ will be translated into a Bu¨chi Automaton Aϕ as shown
in Figure 2.1. There are two states, ”init” state and ”1” state, where both
the initial and the accepting state is the ”init” state. The transition labels
are the predicate names, and ”1” in the label matches any predicate names.
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”!checkVote” means any predicate but checkVote, and a || b is used used
to match either a or b.
Figure 2.1: Bu¨chi Automaton Example
The LTL2BA generated Bu¨chi automaton code in PROMELA is shown
as following.
never { /* G ( checkVote -> F sendConfirm ) */
accept_init : /* init */
if
:: (! checkVote) || (sendConfirm) -> goto accept_init
:: (1) -> goto T0_S2
fi;
T0_S2 : /* 1 */
if
:: (1) -> goto T0_S2
:: (sendConfirm) -> goto accept_init
fi;
}
Next, we take a piece of code as an example for the property checking.
Example 2.6.2. A simple piece of code
checkVote ();
sendConfirm ();
checkVote ();
while (a_boolean_value) {
sendConfirm ();
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}
The function names F = checkVote | sendConfirm | checkVote
After applying J·K to the code above, the returned path is {checkVote,
sendConfirm, checkVote, (whl Nil sendConfirm)}.
The input for Bu¨chi Automaton Aϕ is the set of path {checkVote,
sendConfirm, checkVote; checkVote, sendConfirm, checkVote,
sendConfirm; checkVote, sendConfirm, checkVote, sendConfirm,
sendConfirm} by unrolling the whl statement up to two times, and the
decoration symbol whl and the empty symbol Nil will be gone after the
unrolling.
The second and the third path of the input set end in the ”init”’ state,
which is the accepting state, thus the policy is followed. In contrast, paths
from the following code will not be accepted, thus the property is not fol-
lowed. Because all paths end up in the non-accepting state ”1” after the
unrolling.
checkVote ();
while (a_boolean_value) {
sendConfirm ();
checkVote ();
}
2.6.2 State of Victoria
The Australian state of Victoria used a variant of the Preˆt a` Voter [31, 45]
cryptographic voting protocol for the 2014 state election. There are many
components involved in the system, such as the POD which prints the empty
ballot, EBM (also called EVM) which helps voter to vote, public bulletin
board which publishes information for receipt checking, and private bulletin
board (WBB) which acts as the server and is in charge of coordinating the
ballot generating, ballot casting and receipt generating.
We take the private Bulletin board’s ballot receiving process as a case
study. WBB contains multiple peers. Communication between peers is
considered internal, and communication between a WBB peer and EBM is
external. All income and outcome packets for each WBB peer are treated
differently depends on the packet type, such as the “StartEVMMessage”
and the “VoteMessage”.
Figure 2.2 shows the diagram for handling the vote message from EBM
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Figure 2.2: EBM Message in WBB [44]
in a WBB peer. We can use the following formula to formulate this speci-
fication in Mode 1. Similarly, the specification in mode 2 can be defined.
1. (ReceiveV ote → ♦CheckSerialNo)
2. (CheckSerialNo → ♦(CreateSigSK1 ∨ CreateErrorSig))
3. ((CreateSigSK1 ∨ CreateErrorSig) → ♦StoreSiginDB)
4. (StoreSiginDB → (♦SendPeerSig ∧ ♦Sleep))
5. (Sleep → ♦(CheckNewShares))
6. (CheckNewShares → ♦(ReceiveThreshold∨SetCurrentShareF irst))
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7. ((SetCurrentShareF irst∨SetCurrentShareNext) → ♦(StoreShareinDB))
8. (StoreShareinDB → ♦(IsShareV alid))
9. (IsShareV alid → ♦(SetInvalidCount ∨ SetV alidCount))
10. ((SetInvalidCount ∨ SetV alidCount) → ♦CheckMoreShare)
11. (CheckMoreShare → ♦(SetCurrentShareNext∨ReceiveThreshold))
12. (ReceiveThreshold → ♦(TotalPeerNoReceive∨CombineShare))
13. (CombineShare → ♦StoreCombinedSig)
14. (StoreCombinedSig → ♦ReturnSigSK2)
15. (TotalPeerNoReceive → ♦(TimeOut ∨ ThresholdFailed))
16. (TimeOut → ♦(ThresholdFailed ∨ (♦Sleep ∧ ♦SendPeerSig)))
2.6.3 Test and Findings
We specified some of the flatten steps in our implementation to generate the
path in order to avoid unroll too many non-necessary overridden functions,
and then checked the aforementioned properties for EBM message. For
example, when “External Message” is received, for our checking purpose,
we take the “Vote Message”, a subclass of “External Message” to flatten
the method. The type of the message is run-time dependent, it checks the
incoming external message from the ballot marking machine, and parses the
message in JSON format, in which the type field of the message is included.
The whole procedure contains the following three threads: the external
message receive thread, the message process thread, and the timeout thread.
Method “WBBExternalPeerThread.run()” is in the external message
thread, in which method “TimeoutManager.addDefaultTimeout(Runnable
task)” is used in the external peer thread to handle timeout, and the method
“SerialExecutor.execute(Runnable r)” is used to process the message in
message process thread.
The core process part is the message process thread, the external mes-
sage thread takes care of read in message, and validates the message. How-
ever these threads do not run independently, the external peer thread initi-
ates the timeout thread, and starts the process message before it ends. We
concentrate the flattened run() function in these three threads, and then
unfold them to check if the design specification is followed.
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We managed to construct execution traces based on the unique unman-
gled name of the method and some hard coded flattening of the functions.
It takes about 2.9 seconds to generate paths in WBB, which includes 88 java
files and 99 classes, and there are 1142 paths consider different functions
individually before flattening.
Here we give some examples of how property checking is conducted.
In the design, it is required that before any processing of the message,
the message itself should be validated first. The following property states
that every message should be validated before it gets processed.
(preProcessMessage → performV alidation)
We check the formula through its converse, which is
(preProcessMessage → ♦performV alidation)
, with a reversed order of the paths in class WBBExternalPeerThread
One challenging for tracking evidence flow by function calls is that not
all steps for the evidence go through the function calls. This means not all
formulas described in the previous subsection are able to map into func-
tion call representation. For example, the ”TotalPeerNoReceive” predicate
won’t appear in the path, because it is represented by a return value from
checking the threshold.
Here, we provide a list of mapping examples between the function names
in the source code and the predicate in the formulas in Table 2.1.
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Predicate Function Name
ReceiveVote parseMessage
CheckSerialNo performValidation
CreateSigSK1 createInternalSignature
StoreSiginDB storeIncomingMessage
SendPeerSig sendToAllPeers
ReceiveThreshold checkThreshold
TimeOut checkAndSetTimeOut
Sleep sleep
ThresholdFailed canOrHaveReachedConsensus
TotalPeerNoReceived canOrHaveReachedConsensus
CombineShare constructResponseAndSign
Table 2.1: Function Names and Predicates
We describe here two policies that are violated.
1. (TimeOut → ♦(ThresholdFailed ∨ (♦Sleep ∧ ♦SendPeerSig)))
2. (ReceiveThreshold → ♦(TotalPeerNoReceive∨CombineShare))
The first formula states that, when timeout is checked, it either send
the signatures again to other peers and goes to sleep for a while, or goes to
the threshold failed state. In our test, this policy is not followed, because
the timeout thread directly goes to send the error back in the source code
instead of checking the threshold once the time is out. By looking back
at the design, we also notice that there is a problem in the design. The
design forms a possibly infinite loop with checking the threshold count after
time is out, then it goes back to timeout again if the total number of
peer’s signature is not received. Meanwhile in the code, timeout checker
terminates the loop when time is out. The related path of these actions are
marked as dotted red in Figure 2.2.
The second policy above is also not followed, because the message pro-
cess thread ends directly after checking the threshold. The implementation
handled this in a listener, which processes the peer’s signature share mes-
sage separately. This violation is caused by the difference between the
actual implementation and the design specification.
We remark that, because the source code uses try...catch block to
capture exception all the time, there are plenty of exit points before they
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continue with the route shown in Figure 2.2, which also leads to other
difference between the design and the implementation.
Chapter 3
Epistemic Policies for Voting
Systems1
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 provides a method to verify property in a static way on source
code. This chapter, we turn our attention to property verification based on
log checking.
In modern voting systems, disputes regarding claims that something
went wrong during an election are usually settled by inspecting logs, as
these are often the only persistent records of the events that occurred dur-
ing operation. Typical challenges include that a vote was not properly
counted, that it was changed by and adversary, that the election com-
mission permitted voters to vote multiple times, or that the secrecy of a
vote was compromised. Voter-verifiable systems provide additional mecha-
nisms to allow voters to check if his or her vote was cast-as-intended and/or
counted-as-cast also rely on logs when it comes to settling claims, for ex-
ample, that a server was compromised or when a software “glitch” caused
a system to fail.
One way to cope with this challenge is to formulate in a precise man-
ner what a “valid” log should look like by describing its properties in a
mathematical concise way. These descriptions are generally referred to as
security policies. In this chapter, we study the role of security policies for
electronic voting systems, and describe a tool that we developed to analyze
them automatically.
1Joint work with Daniel Gustafsson and Carsten Schu¨rmann
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Most security policy languages are based on logic. Early examples
include the Chinese wall security policy [27], security policies in deontic
logic [21], and the logic-based security language Binder [50], but there are
many others. Security policy languages are usually tailored to their appli-
cation domains. There are languages that capture time and time-outs [13],
access control [60], and aggregation [12].
This chapter presents a model-checker for the epistemic first-order tem-
poral logic (EFOTL) to express security protocols for distributed and com-
municating systems. EFOTL is an extension of first-order linear time tem-
poral logic with an epistemic connective representing knowledge for specific
agents. The hallmark characteristic of EFOTL is a set of modal connectives,
also called knowledge modalities, that allow us to express epistemic security
policies in terms of what each agent knows. Every node in a distributed
system, for example servers, client computers, printers, can be considered
agents and by using the different knowledge modalities, we can express
security policies that involve several agents, concisely and succinctly.
When we try to express global security policies in First-Order temporal
logic, we need to do this via user-defined predicates, such as knows(a, P )
that capture that an agent a (for example, representing a voter, a database,
a printer) knows P . Although this is possible, it tends to lead to complex
and convoluted security policies that are difficult to maintain.
The combination of epistemic and temporal features of EFOTL allows us
to formulate a large class of important policies for voting systems. Examples
of such epistemic security policies include the authentication between two
or more principals, commitments to shared-secrets between agents, checks if
threshold were reached before decision were made, and protocol conforming
communication patterns. Every send instruction initiated by one agent
must be matched by a receive instruction of another agent. Ballot papers
must be created, stored, retrieved, completed, and submitted or audited,
and all events must happen in a particular order.
As case study, we derive epistemic security policies for the Victoria 2014
state election, Australia and analyze the log files that were given to us.2
Only few voters were permitted to use the machines (voters with disabili-
ties, or voters living in the UK) in this election, and only 1121 ballots were
cast during the election. For other reasons, the logs that we were given were
from a handful of polling stations and contained data for even fewer (24)
votes. Despite these small numbers, the technology scales reasonably well.
2Access to the log data courtesy of Craig Burton, Victorian Election Commission.
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We have scaled our experiments to much larger, automatically generated
logs (for several thousands of votes). The findings, when this model-checker
is applied to the logs that were generate by the vVote system during the
Victoria 2014 state election and the possible logs for Norwegian 2013 par-
liamentary election, is also reported.
The knowledge modalities of EFOTL allow us to express security policies
for an entire system, while referring to local knowledge (logs) of each agent.
Each agent may run multiple sessions of the same protocol, for example,
for the purpose of authentication, voting, cleansing, and mixing. In a slight
deviation from the standard semantics, we identify worlds with sessions.
The information about which world a log entry is associated with is usually
contained within a log, as our case study shows, and can be easily derived.
For the purpose of this chapter we therefore assume that every log entry
can be uniquely identified as belonging to a particular session.
Especially for voting systems, where the same protocol is executed over
and over again, each log may contain repeated sequences of the similar
events. In order to exploit the symmetries between different runs of the
same protocol, we will show in this chapter that it is sound to reason about
equivalent sessions, i.e. sessions that cannot be further distinguished by
inspecting the log. For example, consider two agents Alice and Bob and
two instances of the same protocol. Alice and Bob exchanges a sequence of
messages. If Bob, by inspecting his own log (for the two sessions) cannot
distinguish between the messages sent to Alice, he may not identify the
two sessions explicitly. Alice on the other hand may have logged more
information and thus can identify the two sessions. Therefore in EFOTL
reachability relations are indexed by agents, which supports reasoning about
sessions modulo reachability.
This chapter describes a language for expressing security policies about
different agents and their local logs and a a reachable world semantics,
that allows us to identity similar sessions, which is described in Section 3.2,
a model-checker for checking epistemic security policies described in Sec-
tion 3.3, and a technique for turning logs into models, which is described
in Section 3.4. Furthermore, we describe a case study using the logs from
the Victory 2014 State Election in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6, we show
a possible way to include the metric part, which allows us to express se-
curity policies using real time constraints, for example if a certain event
happened before, during, or after a certain time interval. Finally, we assess
conclusions and describe future work in Section 3.7.
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3.2 A Language for System Properties
EFOTL extends first-order temporal logic by epistemic connectives indexed
by agents. An agent could refer to a particular participant in a commu-
nication, a principal, the name of a computer in a distributed system, or
possibly even just a process.
We denote agents by a, b, . . . and refer to the set of all agents as A =
{a, b, . . . }. For example, each node of the web bulletin board [46] that was
used during the Victoria State 2014 election is for this work is considered an
agent. We denote the time points by i, j, . . . and refer to the set of all time
points as I = {i, j, . . . }. Each entry in a log (that is usually time-stamped
when the entry was written) corresponds to a time point relative to the other
log entries and their time points. Several log entries may be generated by
one single protocol run (session). Examples of such sessions include requests
to a bulletin board to store a receipt. In this work, we identify sessions with
modal worlds. Worlds are denoted by W = {w, v, . . . }. In Section 3.4 we
return to the interpretation of worlds as sessions and explore this connection
in detail.
The term algebra of EFOTL is finite and generated from variables V :=
{x0, x1, ...} and uninterpreted constants C. We may therefore refer to the
set of terms as T := {t0, t1, ...tn}. We write P := {P0, P1, ...} for the set of
predicates. These predicates are given a priori, and can, for example, be
extracted from the log to be checked. To refer to the arity of a predicate
Pn, we write |Pn|.
Definition 3.2.1 (Syntax of EFOTL).
ϕ, ψ ::= true | Pn(t1, ..., t|Pn|) | ¬ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ∃x. ϕ |
 ϕ | #ϕ | ϕ S ψ | ϕ U ψ | Kaϕ
In this work, we assume that time is linear and not branching. We
identify each entry in the log with a world, a time point and a agent. The set
of well-formed formulas that we will use to express security policies below,
contain the finite set of predicates Pn(t1, ..., t|Pn|) (including propositions
which are 0-ary predicates) and are closed under negation, conjunction, and
existential operators as well as linear time operators such as  ϕ and #ϕ,
which states that ϕ holds at the previous or next time point, respectively.
Furthermore the set is closed under ϕ S ψ and ϕ U ψ, which express that ϕ
holds since ψ and ϕ holds until ψ holds, respectively. Finally, we close the
set of well formed-formulas also under the epistemic operator Kaϕ (to be
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read as a knows ϕ), which allows us to specify security policies that include
multiple agents, and multiple local logs.
We say that a formula ϕ is closed if all terms in the predicates from ϕ are
either constants or bound by the existential operator, following standard
convention. Below, we will make extensive use of the following connectives
defined as syntactic sugar.
Definition 3.2.2 (Syntactic sugar in EFOTL).
ϕ ∨ ψ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) ϕ→ ψ ≡ (¬ϕ) ∨ ψ
∀x.ϕ ≡ ¬∃x.¬ϕ ♦ϕ ≡ true U ϕ
ϕ ≡ true S ϕ ϕ ≡ ¬(♦¬ϕ)
ϕ ≡ ¬(¬ϕ)
The connectives ∨, → and  (always in the future),  (always in the
past), ♦ (eventually in the future),  (eventually in the past) and the
quantifier ∀ are defined in a standard classical way.
We begin now with the description of the semantics of EFOTL using a
Kripke structure with a possible world model. A Kripke structure is defined
as M = (W,D, µ, (Ra)a∈A), where D is the domain, each Ra ⊂ W ×W
describe the reachability relation on worlds that belongs to agent a. Recall
that different agents may have different views on the worlds.
We write µ for the standard interpretation of predicates that associates
with each possible world w, time point i, and agent a, a set of instances:
µ(w, i, a). For convenience, we use Mi(w,a)(P ) for µ(w, i, a)(P ). Analo-
gously, we capture variable binding by an valuation function ν : V → D,
which we extends straightforward to terms as ν : T → D. Terms ti are
mapped to a corresponding element in the domain.
Next, we define temporal structures indexed by time point i for world w
as (M, ν, w, i). Based on this, we can now define the relation |=, where
(M, ν, w, i) |=a ϕ reads as ”From agent a’s view, ϕ is true or satisfied, in
world w at time point i of structure M”. We use M |=a ϕ to represent
(M, ν, w, i) |=a ϕ for all possible ν, w and i, and (M, w) |=a ϕ to represent
(M, ν, w, i) |=a ϕ for all possible ν and i.
Definition 3.2.3 (Semantics of EFOTL). The meaning of formula ϕ is
defined as (M, ν, w, i) |=a ϕ in Figure 3.1.
The semantics of the first-order logic fragment for connectives ¬, ∧ and ∃
is standard. The cases for the temporal connectives are also standard. Note,
how # (next) and  (past) affect the time point i by moving forwards and
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(M, ν, w, i) |=a true iff TRUE
(M, ν, w, i) |=a P (t1, ..., t|P |) iff (ν(t1), ..., ν(t|P |)) ∈ Mi(w,a)(P )
(M, ν, w, i) |=a ¬ ϕ iff (M, ν, w, i) 6|=a ϕ
(M, ν, w, i) |=a ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M, ν, w, i) |=a ϕ and
(M, ν, w, i) |=a ψ
(M, ν, w, i) |=a ∃x. ϕ iff for some d ∈ D, (M, ν[x :=
d], w, i) |=a ϕ
(M, ν, w, i) |=a  ϕ iff (M, ν, w, i− 1) |=a ϕ
(M, ν, w, i) |=a #ϕ iff (M, ν, w, i+ 1) |=a ϕ
(M, ν, w, i) |=a ϕ S ψ iff for some j ≤ i (M, ν, w, j) |=a
ψ, and for all k ∈ [j + 1, i + 1)
(M, ν, w, k) |=a ϕ
(M, ν, w, i) |=a ϕ U ψ iff for some j ≥ i (M, ν, w, j) |=a ψ,
and for all k ∈ [i, j) (M, ν, w, k) |=a
ϕ
(M, ν, w, i) |=a Kb(ϕ) iff for all w′ ∈ W, s.t. (w, w′) ∈ Ra,
(M, ν, w′, i) |=b ϕ
Figure 3.1: Semantics of EFOTL
backwards in time, respectively. As to the semantics for the until-connective
U and since-connective S, it can literally be read as that ϕ needs to be valid
until ψ is valid at j, or that ϕ is valid since Ψ was valid at j, respectively.
Finally, the semantics of the epistemic connective Kb(ϕ) is defined based
on the possible word semantics. In order to define the meaning of this
formula relative to agent a and world w, it is checked in terms of the meaning
of ϕ relative to b and every world reachable from w according to a. This
semantics is designed due to the strong connection between the worlds and
the agents in logs, which are defined with respect to the truth local to an
agent instead of the standard global one. This design allows us to pinpoint
problems when a policy fails to check, and to optimize the checking process
as shown in Theorem 3.2.2 below.
Depending on the properties of the family of reachability relation (Ra)a∈A
we can classify EFOTL as model logic S4 if the each relation is reflexive
and transitive, and as S5, if each relation is an equivalence relation, i.e., it
is also symmetric. We summarize this observation as a theorem:
Theorem 3.2.1
For all formulas ϕ and ψ, all structures M and all agents a, b, where each
accessible world relation is an equivalence relation.
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1. The distribution property. M |=b (Ka(ϕ) ∧ Ka(ϕ→ ψ))→ Ka(ϕ)
2. The knowledge generalization rule. If M |=a ϕ then M |=b Ka(ϕ)
3. The knowledge of truth property. M |=a Ka(ϕ)→ ϕ
4. The positive introspection property. M |=b Ka(ϕ)→ Kb(Ka(ϕ))
5. The negative introspection property. M |=b ¬Ka(ϕ)→ Kb(¬Ka(ϕ))
Proof. (of Theorem 3.2.1)
1. If (M, w) |=b Ka(ϕ) ∧ Ka(ϕ → ψ), then for all worlds w′ such that
(w,w′) ∈ Rb, we have both (M, w′) |=a ϕ and (M, w′) |=a ϕ→ ψ,
from which we get (M, w′) |=a ϕ. Thus for all w′ such that (w,w′) ∈
Rb, (M, w′) |=a ψ, therefore (M, w) |=b Ka(ψ).
2. If (M, w) |=a ϕ for all worlds w in W, then for all world w and all w′
such that (w,w′) ∈ Rb, we have (M, w′) |=a ϕ, thus (M, w) |=b Ka(ϕ)
for all worlds w.
3. Suppose that (M, w) |=a Ka(ϕ). Because (w,w) ∈ Ra for Ra is re-
flexive, we have (M, w) |=a ϕ.
4. Suppose that (M, w) |=b Ka(ϕ). Consider any w′ such that (w,w′) ∈
Rb, for all w
′′ with (w′, w′′) ∈ Rb, we have (w,w′′) ∈ Rb since Rb is
transitive, thus (M, w′′) |=a ϕ, therefore we have (M, w′) |=b Ka(ϕ).
By the definition of |=, we have (M, w) |=b Kb(Ka(ϕ))
5. Suppose that (M, w) |=b ¬Ka(ϕ), then exits w′, such that (w,w′) ∈
Rb and (M, w′) |=a ¬ϕ. For all w′′ such that (w,w′′) ∈ Rb, we
have (w′′, w′) ∈ Rb since Rb is transitive and symmetric, which means
for all w′′ such that (w,w′′) ∈ Rb, (M, w′′) |=b ¬Ka(ϕ). Therefore
(M, w) |=b Kb(¬Ka(ϕ)).
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From now on, we only consider reachability relations that are indeed
equivalence relations. Thus, for our practical purposes, EFOTL is a modal
logic S5.
We construct the equivalence relations (w,w′) ∈ Ra if for all time point
i, predicate P , µ(w, i, a)(P ) = µ(w′, i, a)(P ). By only considering this
equivalence relations, we save time by avoiding redudant checking, since
the following theorem permits us to exploit these symmetries during model-
checking.
Theorem 3.2.2 (Symmetry)
For all formula ϕ, if the accessible world relation is an equivalence rela-
tion created as above, then for all agent a and for all (w,w′) ∈ Ra, then
(M, ν, w, i) |=a ϕ iff (M, ν, w′, i) |=a ϕ.
Proof idea. (of Theorem 3.2.2) Since Ra is symmetric we need to only prove
the if direction which we do by induction on the formula. We demonstrate
below only the cases which involves worlds here:
If ϕ = P (t1, ..., t|P |), then the implication holds by definition of Ra.
If ϕ = Kb(ψ), then for all world w1 such that (w,w1) ∈ Ra then (M, ν, w1, i) |=b
ϕ. We need to show that for all worlds w2 such that (w
′, w2) ∈ Ra then
(M, ν, w2, i) |=b ϕ. Since Ra is transitive we therefore have (w,w2) ∈ Ra
and we are done.
Agents and terms define distinct syntactic categories. Sometimes, it is
useful to be able to refer to agents in predicates, for example to express
that a message was send to or received from a particular agent. In order to
do so, we denote with paq the constant in C that corresponds to agent a.
p·q is injective.
Example 3.2.1 (Channel Reliability). As our first example, consider a
binary communicating systems, with agents a and b. The first property
that we wish to discuss is channel reliability. Every message sent by a will
eventually be received by b.
 ∀m. Ka(send(pbq,m))→ ♦Kb(receive(paq,m))
We comment briefly on the choice of predicates. The formula
Ka(send(pbq,m)) is true if and only if send(pbq,m) appears in a’s log. This
means that in the case of send, the first argument refers to the receiver, and
in the case of receive to the sender. In both cases, the second argument
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refers to the message itself. Without epistemic connectives, send and receive
would have to be designed as tertiary connectives, by respectively adding
sender and receiver explicitly. With epistemic connectives, as it is the case
in this example, they may remain implicit.
Example 3.2.2 (Channel Authentication). This example is very similar
to the previous one. It is the inverse to channel reliability: Any message
received by a, must previously have been send by b.
 ∀m. Ka(receive(pbq,m))→ Kb(send(paq,m))
Extended examples and case studies may require that safety policies
quantify of over agents. Our logic currently does not support this, but we
believe that it could be easily extended. We leave an extended design to
future work.
Example 3.2.3 (Sequentiality). The final example expresses a security
policy, which states that no session may overlap. Any session that was
started must run to completion before another can be started. The following
EFOTL captures this:
∀id.∀id′.start(id)→ ¬start(id′) U end(id)
Note, that this policy, for example, prevents deadlocks, because only one
session may run at a time.
It may be possible to strengthen EFOTL further, for example, by adding
support for uninterpreted function symbols, higher-order quantification,
and quantification over worlds. In the interest of brevity and elegance, how-
ever, we describe in this chapter only the basic version of EFOTL, which
is sufficiently powerful to capture interesting security policies that we wish
to express about distributed and communicating systems.
3.3 Finite Model Checking
In the setting of voting systems, logs are always finite, and hence we will
restrict our attention in this section to finite models only. A consequence is
that model checking is decidable, which means that we can always decide
if a formula is satisfied in a given model or not.
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Definition 3.3.1 (Finite Models). A model M = (W, D, µ, (Ra)a∈A) is
finite iff W and D are finite sets and there exists a time point i such that
for all j > i or j < 0, agent a, world w and predicate symbol P then
Mj(w,a)(P ) = ∅.
Next, we begin the discussion of some basic insights that will help us
define the model checking Algorithm 3.2. Let us return briefly to the se-
mantics of EFOTL. To check if a model satisfies a security policy means
to unroll the equivalences described in Figure 3.1, until done. This is all
straightforward, except for the two temporal connectives such as U and
S where we will have to guess the correct j. In order to aid with this
choice, we compute an upper and a lower constant point, or a window if
you wish, outside of which the security policy expressed as formula ϕ will
have a constant truth-value. The lower constant point is denoted by bϕ cM
and the upper constant point by dϕ eM.
Definition 3.3.2 (Lower (Upper) constant point). Let ϕ be a formula and
M be a model then n is a lower (an upper) constant point for ϕ inM if forall
i ≤ n (forall i ≥ n) then (M, ν, w, n) |=a ϕ if and only if (M, ν, w, i) |=a ϕ.
Definition 3.3.3 (Bounds). Let M be a finite model, ϕ a formula. We
construct a lower and an upper constant points as defined below, where
bP cM refers to the earliest time point when P was mentioned in the µ-
component of M, and dP eM is the last.
Formula ϕ bϕ cM dϕ eM
True 0 0
P (t1, ..., tn) bP cM − 1 dP eM + 1
¬ϕ bϕ cM dϕ eM
ϕ ∧ ψ bϕ cM unionsq bψ cM dϕ eM u dψ eM
∃x.ϕ bϕ cM dϕ eM ϕ bϕ cM + 1 dϕ eM + 1#ϕ bϕ cM − 1 dϕ eM − 1
ψ S ϕ bϕ cM dϕ eM u dψ eM
ψ U ϕ bϕ cM unionsq bψ cM dϕ eM
Ka(ϕ) bϕ cM dϕ eM
We will use these constant points as upper/lower bounds, when checking
a model. They are not tight, but they do the job of limiting the search for
j. If we were to take also agents and worlds into consideration, we could
achieve much better bounds. This would improve the performance of our
model checker, but would lead to a much more unwieldy Definition 3.3.3.
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We now prove that these functions indeed will compute a lower and an
upper constant point. In order to to be more concise we only write the time
point for the Kripke semantic.
Theorem 3.3.1
LetM be a finite model, and ϕ be a formula then bϕ cM is a lower constant
point for ϕ in M.
Proof. (of Theorem 3.3.1) By induction on ϕ, we only demonstrate the
case for ϕ U ψ, the remaining cases follow in a similar fashion. Let n =
bϕ cM unionsq bψ cM and assume k ≤ n we need to show that k |= ϕ U ψ iff
n |= ϕ U ψ. In the if direction, by the semantics of k |= ϕ U ψ, there exists
an j ≥ k such that j |= ψ and the interval [k, j) |= ϕ. For this j, either
j ≥ n in which case n |= ϕ U ψ as we want, or j < n in which case by
induction hypothesis on ψ we have bψ cM |= ψ and because n ≤ bψ cM
we get n |= ψ and we are done. The only if direction follows in a similar
fashion.
Theorem 3.3.2
LetM be a finite model, and ϕ be a formula then dϕ eM is an upper constant
point for ϕ in M.
Proof idea. By induction on ϕ, this proof is symmetric to the proof of The-
orem 3.3.1 .
We now present our algorithm in Figure 3.2 for checking finite models,
and prove some properties of this algorithm. This algorithm follows closely
the definition of the semantics from Figure 3.1, and is given as a lazy func-
tional program. Observe, how we use dψ eM and bψ cM in the cases for
checking ϕ U ψ and ϕ S ψ to guarantee termination of the algorithm. The
algorithm uses auxiliary functions like isElem and mu. x ‘isElem‘ xs is
used for checking if x is an member of the set xs, and mu m i w a p is used
to compute Mi(w,a)(P ) defined in the semantics.
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check :: Formula → Model → Nu → World → Time → Agent →
Bool
check f m nu w i a = case f of
Truth → True
-- nu: valuation function ,
--mu: get interpretation of predicates
Prop p ts → apply nu ts ‘isElem ‘ mu m i w a p
Not p → not (check p m nu w i a)
And p q → check p m nu w i a && check q m nu w i a
Exists x p → or [ check p m (extend nu x d) w i a
| d ← domain m]
Previous p → check p m nu w (i - 1) a
Next p → check p m nu w (i + 1) a
-- lcp: get lower constant point
Since p q → check q m nu w i a
|| (i > (lcp m q) && check p m nu w i a
&& check (Since p q) m nu w (i - 1) a)
-- ucp: get upper constant point
Until p q → check q m nu w i a
|| (i < (ucp m q) && check p m nu w i a
&& check (Until p q) m nu w (i + 1) a)
-- rel m a w: get the relation for agent a from world w
Knows k p → and [ check p m nu w’ i k | w’ ←
rel m a w]
Figure 3.2: Model Checking Algorithm
Next, we show the partial correctness of the checking algorithm in Fig-
ure 3.2 in Theorem 3.3.3.
Theorem 3.3.3 (Partial correctness of Model Checking)
1. If check ϕM ν w i a = True then (M, ν, w, i) |=a ϕ.
2. If check ϕM ν w i a = False then (M, ν, w, i) 6|=a ϕ.
Proof. (of Theorem 3.3.3) check differs from the Kripke semantics in Fig. 3.1
only in the case for U and S. In the case of ϕ1 U ϕ2 we check every possible
time point until dϕ2 eM. If ϕ2 don’t become true until then it will never
be true and we can conclude that ϕ1 U ϕ2 will not hold. A symmetric
argument is made for S.
3.3. Finite Model Checking 49
Total correctness of the algorithm in Figure 3.2 is provided by proving
that it will terminate.
Theorem 3.3.4 (Termination of Model Checking)
Let ϕ be a formula and M be a finite model then check ϕM ν w i a will
terminate.
Proof. (of Theorem 3.3.4) In the case of ∃x.ϕ1 we are recursing on a sub-
formula, and we know that the domain D is finite. The case for Ka(ϕ′)
is similar, and here we know that W is finite. The remaining cases either
returns immediately or recurse on the subformula, with the exception of S
and U . In the case of ϕ1 U ϕ2 the distance between the current time point i
and dϕ2 eM will decrease until i > dϕ2 eM. If this point is reached the algo-
rithm immediately returns. The case for S follows a similar argument.
This establishes that model checking in finite models is decidable, and we
will now address the complexity of algorithm in Figure 3.2. The complexity
of the algorithm is shown in Theorem 3.3.5.
Theorem 3.3.5 (Complexity for Model Checking)
Let ϕ be a formula and M be a finite Kripke model. Given the world w,
time point i, and agent a, the decision problem for (M, ν, w, i) |=a ϕ is in
O(|M||ϕ|). The size of the model |M| is |W|+ |D|+ j, where j is the time
point where no predicate are no longer true.
Proof. (of Theorem 3.3.5))
We show this by showing that the Algorithm 3.2 have this complexity,
which is done by induction on the structure of ϕ.
• P (c1, ..., c|P |) :, this is a set contain problem, and it requires polyno-
mial time respecting to size of structure.
• ¬ϕ1 :, this is a constant time with respect to checking ϕ1.
• ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 :, this is constant to the complexity of checking ϕ1 and ϕ2.
• ∃x. ϕ1 :, this is enumerating elements from the domain, and as such
|M| · |M ||ϕ1| ≤ |M ||ϕ1|+1.
• ϕ1 S ϕ2 and ϕ1 U ϕ2 : the worse case is that the number of iterations
needed are the length of the whole model which is bounded by j which
leads to the following time |M|(|M ||ϕ1| + |M ||ϕ2|) ≤ |M||ϕ1|+|ϕ2|+1.
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• Kbϕ′ : the worse case is to enumerate all worlds, in which case we
have |M| · |M||ϕ′| ≤ |M||ϕ′|+1.
3.4 Checking Logs
Next, we focus on how to transform logs into Kripke structures that can
be subsequently be checked using Algorithm 3.2. This is an important step
for the whole log checking procedure. This is not always easy, as it may
be unclear who to assign events to sessions, and the clocks of the different
agents may not always be synchronized properly. In the first part of the
section, we assume an ideal world, and sketch the steps involved. In the
second, we comment on our specific experiences doing so for checking the
logs of the 2014 Victoria state election in Australia. Throughout this section
we assume that we are given a set of EFOTL signatures, which include the
predicate, the agent. However, the worlds are created during the model
generation.
3.4.1 Model Generation
Let us assume that we are given the logs generated by all the agents that
participated in a distributed system. For simplicity, we assume here that the
local clocks of each agent are properly synchronized, for example, accessing
a time server, and that all log events are appropriately time stamped. We
also assume the events log entries are recorded in plain text. The tasks that
we need to execute to reconstruct a Kripke structure are as follows:
• Translate the plain text into pairs of EFOTL predicates and worlds.
• Partition the logs according to the world.
• Map real time into discrete time points that are understood by EFOTL.
• Update the reachability relation according symmetries among ses-
sions.
Translation: For the first step, we consider the log from one agent, and
treat other agent’s log the same way. We then iterate through the log and
translate each entry event into an EFOTL predicate by retrieving a suitable
predicate name, and generating a vector of arguments from the domain D.
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Agent names a will be translated to the corresponding domain element paq
as shown in Example 3.2.2. Then we translate the information in a entry
event that identifies the session, in which this particular event was a part,
in into a world. Such information could be a session identifier or the serial
number of particular ballot. The worlds are global for all logs across the
multiple agents after the translation.
Partition: As a next step, we partition each log for each of the agents
into sets of events that belong to the same world according to the translation
world identifier. Such as a log contains information from several sessions,
the identifier can be the session id. After this step is complete, we can
identify all events that participated in one session, as they share the same
world.
Mapping: Next, we can create a total order of all events from all agents
in one session, because we assume that they are time-stamped. We assign
time points starting with 0 in order to each event. These are the time points
for the model. We call this mapping process synchronization.
Symmetry: Finally, we update the reachability relation for each agent a
and each worlds in the following way. Initially, each world denotes one ses-
sion. We identify two worlds in the reachability relation Ra, if the sequence
of log events for both worlds is equivalent for agent a. This way, we make
symmetries for the model checker explicit, who can use this information to
optimize search.
After completion of these four steps, we have all the ingrediants to cre-
ate a Kripke structure for checking our epistemic security policies (see Sec-
tion 3.2): The Kripke model M = (W,D, µ, (Ra)a∈A) can now be defined.
The worlds W are defined to be the collection of all sessions, D the set of
all constants that appear in any log, including elements denoting agents.
The mapping is defined µ(i, w, a)(P ) as the set of predicate P that are
true for agent a, at time point i in world w. Making the symmetry step
from above more precise, the family of relations (Ra)a∈A is defined so each
relation is an equivalence relation in the following way: (w,w′) ∈ Ra iff
∀iP.µ(i, w, a)(P ) = µ(i, w′, a)(P ).
We illustrate this process using two examples.
Example 3.4.1. An event of the form “@ 2014-10-02-13:00, session 15.
Message m sent to principal a” will be translated into “2014-10-02-13:00
(send (m, a), 15)”. D must be chosen to contain elements denoting message
m and agent a. “send” is a predicate symbol.
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Time Log from a
13:00:00 (send(pBq,M), 1)
13:00:02 (send(pBq,M ′), 2)
13:00:03 (send(pBq,M), 3)
Time Log from b
13:00:01 (receive(pAq,M), 1)
13:00:04 (receive(pAq,M ′), 2)
13:00:05 (receive(pAq,M), 3)
Figure 3.3: Log Sample of three sessions
Time Point World [1] , World[3] World [2]
Log A Log B Log A Log B
0 send(pBq,M) send(pBq,M ′)
1 receive(pAq,M) receive(pAq,M ′)
Figure 3.4: Result of synchronisation of Log Sample Figure 3.3
Example 3.4.2. As a concrete example we return to Example 3.2.1 and
consider two hypothetical logs depicted in Figure 3.3 generated during three
sessions. Each entry of the contains a pair of an EFOTL predicate and the
corresponding session (world). The two agents talking to one another are a
and b. The setting is such that whenever a sends a message, b will receive
it. In the log shown in Figure 3.3, we write directly the predicates send and
receive. Figure 3.4 gives an account for how this information is represented
in the Kripke structure. Note, that by symmetries, session 1 and 3 form an
equivalence class modulo reachability, whereas 2 remains the only element
in the equivalence class generated by 2.
One special thing here is that Ra and Rb are the same here just because
their local view of world 1 and world 3 are equivalent, however, if at 13:00:05
b receives M ′′ instead of M then pair (World 1, World 3) is still in Ra but
not in Rb.
3.4.2 Empirical Observations
We now describe our solution to various practical challanges that arose when
trying to reconstruct the Kripke structure from the logs for the Victoria
2014 state election.
Translation: We could parse logs line by line, as originally intended.
Network errors, printer warning etc. left many multi-line warning together
with Java traces in the logs. These exceptions are harmless though form a
parsing point of view, as we simply skipped them.
We associate each relevant log entry with a predicate, consisting of a
predicate symbol and an array of arguments, i.e. constants in D. In the
logs, events are usually represented as large serialized JSON objects, which
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Election #Agents #Worlds Time
Norway Election 2 1000 92sec
Victoria State Election 7 17 1.4sec
Figure 3.5: Experiments
means that we needed to formulate and execute complex filter operations
to access the information relevant for our model.
Partition: One of our main challenges was to identify sessions. Most log
entries, but regrettably not all, provide the serial number of the ballot the
event should be associated with. If the serial number exists, we use it as
world, if not, we extrapolate a suitable world from contextual information,
for example, which was the last serial number seen. This heuristics is very
crude, and could be easily improved upon by logging more information.
3.5 Examples of Policy Checking
In this section we demonstrate the usefulness of EFOTL and illustrate its
expressiveness by describing a set of epistemic security policies for both,
the Norwegian 2013 parliamentary and Victoria 2014 state election. Fur-
thermore, we report on the results of checking the security policies using a
prototype implementation of Algorithm 3.2 in Haskell [81]. As input to the
model construction, we used in the Victoria case the logs that were given by
the Victorian Election Commission, which amounted to 24 ballots. Since
we did not have access to the Norwegian logs, we synthesized sample logs
for about 1500 ballots, a third of which accounts for double votes. We used
those as input to our model-checker.
Below we describe the two case studies in detail. We state the stage, and
background and setup of each election system and derive epistemic security
policies. Our findings are reported in Figure 3.5.
3.5.1 Norwegian Electronic Voting
Background: Norway offered in 2013 internet voting as a supplement to
traditional pen-and paper based voting. 75000 internet ballots were cast.
As we did not have access to the logs, we decided to rebuild part of the
infrastructure in our lab and focus on the vote collector that is the server
that collects all incoming encrypted votes and the cleanser, i.e. the server
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that removes double votes. Note, that in a Norwegian election the incoming
encrypted votes carry identifiying information, as voters may vote several
times. Only the last vote counts.
Time Vote Collector Server (V) Cleanser (C)
@ 13:00 (Ballot(1001), 1)
@ 13:02 (Ballot(1002), 1)
@ 13:04 (Ballot(1003), 2)
@ 13:05 (Ballot(1004), 1)
@ 13:06 (Ballot(1006), 2)
@ 14:00 (Read(1001), 1)
@ 14:01 (Read(1002), 1)
@ 14:03 (Read(1003), 2)
@ 14:04 (Read(1004), 1)
@ 14:05 (Read(1006), 2)
@ 14:07 (Reject(1001), 1)
@ 14:08 (Reject(1002), 1)
@ 14:09 (Reject(1003), 2)
@ 14:11 (Accept(1004), 1)
@ 14:12 (Accept(1006), 2)
Time point Voter 1 Voter 2
Vote (V) Cleanser (C) Vote (V) Cleanser (C)
0 Ballot(1001) Ballot(1003)
1 Ballot(1002) Ballot(1006)
2 Ballot(1004) Read(1003)
3 Read(1001) Read(1006)
4 Read(1002) Reject(1003)
5 Read(1004) Accept(1006)
6 Reject(1001)
7 Reject(1002)
8 Accept(1004)
Figure 3.6: Log Sample for Cleanser and Vote Collector Server before and
after synchonisation in Norwegian election.
An example of a log that we analyzed can be found in Figure 3.6. We
define the following predicates for reconstructing log events. Note, that
each log event is a pair, where the second component represents the voter,
which is, in EFOTL, a world.
• (Ballot(id), v) is an event that may occur in the log of the vote collec-
tor. It testifies that a ballot was received from voter v with a unique
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ballot id number id. For simplicity, we omit the ciphertext repre-
senting the encrypted vote, as our security policies do not mention
it.
• (Read(id), v) is an event that may occur in the cleanser’s log and
testifies that a ballot with id cast by voter v was read.
• (Accept(id), v) is an event that this is the ballot that will count as
v’s ballot. It also means taht it will be forwarded to the mixer and
eventually to the final counting, components, that we have not but
could model in our system.
• In contrast, (Reject(id), v) is the log entry that says that this ballot
(from voter v) was discarded.
In this case study, there are only two agents, the vote collector V and
the cleanser C. Each voter forms a world. As each ballot has its unique
identification number, the logs will not exhibit any exploitable symmetries.
As a consequence, each (Ra)a∈{V,C} will only consists of singelton pairs
{(v, v)|v voter}. The result of synchronisation can be found in Figure 3.6.
Epistemic Security Policies: The first policy that we describe here is
that vote collector and the cleanser agree on which ballots actually exist.
This property is expressed by two forumulas that relate Ballot events in
the log of the vote collector server V and the Read events in the log of the
cleanser C. The first policy states that each ballot must be read by the
cleanser. The second formula states the converse namely that every ballot
in the cleanser needs to be in vote collector server.
∀ id. (KV (Ballot(id))→ ♦KC(Read(id)))
∀ id. (KC(Read(id))→ KV (Ballot(id)))
Furthermore since the order of ballots matters, we wish to make sure
that the ordering of any two ballots is preserved between V and C.
∀ id, id′. (KV (Ballot(id) ∧ ♦Ballot(id′))
→ ♦KC(Read(id) ∧ ♦Read(id′)))
The remaining policies focus on the cleanser, and establish a relation
between the predicates Reject and Accept on the one side and Read on the
other. For example, every read ballot must either be accepted or rejected
later.
∀ id. KC(Read(id)→ ♦(Accept(id) ∨ Reject(id)))
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A ballot should not both be rejected and accepted.
∀ id. KC(Accept(id)→ (¬Reject(id) ∧ ¬♦Reject(id)))
The next policy expresses the only the lastw vote castshould be accepted
accepted. The policy requires therefore require that all earlier ballots from
the same voter must be rejected. Here we use the # modality to make sure
we are not counting the same ballot twice.
∀ id, id′. KC((Read(id) ∧#♦Read(id′))→ ♦Reject(id))
Finally, the last policy guarantees that for every voter who voted, at
least one ballot is accepted.
∀ id. KC(Read(id)→ ♦∃ id′.Accept(id′))
Summary: Not surprisingly, our experiments showed that no violations
of this set of epistemic security policy were found.
3.5.2 Victoria Sate (Australia) Electronic Voting
The Australian state of Victoria used a variant of the Preˆt a` Voter [31, 45]
cryptographic voting protocol for the 2014 state election. The implemen-
tation is called vVote, which uses a centralized logging framework slf4j.
While in operation, the system generated detailed logs of the import ac-
tions during the election. In this section we describe our case study, where
we develop epistemic security policies and checked the logs for violations.
Background: The Victoria State voting system has the following main
components: web bulletin board (private and public ones), print-on-demand
printer, randomness generation server, electronic ballot maker, etc. The
reliability of this system depends on a threshold signature scheme, which
allows a subset of the private bulletin board peers above a particular thresh-
old to jointly generate signatures for certain message. Voting in this system
has three core procedures, ballot generation, printing ballot on demand and
vote casting. All of these procedures are implemented in a distributed way
and rely on the interact of the different components of vVote. The logs
that we evalute were generated by the private bulletin board peers (MBB),
print-on-demand printer (VPS) and the electronic ballot maker (EVM).
Before the election, VPS generates empty ballots with the help of ran-
domness servers. Each ballot contains a permuted candidate list. The
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process of casting a vote is as follows: The voter enters a polling sta-
tion, registers, and receives the permuted candidate list before entering
the booth. In the booth he or she uses the list to authenticate to the EVM,
casts the vote (or alternatively audits the ballot). Upon casting the vote,
the voter receives a receipt with his preferences listed in the same order
as the permuted candidate list. He or she can check that both match up.
As the candidate list is required to be shredded after the voting, the re-
ceipt provides evidence that a vote was cast, but it does not reveal to vote
preferences.
When a voter begins the vote casting process in the voting booth, a
pre-generated ballot is authenticated by MBB and a message recExt of
type “pod” is logged in MBB’s log and a signed response (sendRes) is then
sent back to VPS. This is shown in Figure 3.7. Once the signatures of four
out of five MBB peers are validated, the VPS logs that the threshold of
reporting peers was met (meThld()) and it prints out the ballot for the
voter.
After the voter obtains the ballot, the voter can decide whether to run
a confirmation checking (audit), which ensures the ballot is well-formed,
or to cast a vote with this ballot(vote). The audit is done by VPS and
reveals the randomness used for permuting the candidates and proves its
correctness to MBB with a message of type “audit”. If the voter decides
to audit the ballot, he or she may not use it for voting but must instead
request a new ballot. A ballot is cast with the help of EVM, and the casting
process consists of a start EVM message (with message of type “startevm”)
and a vote message (with message of type “vote”). The predicates used are
the following:
• sendM (ty): the client sends a message to all MBB peers with a ballot
of type ty.
• recExt(ty): MBB peer receives from a client a message with ballot of
type ty.
• sendRes(): MBB peer sends response with its signature back to the
client who sent the external message to it.
• validSig(pprq): The client validates the signature received from MBB
peer pr.
• recRes(pprq, ty): The client receives the response from peer pr for
ballot of type ty.
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Time point VPS MBB peer1
0 @ 13:52:36,308 sendM (94,pod)
1 @ 13:52:40,063 recExt(94,pod)
... (Internal Message)
2 @ 13:52:46,759 sendRes()
3 @ 13:52:46,762 recRes(94, ppeer1q,pod)
... (Other peers’ Message)
4 @ 13:52:48,393 validSig(ppeer1q)
5 @ 13:52:48,396 validSig(ppeer5q)
6 @ 13:52:48,398 validSig(ppeer3q)
7 @ 13:52:48,401 validSig(ppeer4q)
8 @ 13:52:48,402 metThld()
Figure 3.7: Logs from VPS, MBB
• metThld(): The threshold of responses received and signature vali-
dated is met.
Epistemic Security Policies: Without loss of generality, we specify our
epistemic secruity policies only for MBB peer1. The policies for the other
peers are similar, and we check them as well. In this case study, we choose
ballot serial numbers to represent worlds. Each such serial number is
unique. Wheras the agents are VPS (V ), EVM (E) and the five MBB
peers (named: peer1 (P1), peer2 (P2), ..., peer5 (P5)). The first policy we
show is that when a peer i receives an external messages, they must have
been originated from either from VPS or EVM.
∀ ty. KPi(recExt(ty))→
(KV (sendM (ty)) ∨ KE(sendM (ty)))
The second policy that we check is that the threshold is only met if it is
proceeded by at least four (out of five) valid signature checks from different
peers. Formally we check that at least one of the five possible scenarios are
satisfied which is what the formula ϕ does.
Let ψ(ps) =
∧
p∈ps validSig(p)
Let peers = {ppeer1q, ppeer2q, ppeer3q, ppeer4q, ppeer5q}
Let ϕ = metThld()→ ∨p∈peers ψ(peers \ {p})
We check this policy, ϕ, for every client, i.e for both VPS and EVM.
KV (ϕ) ∧ KE(ϕ)
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Third, we check that if a client validates a response from a peer, it
should have first received a response from that peer. Since this should hold
for every client we define this as formula ϕ′ as before.
Let ϕ′ = ∀ pr. validSig(pr)→ (∃ ty. recRes(pr, ty))
We check this policy, ϕ′, for every client VPS and EVM in a way similar
as before.
KV (ϕ′) ∧ KE(ϕ′)
Finally, we define two security policy to check two error conditions. The
first expresses that any ballot that was audited on peer i, it should not be
used later for voting. If such a case occurs EVM should have logged ”error”.
KPi(recExt(”audit”) ∧ ♦recExt(”startevm”))
→ KE(♦∃ pr.recRes(pr, ”error”))
The second being that a voter cannot reuse a ballot, which will also
incur a logged error message by EVM.
KE((sendM (”startevm”) ∧ #♦sendM (”startevm”))
→ ♦∃ pr.recRes(pr, ”error”))
Summary We have used the EFOTL checker to check all policies on 17
ballots. Because synchronization failed on some of the logs, we excluded
them and hence 7 ballots from our analysis. One of the ballots that we
inspected was audited. The result is summarized in Figure 3.5 after the
synchronization of peer clocks.
We remark that synchronizing clocks in a distributed environments is
challenging. We observe that not all agents synchronized their clocks. As
shown in the following example, it is a severe problem for logging. In one
session, one agent sends a message to another and logs it at 09:46:15, and the
recipient receives the message and logs this event with time stamp 10:45:37.
However, the response is logged to have been sent at 10:45:44 and the
response is recorded as received at 09:46:25, which shows a clear difference
of clocks due to the time zone or other causes. For log checking purpose,
we offset the clients time manually to compensate for the difference.
There are two reasons for this synchronization problem. In a distributed
system live vvote, time stamps shows the order of events, but the peers of
the system are not proper set with the correct time.
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The first reason is that the clock of all standalone servers are not prop-
erly set and the time zone are not correctly logged, which means the clock
is not accurate and the logs missed the time zone information. The second
reason is the logged event time is not the exactly time of this event, and this
is caused by the time difference between logging and event execution. The
first problem is easy to fix using methods network time protocol and log-
ging time zone properly. The second problem can be fixed via logging two
entries of the event, one before the execution and one after the execution
of the event, and this gives a range of time for the logging checking.
3.6 Metric EFOTL
We continue the work of EFOTL with an extension of the metric prop-
erty [13] for temporal operators. EFOTL with the metric extension is named
as epistemic metric first-order temporal logic (EMFOTL) in the following
chapters. The logs from Victoria election is further analyzed as a case study
for this extension.
3.6.1
The metric property reasons about a real time interval. For the temporal
part of EMFOTL, we use I to refer to a time interval. More explicitly,
a time interval is defined as I = [n1, n2), where n1 and n2 are real time
clocks, and n2 is a clock greater than n1 or +∞. I represents a set {i | n1 ≤
i and i < n2}.
Definition 3.6.1 (Syntax of extended EMFOTL).
ϕ, ψ ::= Pn(t1, ..., t|Pn|) | ¬ ϕ | ϕ ∧ ψ | ∃x. ϕ |
 Iϕ | #Iϕ | ϕ SI ψ | ϕ UI ψ | Ka(ϕ)
As in EFOTL, we also use a Kripke structure with a possible world
model to describe the semantics of EMFOTL. A Kripke structure is defined
as M = (W,D, µ, τ, (Ra)a∈A), where D is the domain, each Ra ⊂W×W
describe the reachability relation on worlds that belongs to agent a. Recall
that different agents may have different and possibly incompatible views on
world.
The semantics of EMFOTL for non-temporal part of EMFOTL is the
same as we defined before, while the temporal part requires another func-
tion. The model is extended by introducing a function τ that maps current
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(M, ν, τ, w, i) |=a  Iϕ iff (M, ν, τ, w, i− 1) |=a ϕ,
and τwi − τwi−1 ∈ I
(M, ν, τ, w, i) |=a #Iϕ iff (M, ν, τ, w, i+ 1) |=a ϕ,
and τwi+1 − τwi ∈ I
(M, ν, τ, w, i) |=a ϕ SI ψ iff for some j ≤ i, (M, ν, τ, w, j) |=a ψ
and τwi − τwj ∈ I,
and for all k ∈ [j + 1, i+ 1)
(M, ν, τ, w, k) |=a ϕ
(M, ν, τ, w, i) |=a ϕ UI ψ iff for some j ≥ i (M, ν, τ, w, j) |=a ψ
and τwj − τwi ∈ I,
and for all k ∈ [i, j)
(M, ν, τ, w, k) |=a ϕ
Figure 3.8: Semantics of EFOTL
world (w)’s time point (i) into a real time value τwi . Time stamps of all
agents are synchronized when constructed the model, so τ is agent inde-
pendent.
There are two ways to look at the temporal operators without metric
interval, one is consider it a different operator, and the other is set the
interval to be [0,+∞). Here we use the second option, and omit the [0,+∞)
when used in formula.
A formula ϕ is bounded if all occurrences of U[n1,n2) in ϕ, n2 is not
infinity.
Definition 3.6.2 (Semantics of EMFOTL). The meaning of formula ϕ is
defined as (M, ν, τ, w, i) |=a ϕ in Figure 3.8.
3.6.2 Finite Model Checking
Definition 3.6.3 (finite models). A model M = (W, D, µ, τ, (Ra)a∈A)
is finite iff W and D are finite sets and there exists a time point i such
that for all j > i or j < 0, agent a, world w and predicate symbol P then
Mj(w,a)(P ) = ∅.
The world relation now changes to (w,w′) ∈ Ra if for all time point i,
predicate P , µ(w, i, a)(P ) = µ(w′, i, a)(P ) and τ(w, i) = τ(w, i).
The finite models are defined similarly as for EFOTL, however, the
constant point does not apply for EMFOTL structure due to the introducing
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of time intervals. Because the time interval constrain is satisfied differently,
when time point index moves.
So instead of using the constant point for boundary point checking, we
here simply define the checking out of boundary exception, because there’s
no time point defined out side the boundary. Whenever the time point out
of the finite model are accessed, the checking algorithm will return Unkown.
This will have some side effects as when true is checked out the scope the
algorithm will still return Unkown.
3.6.3 Checking Logs
In the Australian voting system technical report [45], there’s a requirement
states that the printed empty ballot can only be used within 5 minutes after
printed. We are now able to express this policy with the metric extension.
Here shows two formulas that expresses the policy.
KP (SendRes() ∧ ♦[300,+∞)RecExt(”startevm”)→ ¬♦[300,+∞)RecExt(”vote”))
This formalization means if the “startevm” is received by the peer 300
seconds after the ballot is confirmed by the peer, then it can not be used
by EVM for casting a vote.
KP (RecExt(”vote”)→ (RecExt(”startevm”) ∧ ♦[0,300)SendRes()))
This formalization states if a vote is cast, then there must be a “startevm”
for checking the ballot signature and the “startevm” is no later than 300
seconds after the ballot is confirmed by the peer.
When our prototype checking tool is tested, a violation of the 5 minutes
police is found in the log entry, in which a ballot generated at ”11:08:28”
was cast at ”11:14:09”. The cause of this problem can be the time syn-
chronization problem discussed in the EFOTL Victoria case stuty part in
Section 3.5.2.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we describe how to verify security policies of distributed
systems by inspecting the content of logs of different agents. We describe
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the logic EFOTL as a security policy language and discuss its properties.
EFOTL is an extension of first-order linear-time temporal logic that allows
us to express security policies that refer explicitly to the local knowledge
(aka. logs) of agents using epistemic connectives. We describe a model
checker algorithm that we applied to checking various epistemic security
policies of voting systems. Furthermore we describe a procedure for ex-
tracting Kripke structures from logs. As a case study, we showed how to
formulate some policies for the Norwegian system, and we also apply our
tools to the logs that were generated during the Victoria 2014 state elec-
tion. Several epistemic security policies are given and checked. In the end,
a brief discussion of adding metric time into EFOTL is discussed.
The underlying possible world semantics allows us to identify sessions
with worlds. This means, that references to session and time may remain
implicit, which leads to elegant formulations of security policies.

Chapter 4
Verifying Voting Schemes1
4.1 Introduction
The goal of any social choice function is to compute an “optimal” choice
from a given set of preferences. Voting schemes in elections are a prime
example of such choice functions as they compute a seat distribution from
a set of preferences recorded on ballots. By voting scheme we refer to the
method for counting ballots and computing who won – as opposed to an
actual computer implementation of such a scheme or a scheme describ-
ing the process of casting votes via computer. The difficulty in designing
preferential voting schemes is that the optimisation criteria are not only
multi-dimensional, but multi-dimensional on more than one level. On one
level, we want to satisfy each voter, so each voter is a dimension. On a
higher level, there are desirable global criteria such as “majority rule” and
“minority protection” that are at least partly inconsistent with each other.
It is well-known that “optimising” such theoretical voting schemes along
one dimension may cause them to become “sub-optimal” along another.
This observation is not new and voting specialists have proposed a series
of mathematical criteria [26] that can be used to compare various voting
schemes with one another. A classic example is the notion of a Condorcet
winner, defined as the candidate who wins against each other candidate
in a one-on-one contest. Such a winner exists provided that there is no
cycle in the one-to-one contest relation. A voting scheme is said to satisfy
the Condorcet criterion if the Condorcet winner is guaranteed to be elected
when such a winner exists. Another is the monotonicity criterion which
1Based on “Verifying Voting Schemes” [19], joint work with Bernhard Beckert,
Rajeev Gore´, Carsten Schu¨rmann and Thorsten Bormer, published in JISA 2014
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requires that a candidate who wins a contest will also win if the ballots
were changed uniformly to rank that candidate higher.
In practice, theoretical voting schemes are often simplified in many ways
when used in real-world elections, typically to reduce their complexity to
allow counting by hand. Such practical schemes may not satisfy general
properties such as the Condorcet criterion simply because it is intractable to
compute the Condorcet winner by hand, but they may satisfy some weaker
version of “optimality” that is specific to that particular scheme. It may
even happen that one among the optimal winners is chosen at random [25]
(as allowed by the Australian Capital Territory’s Hare-Clark Method) or
that someone other than the optimal winner is elected.
Voting schemes also evolve over time – for national elections in the
large, and local elections, union elections, share holder elections, and board
of trustee elections in the small. Incremental changes to the electoral sys-
tem, the tallying process and the related algorithms challenge the common
understanding about what the voting scheme actually does. For example,
since 1969 some local elections in New Zealand adopted Meeks’ method [72],
which is a voting scheme for preferential voting that uses fractional weight-
ings in its computations and is too complex to count by hand. This also
required an adjustment of understanding about who will now be elected.
In general, it is often not clear whether changes to the electoral system
improve or worsen the overall quality of a voting scheme with regard to the
various dimensions of optimisation. Changes to the electoral system in Ger-
many, for example, have created paradoxical situations where more votes
for a party translate into fewer seats and fewer votes into more seats, and
have prompted Germany’s Supreme Court to intervene at several occasions
(see, e.g., [32]).
Many jurisdictions around the world are now using computers to count
ballots according to traditional voting schemes. Using computers to count
ballots opens up the possibility to use voting schemes which really are op-
timised along multiple dimensions, while retaining global desiderata such
as the Condorcet criterion. The inherent complexity of counting ballots ac-
cording to such schemes means that it may no longer be possible to “verify”
the result by hand-counting, even when the number of ballots is small. It
is therefore important to imbue these schemes with the trust accorded to
existing schemes. Note that our focus is on trust in the voting scheme, not
trust in the computer-based process for casting votes.
One way to engender trust in such complex yet “fairer” voting schemes
is to specify the desiderata when the scheme is being designed, and then for-
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mally check that the scheme meets these criteria before proposing changes
to the legislation to enact the scheme. Such formal analyses could con-
tribute significant unbiased information into the political discussions that
typically involve such legislative changes and also assure voters that the
changes will not create paradoxical situations as described above.
Formal analysis, however, is only practicable when we possess formal
specifications of the voting scheme. We argue that it is important to give
declarative specifications of the properties of a voting scheme for two rea-
sons: (1) For understanding their properties and how they change during
the evolution process, so that improving a scheme in one aspect does not
by accident introduce flaws with respect to other aspects. (2) For checking
the correctness of the scheme from both an algorithmic and implementation
perspective. We also argue that general criteria are not sufficient and crite-
ria are needed that are tailor-made for specific (classes of) voting schemes.
The properties in question are difficult to state, to formalise, to under-
stand, to analyse, and to describe declaratively (as opposed to algorithmi-
cally) because: the final voting scheme may have to compromise between the
conflicting demands of multiple individual desirable properties; the voting
scheme may evolve and we may have to revisit these desiderata; even when
the properties can be made mathematically precise, the resulting mathe-
matical statement cannot serve as a specification if the electoral law defines
a voting scheme that does not (always) compute the optimal solution.
In this chapter, we show that seemingly innocuous revisions to a voting
scheme can have serious implications on the desired properties of the sys-
tem and how analysis techniques employing Satisfiability Modulo Theories
(SMT) solvers [24] can be used to discover them. As a running example,
we use the preferential voting schemes single transferable vote (STV) that
is used in elections world-widely, such as the Victoria election in Australia,
but also for smaller professional elections.
In Section 4.3, we define two tailor-made criteria to establish the desired
properties of the voting scheme. Both criteria are formulated using first-
order logic and are amenable for bounded model checking with Z3, which is
the tool of choice for our formal analysis (Section 4.4). Besides the experi-
ments, we also discuss advantages and disadvantages of different verification
techniques. Subsequently, we discuss (Section 4.5) a particularly interest-
ing variant of the Single Transferrable Vote Algorithm (CADE-STV) for
the board of trustees of the International Conference on Automated De-
duction (CADE). We explain its oddities and differences to standard STV,
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and give a historical account of the conception and the stepwise refinement
of the algorithm.
4.2 Basic Definitions
The basic notions related to voting schemes are defined below.
Definition 4.2.1. (Voting scheme, ballot, ballot box, election result) Given
a non-empty set C of candidates, a voting scheme 〈B, T 〉 is characterized
by:
• a set B of possible ballots that can be cast by voters;
• a tallying function T assigning to each possible ballot box an elec-
tion result, where a ballot box is a (finite) multiset of ballots and an
election result is a (finite) duplicate-free sequence of candidates (the
elected candidates).
Given a non-empty set V of voters we assume that each voter casts
exactly one ballot in the election, allowing us to use the term voter and
ballot interchangeably when identifying specific voters and ballots.
According to our definition of a voting schemes (Definition 4.2.1), the
order of ballots in a ballot box is irrelevant and tallying functions are de-
terministic. Also, by definition, the order in which candidates are elected is
part of the election result. These assumptions hold for all voting schemes
considered in this chapter, but the results and methods presented in the
following apply as well to more general notions of voting schemes.
In this chapter, we focus on preferential voting schemes.
Definition 4.2.2. (Preferential voting scheme) In a preferential voting
scheme 〈B, T 〉, the possible ballots b ∈ B are partial linear orders on can-
didates.
A ballot for a preferential voting scheme orders candidates according to
the voter’s preference.
Suppose that C candidates, numbered 1, 2, . . . , C, are competing. Then,
we use the notation [c1, c2, . . . , ck] for a ballot that ranks a subset of the
candidates in decreasing order of preference, where ci ∈ {1, 2, . . . , C} and
ci 6= cj for i 6= j.
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4.3 Semantic Criteria for Analysing Voting
Schemes
We distinguish between general criteria that preferably each voting scheme
should satisfy and tailor-made criteria that distinguish between different
classes of schemes and capture the essence of particular classes. Both kinds
of criteria are important for the specification and analysis of voting schemes.
Below, we first describe a few important examples of general criteria
found in literature. We then give two examples for tailor-made criteria
applicable to the STV family of voting schemes.
4.3.1 General Criteria
Many general criteria that voting schemes preferably should satisfy have
been proposed (for an overview see [26]). Note that, even though these
basic criteria seem obvious and indispensable for voting schemes on first
sight, they are in fact not always satisfied by each reasonable voting scheme.
Most real-word voting schemes violate at least some basic criteria for some
possible ballot box input.
An “obvious” and widely used criterion is the majority criterion, which
states that, if a candidate c is ranked first by a majority of voters, then c
must be elected. This is indeed satisfied by all reasonable preferential voting
schemes that use votes ranking candidates. However, the majority criterion
can be violated by preferential voting schemes where voters can attach a
numerical preference to candidates instead of just ranking them (Borda
count scheme).
Another “obvious” criterion is the monotonicity criterion [115]. Assume
that there are two ballot boxes b and b′ where b′ results from b by raising the
preference for a candidate c in one or more of the votes and leaving the votes
otherwise unchanged (i.e., a vote of the form [c1, . . . , ci−1, c, ci+1, . . . , ck] is
replaced by [c1, . . . , cj−1, c, cj, . . . , ci−1, ci+1, . . . , ck] (j < i). The mono-
tonicity criterion states that, if c is elected using the ballot box b, then c
must also be elected using b′. Surprisingly, some real-world voting schemes
– including STV – do not satisfy monotonicity [115].
A third simple criterion is the fill-all-seats criterion, which states that
all available seats are filled provided that there are sufficiently many can-
didates, i.e., C ≥ S. In practice, this criterion is often used in a restricted
form, e.g., candidates can be elected only if they reach a certain minimal
quota.
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The majority criterion fully describes the election result for the simple
case of a single seat and a candidate with a majority of first preferences. But
we desire criteria characterising the “right” result in increasingly complex
situations.
An example is the Condorcet criterion. A candidate c is a Condorcet
winner if c wins a one-to-one comparison against all other candidates, i.e.,
for all c′ 6= c there are more voters preferring c over c′ than there are
voters preferring c′ over c. The Condorcet criterion states that a Condorcet
winner c must be elected if there is one. And, as long as there are open
seats and there are Condorcet winners among the remaining candidates,
these must also be elected.
The majority and the Condorcet criteria present each an example of
a conditional criterion. They apply to a ballot box only in the case the
given condition (e.g., the existence of a Condorcet winner in the Condorcet
Criterion) is satisfied; in this case attesting the property (e.g., a Condorcet
winner must be elected). Otherwise they hold trivially. This means, that
there are two degenerate cases of a conditional criterion: the first is when
the condition is never satisfied by a ballot box, in which case the crite-
rion will always hold, no matter which ballot boxes we apply it to. For
the second case, when the property of the criterion simply yields true, the
condition of the criterion becomes irrelevant and a similar observation ap-
plies. We therefore propose to analyze criteria according to coverage and
restrictiveness.
Coverage Should apply to as many different ballot boxes as possible.
Restrictiveness The number of possible election results for ballot boxes
to which the criterion applies should be as restricted as possible.
Returning to our criteria, we note that the majority and Condorcet criteria
are very restrictive (they specify exactly one winner), but they do not have
good coverage (they only apply if there is a clear winner). The fill-all-
seats criterion, on the other hand, has full coverage (it restricts the possible
outcome for all ballot boxes), but it is not very restrictive. But, even criteria
with poor coverage, such as the Condorcet criterion, provide important
insights into voting schemes: It is well known, for example, that STV (which
we use as a case study) does not satisfy the Condorcet criterion.
Ideally, one would like to characterise schemes by a criterion that allows
exactly one result for every possible ballot box, i.e., has full coverage and is
fully restrictive. But for many voting schemes used in practice, such criteria
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do not exist. In these cases, we rely on tailor-made criteria that strike a
compromise between coverage and restrictiveness.
In summary, voting schemes can be analyzed according to many differ-
ent criteria, some criteria are considered important others less important.
We remark, however, that no voting scheme exists that would satisfy all rea-
sonable general criteria simultaneously. In the case of preferential voting,
Arrow’s impossibility theorem [6] states that no scheme can be designed to
satisfy the three fairness criteria:
Unanimity. If all voters prefer candidate A over candidate B, then A is
ranked over B in the election result.
Independence of irrelevant options. If some voters change their ballot
but keep the relative position of candidates A and B in their bal-
lot, then the relative position of A and B remains unchanged in the
election result.
Non-dictatorship. There is no single voter whose preferences always pre-
vail in the election result.
4.3.2 Tailor-made Criteria for Preferential Voting
Schemes
As stated previously, many more voting scheme criteria have been developed
and are described in the literature. So, as a first approach to specifying and
analysing a particular voting scheme, one could select some of these to
characterise the scheme’s properties. For a detailed analysis, however, that
is not sufficient. General criteria cannot distinguish between variants of the
same voting scheme (or the number of available general criteria would have
to be very high).
For example, for our analysis of preferential voting, we have devised two
tailor-made criteria that capture the essence of preferential voting (Crite-
rion 2) with proportional representation (Criterion 1) and are applicable to
our case study STV:
(1) There must be enough votes for each elected candidate.
(2) If the preferences of all voters with respect to two particular candidates
are consistent, then that collective preference is not contradicted by
the election result.
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The first criterion only considers number of votes and ignores prefer-
ences, while the second criterion only considers preferences and ignores
number of votes. This separation of the two dimensions (number of votes
and preferences) is the key to finding strong criteria that can be described
declaratively.
The two criteria compromise in different ways on the two goals of gen-
erality and restrictiveness: Criterion 1 has full coverage. It applies to all
ballot-boxes without being too restrictive (as the order of preferences is
not considered). Criterion 2 has lower coverage. It only applies if the vot-
ers’ preferences are not contradictory. In that case, however, it is rather
restrictive as only a small number of election results are permissible.
Criterion 2 is a weaker version of the Condorcet criterion that, in con-
trast to Condorcet, is satisfied by STV. It assumes a preference to be col-
lective if all voters agree (or at least not disagree), while the Condorcet
criterion assumes a preference to be collective if it is supported by a ma-
jority of voters.
These two criteria may not cover all the desired properties that we ex-
pect to hold, however, they offer a good starting point for a formal analysis
of voting schemes, especially those based on STV. For additional properties
currently not covered, the two criteria may need to be refined accordingly.
4.3.3 Criterion 1: Enough Votes for each Elected
Candidate
One core element of any STV system is the transfer of surpluses from elected
to remaining candidates. Here, a surplus is defined by the number of votes
of the elected candidate above the required quota. We note, that in some
variants of STV, surplus votes are transfered as a whole, whereas other vari-
ants of STV transfer votes at a fractional value. To argue that a particular
transfer is sensible and justifiable, some regulations require that each ballot
can only be used once to elect a candidate marked on the ballot, which leads
us to the definition of the first criterion. It says, that the entire ballot box
can be partitioned into (disjoint) groups of (used) ballots such that each
elected candidate is supported by exactly one group.
Definition 4.3.1. (Criterion 1: Enough votes for each elected candidate)
Let 〈B, T 〉 be a preferential voting scheme (Def. 4.2.2). Let Q be the quota,
C the number of candidates, V the number of voters, and S the number of
seats.
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We define that 〈B, T 〉 satisfies Criterion 1 iff, for all ballot boxes
b = {|β1, . . . , βV|} with βi = [ci1, . . . , ciki ] ∈ B
and corresponding election results T (b) = [r1, . . . , rσ] (σ ≤ S is the number
of elected candidates), there is a partition
b = b1 ∪˙ . . . ∪˙ bσ ∪˙ brest
such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ σ, the following holds:
1. |bi| = Q (there are exactly Q votes in each class that supports an
elected candidate).
2. ri ∈ β for all β ∈ bi (each vote β in the class bi supports candidate ri,
i.e., the candidate occurs somewhere among the preferences of β).
Note, that here the actual order of preferences is not taken into consid-
eration.
Example 4.3.1. Assume there are four candidates A,B,C,D for two va-
cant seats, the votes to be counted are [A,B,D], [A,B,D], [A,B,D], [D,C], [C,D],
and the quota is Q = 2. The election result [A,D] satisfies Criterion 1 using
the partition {[A,B,D], [A,B,D]}, {[C,D], [D,C]}, {[A,B,D]}, where
the first group supports candidate A and the second supports candidate D.
Example 4.3.2. Criterion 1 does not capture election results exactly, it
over-approximates them: Since we ignore the order of preference markings,
the criterion may hold for unintended election results. The result [B,D]
is not a valid election result because it violates the majority criterion: A,
despite its majority of first preferences, is not elected. Nevertheless, it satis-
fies Criterion 1, by virtue of the same partition from the previous example,
because the first group also supports B as elected candidate.
Example 4.3.3. But, Criterion 1 also rules some election results as invalid.
The result [A,B], for example, which contradicts proportional representa-
tion, is not supported by this or any other partition (which shows that this
criterion is indeed related to the requirement of proportional representa-
tion).
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Formalisation To formalise the criteria, we use first-order logic over the
theories of natural numbers and arrays with the following notation in ad-
dition to the notation defined previously:
b: is a two-dimensional array representing the ballot box (b in Defini-
tion 4.3.1), where b[i, j] ∈ {1, . . . , C} represents the number cji of the
candidate that is ranked by vote i in the jth place. Thus, i’s prefer-
ence is [b[i, 1], b[i, 2], . . .]. If vote i ranks only k ≤ C candidates, then
b[i, j] = 0 for k < j ≤ C.
r: is an array representing the result T (b), where r[i] is the ith candidate
that is elected (1 ≤ i ≤ S). If less than S candidates are elected, then
r[i] = 0 for the empty seats.
Our criterion is formalised by a formula φ in which all the above (free)
variables occur. We also use an existentially quantified variable a of type
array that represents the partition and the assignment of classes in the
partition to elected candidates as follows:
a[i] = k if the ith vote supports the kth elected candidate r[k]. If the ith
vote does not support any elected candidate, then a[i] = 0. Using
this representation, a class bk (as introduced in Definition 4.3.1) can
be written as: bk = {βi | a[i] = k, 1 ≤ i ≤ V}; votes not supporting
any candidate are collected in brest = {βi | a[i] = 0}.
Then, the formula φ = ∃a(φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φ4) is the existentially quantified
conjunction:
∀i(1 ≤ i ≤ V→ 0 ≤ a[i] ≤ S) (φ1)
∀i(1 ≤ i ≤ V→ (a[i] 6= 0→ r[a[i]] 6= 0)) (φ2)
∀i((1 ≤ i ≤ V ∧ a[i] 6= 0)→ ∃j(1 ≤ j ≤ C ∧ b[i, j] = r[a[i]])) (φ3)
∀k((1 ≤ k ≤ S ∧ r[k] 6= 0)→
∃count(count [0] = 0 ∧
∀i(1 ≤ i ≤ V→ (a[i] = k → count [i] = count [i− 1] + 1) ∧
(a[i] 6= k → count [i] = count [i− 1])) ∧
count [V] = Q)
)
(φ4)
Formulas φ1 and φ2 express well-formedness of the partition. Formula φ3
expresses that only votes can support a candidate in which that candidate
is somewhere ranked. Formula φ4 expresses that each class supporting a
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particular elected candidate has exactly Q elements. To formalise this, we
use an array count such that count [i] is the number of supporters among
votes 1, . . . , i that support the kth elected candidate.
Note, that this criterion assumes all seats to be filled and has to be
relaxed if a voting scheme does not satisfy the fill-all-seats criterion or there
are not enough candidates that can reach the quota.
4.3.4 Criterion 2: Election Result Consistent with
Preferences
We also consider a second criterion that can be considered orthogonal to
Criterion 1. We check that the election result respects the preferences of
the majority, as stated in the following definition.
Definition 4.3.2. (Criterion 2: Election result consistent with preferences)
Given a ballot box b, let R =
⋃
b be the union of the partial linear orders
given by the votes β ∈ b, and let R+ be the transitive closure of R. Then,
there is an argument for ranking candidate c1 over c2 iff c1R
+c2.
We define Criterion 2 to hold for a preferential voting scheme 〈B, T 〉 iff,
for all ballot boxes b and for all candidates x, y, the following holds:
If there is an argument for ranking x over y but not for ranking
y over x then y must not be ranked higher than x in the election
result T (b).
Note that, in the above definition, R and R+ may not be order relations.
Formalisation That there is an argument for ranking x over y implies
that there is a sequence c of candidates such that x = c[0], . . . , c[k] = y
and there is a sequence of votes v[1], . . . , v[k] such that v[i] prefers c[i− 1]
over c[i] (1 ≤ i ≤ k).
We formalise that vote v[i] prefers candidate c1 over candidate c2 by:
φ(v, i, c1, c2) = ∃j(1 ≤ j ≤ C ∧ b[v[i], j] = c1 ∧
∀j′(1 ≤ j′ < j → b[v[i], j′] 6= c2))
The first line of the above formula says that voter v[i] gives the prefer-
ence j to candidate c1. The second line says that v does not give a higher
preference j′ < j to c2: i.e., gives c2 lower preference or no preference at all.
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Now, we can formalise that there is an argument for ranking x over y
by:
Φ(x, y) = ∃v∃c∃k(x = c[0] ∧ y = c[k] ∧
∀i(1 ≤ i ≤ k → (1 ≤ v[i] ≤ V ∧ 1 ≤ c[i] ≤ C ∧
φ(v, i, c[i− 1], c[i]))))
In a similar way as with φ, we can formalise the fact that the voting
result gives a higher ranking to candidate c1 than to candidate c2 as follows:
ψ(c1, c2) = ∃j(1 ≤ j ≤ S ∧ r[j] = c1 ∧
∀j′(1 ≤ j′ < j → r[j′] 6= c2))
Using the formulas Φ and ψ, the criterion can be formalised as follows:
∀x∀y((1 ≤ x ≤ C ∧ 1 ≤ y ≤ C ∧ x 6= y ∧ Φ(x, y) ∧ ¬Φ(y, x)) → ¬ψ(y, x))
4.4 Checking Properties Using SMT Solver
4.4.1 Overview: Different Approaches to
Verification with SMT Solvers
In this section we discuss a range of methods that employ Satisfiability
Modulo Theories (SMT) solvers for verifying that a voting scheme satis-
fies any of the aforementioned semantic criteria. Our motivation to chose
SMT solvers for this task is twofold: firstly, SMT solvers have evolved into
powerful reasoning tools that are successfully used in model checking and
software verification, and secondly, the theories supported by SMT solvers
allow us to express semantic criteria easily.
Modern SAT solvers are programs that efficiently decide the satisfiability
of a given set of formulas of classical propositional logic [53]. Although
this problem is NP-complete, modern SAT solvers can easily solve problem
instances with hundreds of propositional variables.
SMT solvers are SAT solvers that are extended by theories meaning
they provide domain-specific and highly optimised solvers for arithmetic,
arrays, uninterpreted functions, and so on. There are many SMT solvers
under active development, such as CVC, MathSAT5, Yices, Z3, etc. and
there are annual SMT solver competitions continuously driving the progress
regarding theoretical and engineering aspects of SMT solver technology.
Among all SMT solvers, Z3 has emerged as a powerful and comprehensive
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tool that is also practical in that it provides APIs for various programming
languages, for example Python. Z3’s support for first-order logic over the
theories of natural numbers and arrays is outstanding, which we applied to
formalize semantic criteria of voting systems. These are the main reasons
why we chose Z3 to conduct our experiments.
In the following, we first give an overview of the different ways to apply
SMT solvers for checking semantic criteria of voting schemes and present
experimental results for the applicability of one of these methods. We
address the question of how to represent semantic criteria in the input
language of Z3 (using Z3’s Python API) and demonstrate feasibility of
expressing common semantic criteria at several examples.
To choose a particular technology for the task of verification, we must
strike a balance between the ease of use of a particular tool and the quality
of the resulting proof. In general, it is not possible to combine both full
automation and a full verification, which would be the most desirable result.
Full verification is to provide a general correctness argument for arbi-
trary vote instances of any size. In order to achieve full verification using
SMT solvers, we first need to provide the solver with a logical representation
of the voting algorithm (the implementation of the voting scheme). These
representations can be derived using off-the-shelf methods, such as weakest
precondition generation [11]. As these tools usually cannot derive all loop
invariants automatically, they may have to be assisted by a manual, time
intensive, error-prone, and sometimes unsuccessful process (see Sec. 4.4.3).
If, however, the loop invariants are known, SMT solvers can be used to
discharge first-order proof obligations,
If we unroll loops in the voting algorithm to a specified finite bound, we
speak of bounded verification. The advantage over full verification is that,
as there are no loops left after unrolling, no manual assistance is required.
The disadvantage is that we provide a proof of correctness only for a subset
of vote instances.
Perhaps the most automatic but in general least precise method of veri-
fication is bounded model checking, which exhaustively checks properties for
finitely many concrete vote instance up to a certain size. While the scal-
ability of this method is restricted in general, its main strengths are that
it neither relies on explicit loop invariants nor weakest precondition gener-
ation. It is thus a good candidate for the initial examination of a voting
scheme.
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4.4.2 Bounded Model Checking
We examine voting schemes for their semantic criteria by exhaustively test-
ing voting instances using a bounded model checker. That is, we exhaus-
tively run the voting algorithm on the fixed set of input data defined by a
given bound and test whether the result produced by each concrete execu-
tion of the algorithm satisfies the criterion. If the bounded model checker
does not find a bad state, we have established that the criteria are satisfied,
which by the small scope hypothesis [80] is not a proof but indicates the ab-
sence of programming bugs and conceptual problems. If the model checker
finds a bad state, it is possible to extract a counter example for future
inspection. Bounded model checking is well understood, and its applica-
tion to voting schemes was discussed in an earlier paper [18], where linear
logic was used to express voting schemes, and bounded model checking was
performed via proof search within linear logic.
Here we check the criteria using Z3 by encoding the semantic criteria
in first-order logic (plus theories supported by Z3) instead of a linear logic
framework. In addition we encode input and output of the individual ex-
ecution of the voting algorithm, as well as relevant intermediate values of
program variables. The generated formula is satisfiable iff the semantic cri-
teria hold for the result produced by the voting algorithm. If Z3 reports
that the formula is unsatisfiable, the voting instance serves as a counter-
example.
We comment on two scalability issues when using exhaustive testing
to verify properties of a voting scheme: (a) the size of the input given to
a single test run (e.g., the number of ballots or candidates) and (b) the
number of different possible ballot boxes (and thus test runs needed) given
an upper bound on the number of ballots and candidates. Unsurprisingly,
exhaustively testing all voting instances for a large number of votes or
candidates is intractable. But even the result of a single test run may be
difficult to check if the input is large and we require quantification over
array elements of arrays whose size depends, e.g., on the number of votes.
If a criterion does not only relate a single ballot box to the result pro-
duced by the voting algorithm, but involves multiple ballot boxes, appli-
cability of exhaustive testing is restricted even further. One example for
such a criterion is monotonicity (see Sec. 4.3.1), which relates the ballot box
B, the input to the voting algorithm, to another, slightly changed ballot
box B′. As a prerequisite to be able to determine whether the semantic
criterion holds for a particular voting instance, for all such ballot boxes B′
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we need to know the result of applying the voting algorithm to B′. While
we can still apply instance checking as before by simply running the checks
for vote instance B with all possible ballot boxes B′, this clearly aggravates
the scalability issues.
One improvement to this “brute force” approach is to narrow down the
search space by generating only ballot boxes B′ that actually relate to the
vote instance B as required by the semantic criterion (e.g., for monotonicity,
enumerate only the B′ which result from B by solely raising the preference
for a candidate c in one or more of the votes). A different solution to this
problem is to use weakest precondition generation as described in Sec. 4.4.3
to capture the effect of the voting algorithm in first-order logic with theories.
Furthermore, concerning scalability of instance checking, the perfor-
mance of the SMT solver depends crucially on the way semantic criteria
and relevant data of the program run are encoded in first-order logic over
theories. The effects of different encodings on performance are shown in
the following.
Experiments: Checking Tailor-made Criteria for STV using Z3
To demonstrate that the use of bounded model checking tools is viable, we
report here on our experiments on STV implemented in Python using the
SMT-based model checker Z3 on the two semantic criteria of STV described
in Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4.
We first produced a straightforward encoding in Z3 of the semantic
properties as given in first-order logic. This one-to-one encoding preserves
the structure of the original first-order formulas (including all quantifiers)
and uses Z3’s theories of integers and arrays. Unfortunately, Z3 was not
able to handle quantification over the integers in the one-to-one encoding,
i.e., Z3 could not determine whether the formula in question was satisfiable
or not.
In a second experiment, we eliminated most of the quantifiers in the
formula given to Z3 by replacing a universally quantified formula by a con-
junction over all instances, and replacing some existentially quantified for-
mulae by providing witnesses (e.g., the array variable a in the first STV
criterion), which is possible as the quantifiers range over a small bounded
domain.
With quantifiers mostly eliminated, Z3 was able to check the properties
for concrete voting instances as shown in Figure 4.1b.
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(a) Encoding over bitvectors (no quantifier
elimination)
(b) Encoding over integers with quantifier
elimination
Figure 4.1: Z3 performance for checking both semantic criteria (as stated
in Sec. 4.3.3 and Sec. 4.3.4) of single STV vote instances. The z-axis shows
average Z3 run-time in seconds for a single, randomly chosen ballot box
with fixed number of candidates and votes. Translucent bars indicate that
test runs exceeded a timeout of 1800s. Test runs executed on 12-Core AMD
Opteron Processor at 2.1 GHz, with 32 Z3 instances running in parallel.
A third encoding variant takes advantage of the fact that we are in the
bounded case, which means that the integers used in a concrete instance
are also of bounded size and can thus be represented by bitvectors of a
fixed length. For bitvectors, Z3 provides a strategy good enough to handle
formulas with the original structure and without eliminating quantifiers.
In fact, as shown in Figure 4.1a, for bitvectors, Z3 achieves clearly better
performance than reasoning over the integers with quantifiers eliminated.
The drop of Z3’s runtime at the boundary of 14 candidates respectively
votes indicate a change in Z3’s proof search strategy – whether this can be
further exploited to improve scalability of our model checker is future work.
Combining the use of bitvectors with quantifier elimination does not
lead to further increases in performance. This indicates that Z3’s internal
handling of quantifiers for the bitvector theory is more sophisticated than
what is achieved by our elimination of quantifiers in the formula given to Z3.
Regardless of the encoding, the bounded model checking technique does
not scale to the size of ballot boxes found in real elections. It is, however,
still useful (due to the small model hypothesis) to pinpoint some of the
possible errors in the voting scheme, and to check specific larger instances
of interest.
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Using Z3 and Its Interface
In this section, we give a brief introduction to Z3, and explain how we use
Z3 to check encodings of semantic criteria introduced in Sec. 4.3.1.
Z3 provides APIs for C/C++, .Net, Python, and OCaml. In this chap-
ter, we consider only the Python version. The Z3 API comprises many
classes and functions, only some of which are explained here (a complete
manual can be found on the Z3 website2).
At the class level, the Solver class plays a central role. It allows to
add assertions, check assertions for consistency, and generate models for
consistent assertions.
The API provides functions to construct formulas. For example, the
Int() and BitVec() functions create an integer and a bit-vector constant
respectively. The functions Array() and K() create array variables con-
stants respectively. And the functions ForAll(), Exists(), And(), Or(),
Not() provide logical operators.
Generating a Z3 input formula consists of two parts. One is encoding
the voting instance from electoral raw data; the other is formalising the
criteria.
A voting instance consists of the voting settings (e.g., the number of
candidates, the number of voters, the number of vacant seats, etc.), the
ballots, the voting result (elected candidates), and sometimes the interme-
diate variables such as each ballot’s support candidate in STV. Entities
such as candidates are represented by integers instead of names.
Examples for constructing voting instances in Z3 using bitvectors and
integers, respectively, are shown in Figure 4.2. The function to1DimZ3Array
converts a list of integers into bit-vectors, the function to2DimZ3Array is
defined analogously and hence omitted.
The integer library provides a function Update() that we use set values
of voting instances. Alternatively, we can use assignments in formulas that
are subsequently executed by the solver.
Next we explain the construction of Z3 input formalising criteria. The
majority criterion and the first criterion from Sec 4.3.3 are shown as an
example in Figure 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. We explain each in turn.
In Figure 4.3, the definition of b (ballot) and r (result) are transcribed
literally from the formulation of the criterion. In the formula, the universal
quantifiers are unfolded into conjunctions (using And()), and similarly, ex-
istential quantifiers are unfolded into disjunctions (using Or()). In line 7,
2http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/redmond/projects/z3/z3.html
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Voting instance with bitvectors
1 def to1DimZ3Array(a):
2 AllZero = K(Char, BitVecVal(0, BITVECSIZE))
3 res = AllZero
4 for i, val in enumerate(a):
5 res = Update(res, i + 1, val)
6 return res
8 b = to2DimZ3Array(ballots_instance)
9 r = to1DimZ3Array(result_instance)
Voting instance with bitvectors
Voting instance with integers
1 ballot_sort = ArraySort(IntSort(), IntSort())
2 b = Array(’ballots’, IntSort(), ballot_sort)
3 for i in range(V):
4 one_ballot = Array(’ballot’, IntSort(), IntSort())
5 for j in range(C):
6 one_ballot = Update(one_ballot, j, ballot_instance[i][j])
7 b = Update(b, i, one_ballot)
9 r = Array(’result’, IntSort(), IntSort())
10 for i in range(S+1):
11 r = Update(r, i, result_instance[i])
Voting instance with integers
Figure 4.2: Formalisation of Voting Instance
Majority criterion
1 [ Implies(Exists(count, // count is a counter
2 And(count[0] == 0, count[V] > V/2, // V is total number of voters
3 And([And(Implies(b[i][0] == c, count[i+1] == count[i]+1),
4 Implies(b[i][0] != c, count[i+1] == count[i]))
5 for i in range(V)]))),
6 Or([r[j] == c for j in range(1, S+1)])) // S is the number of elected candidates
7 for c in range(1, C+1) ] // C is the total number of candidates
Majority criterion
Figure 4.3: Encoding of the majority criterion
for c in range(1, C+1) is used to represent “for all candidates”. The
body of this loop reads as follows: If a candidate accumulates more than
50% of the votes, he or she will appear in the in the final elected result r.
Figure 4.4 depicts the formalisation of the first criterion from Sec 4.3.3
in Z3. The formalisation is a one-to-one transliteration. Consider, for ex-
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First criterion
1 F1 = [And(a[i] >= 0, a[i] <= S) for i in range(V)]
3 F2 = [Implies(a[i] != 0, r[a[i]] != 0) for i in range(V)]
5 F3 = [Implies(a[i] != 0, Or([b[i][j] == r[a[i]] for j in range(C)]))
6 for i in range(V)]
8 F4 = [ForAll(k,
9 Implies(And(1 <= k, k <= S, r[k] != 0),
10 Exists(count,
11 And(count[0] == 0,
12 count[V] == Q,
13 And([And(Implies(a[i] == k, count[i+1] == count[i]+1),
14 Implies(a[i] != k, count[i+1] == count[i]))
15 for i in range(V)])))))]
First criterion
Figure 4.4: Formalisation of First Criteria for STV
ample, the Z3-formula F1 that encodes the corresponding first order formula
∀i(1 ≤ i ≤ V→ 0 ≤ a[i] ≤ S) .
Note that there is an index shift. While the voters’ index starts from 1 in
the original formalisation, it starts from 0 in the Z3 representation.
4.4.3 Full and Bounded Verification
Scalability issues of the bounded model checking approach, which requires
exhaustive instance checking, call for other techniques that allow to ana-
lyze either all voting instances up to a considerable size, or even guarantee
correctness independent of the size or concrete content of the ballot box.
In the following, we demonstrate two established methods for this purpose
on a small sample program.
For this, consider the program to compute the sum of the first n inte-
gers plus a constant c (both c and n are input parameters), as shown in
Figure 4.5a. Besides the actual program (in black), we label (in gray) prop-
erties of the program state during program execution. The property n ≥ 0
is the precondition of the program and x = (n2 + n)/2 + c its postcondi-
tion. The precondition captures in which states we intend this program to
be invoked, and the postcondition states what property to expect after the
program terminates.
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n ≥ 0
int i = 0
int x = 0
while (i < n)
{
i++
x += i
}
x += c
x =
n2 + n
2
+ c
(a) Original pro-
gram
n ≥ 0
int i = 0
int x = 0
while (i < n)
inv i ≤ n
∧ x = i
2 + i
2
{
i++
x += i
}
x += c
x =
n2 + n
2
+ c
(b) Program
with annotated
loop invariant
n ≥ 0
int i = 0
int x = 0
if (i < n) {
i++
x += i
if (i < n) {
assume false
} else goto out
}
out: x += c
x =
n2 + n
2
+ c
(c) Program with
loops unrolled once
Figure 4.5: Verification example
With full verification, we are able to prove that the program adheres to
its pre- and postcondition pair (using weakest precondition computation,
as explained below). For the unbounded case, the user needs to supply
information describing the effect of executing (a variable number of) loop
iterations in the program via loop invariants. For our example program,
the appropriate invariant is shown in Figure 4.5b. Finding the right loop
invariant for this example is trivial – for concrete voting algorithms, how-
ever, this is a difficult and sometimes infeasible task, as there might not
even be a suitable abstraction in form of a concise invariant that describes
the loop’s effects.
Another option which does not need further user-supplied information
is to use bounded verification. Loops in the program are dealt with by ex-
amining only program executions up a small number of loop iterations (the
bound). This allows us to transform loops into if-cascades – as depicted
in Figure 4.5c for executions containing at most one loop iteration. The
assume statement inserted by the transformation in the second if-block is
used for weakest precondition computation: independently from the prop-
erties that actually hold at this point in the execution, this statement adds
false as an assumption so that from this point on, any property holds, ef-
fectively treating all executions of the original program that pass this point
as if they unconditionally establish the postcondition.
Starting from either the original program with annotated invariants or
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(0 < n→ ((1 < n→ true) ∧ (1 ≥ n→ 1 + c < 9)) ∧
(0 ≥ n→ 0 + c < 9)
int i = 0; int x = 0
(i < n→ ((i + 1 < n→ true)∧
5 (i + 1 ≥ n→ x + (i + 1) + c < 9)) ∧
(i ≥ n→ x + c < 9)
if (i < n) {
(i + 1 < n→ true) ∧ (i + 1 ≥ n→ x + i + c < 9)
x += i; i++
10 (i < n→ true) ∧ (i ≥ n→ x + c < 9)
if (i < n) {
false→ x + c < 9⇔ true
assume false
x + c < 9
15 } else goto out
}
x + c < 9
out: x += c
x < 9
Figure 4.6: Weakest precondition computation for property: x < 9
the unrolled program, the next step in showing correctness of the program
is to generate the weakest precondition for the given postcondition with
respect to the program, resulting in a first-order logic formula. The weakest
precondition is a property of program states s.t., if the program is started
in a state satisfying the weakest precondition, then it terminates in a state
that satisfies the postcondition. If the actual precondition of the program
implies the weakest precondition, then the program is correct with respect
to the given pre-/postcondition pair. Whether this implication holds is
typically checked automatically using an SMT solver.
For our example program, Figure 4.6 shows the intermediate properties
resulting from weakest precondition computation for a simple postcondition
P : x < 9. For P to hold after execution of the final statement x+=c in
line 18 of the program, P with all occurrences of x replaced by x+ c has to
be true beforehand. Corresponding rules for the other statement types are
applied to all statements of the program to get the weakest precondition
of the program with respect to P , as seen in lines 1-2 in Figure 4.6. The
constructed weakest precondition is equivalent to (n = 1 → c < 8) ∧ (n ≤
0→ c < 9).
As explained, bounded verification only guarantees correctness up to a
given number of loop iterations. Thus for parameters that affect the number
of loop iterations in the program execution (in our example: n), we only get
correctness results for a subset of values. In the weakest precondition for our
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example program in Figure 4.6, the sub-formula (1 < n → true) captures
this: for any concrete value for n greater than one, the whole formula simply
evaluates to true, although the postcondition x < 9 actually may not hold.
With the number of loop iterations depending on the values of input pa-
rameters, we get similar scalability issues as described for bounded model
checking, if we want to examine larger parameter values. In contrast to
bounded model checking, however, for variables not affecting the number of
loop iterations, the result of bounded verification applies to all values, as
variables are handled symbolically by the technique. Additionally, on this
abstract level, analysis of program properties might be simplified by ex-
ploiting symmetries in the program behaviour. For these reasons, bounded
verification is a promising approach to check properties of voting schemes.
4.5 Case Study: Variants of the STV
Scheme
Single transferable vote (STV) is a preferential voting scheme [116] for
multi-member constituencies aiming to achieve proportional representation
according to the voters’ preferences.
4.5.1 The Standard Version of STV
There are many versions of STV, but most are an extension or variant of
the standard version that is shown in Figure 4.7.
For input and output of the algorithm, we use the same notation and
encoding as in Section 4.3. There are V voters electing S of C candidates,
and:
b: is the input ballot box, where b[i, j] is the number of the candidate
that is ranked by vote i in the jth place. If the vote does not rank all
candidates, then b[i, j] = 0 for the empty places.
r: is the output election result, where r[i] is the ith candidate that is
elected (1 ≤ i ≤ S). If less than S candidates are elected, then r[i] = 0
for the empty seats.
We assume the input for the algorithm to satisfy the following conditions
(which are pre-conditions for running the standard STV algorithm): (1) C ≥
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Standard Version of STV
1 // Initialisation
2 r := [0, ..., 0]; // no one elected yet
3 e := 1; // e is the next seat to be filled
4 cc := C; // cc is the number of (continuing) candidates
5 Q := bV/(S + 1)c+ 1; // Droop quota
7 // Main loop: While not all seats filled and
8 // there are more continuing candidates than open seats
9 // In each iteration one candidate is elected or one candidate eliminated
10 while (e ≤ S) ∧ (cc > S− e + 1) do
11 // QuotaReached is the set of candidates for which the number of
12 // first-preference votes reaches or exceeds the quota Q
13 QuotaReached := {c | 1 ≤ c ≤ C ∧ #{v | 1 ≤ v ≤ V ∧ b[v, 1] = c} ≥ Q};
14 if QuotaReached = ∅ then
15 // no one has reached the quota,
16 // eliminate a weakest candidate by deletion from the ballot box
17 Weakest := {c | 1 ≤ c ≤ C ∧ #{v | 1 ≤ v ≤ V ∧ b[v, 1] = c} is minimal};
18 choose c ∈ Weakest;
19 delete(c);
20 else
21 // one or more candidates have reached the quota,
22 // elect one of them
23 choose c ∈ QuotaReached;
24 r[e] := c; // put c in the next free seat
25 e := e + 1; // increase the number e of the next seat to be filled
26 do Q times // Q of the votes that
27 choose i ∈ {i | 1 ≤ i ≤ V ∧ b[i, 1] = c}; // give c top preference
28 for j = 1 to C do b[i, j] := 0; od // get erased
29 od
30 delete(c); // delete c from the ballot box
31 fi
32 cc := cc− 1; // in any case we have one less continuing candidate
33 od
35 // Fill the empty seats
36 if e < S then
37 fill the remaining seats r[e, . . . , S] with the remaining cc candidates
39 // procedure for deleting candidate c from votes in b
40 procedure delete(c) begin
41 for i = 1 to V do for j = 1 to C do
42 if b[i, j] = c then
43 for k = j to C− 1 do b[i, k] := b[i, k + 1] od;
44 b[i, C] := 0;
45 fi
46 od od
47 end
Standard Version of STV
Figure 4.7: The standard STV algorithm
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S, (2) V ≥ 1. and (3) votes are linear orders of a subset of the candidates,
i.e., for all 1 ≤ i ≤ V and all 1 ≤ j, j′ ≤ C:
• 0 ≤ b[i, j] ≤ C,
• if b[i, j] 6= 0 and j 6= j′ then b[i, j] 6= b[i, j′],
• if b[i, j] = 0 then b[i, j′] = 0 for all j′ ≥ j.
The initialisation part of the STV algorithm, in particular, computes a
quota necessary to obtain a seat (line 5). Different definitions of quotas are
used in practice. The most common is the Droop quota Q = bV/(S + 1)c+1.
To determine the election result, STV uses an iterative process, which
repeats the following two steps until either a winner is found for every seat
or the number of remaining candidates equals the number of open seats
(lines 10–33).
1. If no candidate reaches the quota of first-preference votes, a candidate
with a minimal number of first-preference votes is eliminated and that
candidate is deleted from all ballots (lines 17–19).
2. Otherwise one of the candidates with Q or more first-preference votes is
chosen (line 23) and declared elected (line 24). Of the first-preference
votes for that candidate, Q are chosen and erased (lines 26–29). These
are the votes that are considered to have been “used up”. If the
candidate has more than Q votes, the surplus votes remain in the
ballot box. Finally, the elected candidate is deleted from all ballots
still in the box.
The procedure for deleting a candidate c (lines 40–47) works by searching
for the candidate in each vote and, if c is found to have preference j, then
the candidate with preference j + 1 moves to preference j, the candidate
with preference j + 2 moves to preference j + 1, and so on.
When the main loop of the standard STV algorithm as shown in Fig-
ure 4.7 terminates, either (a) all seats are filled, or (b) the number cc of
remaining candidates is equal to the number of open seats. In case (b), a
further step is needed to distribute some or all of the remaining candidates
to the equal number of remaining seats. The default is to fill all the re-
maining seats with the remaining candidates (line 37). Alternatively, one
may continue the main STV loop to see if the further candidates get elected
(which may leave seats open).
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Example 4.5.1. We consider the same situation as in Example 4.3.1, i.e.,
there are four candidates A,B,C,D for two vacant seats, and the votes
to be counted are [A,B,D], [A,B,D], [A,B,D], [D,C], [C,D]. The Droop
quota in this case is Q = b5/(2 + 1)c+ 1 = 2.
In the first iteration of the main loop, candidate A meets the quota and
is hence elected. Two of the votes [A,B,D] are erased, the third is a surplus
vote. It is transformed into [B,D] by deleting A from the ballots.
In the second iteration no candidate reaches the quota, thus the weakest
of the remaining candidates B,C,D is eliminated – which one depends on
the kind of tie-breaker used as all three have exactly one first-preference
vote at that point. (1) If the tie-break eliminates B, the aforementioned
transformed vote [B,D] will be transformed again and will become a vote
for D, so that D will be elected in the next iteration. (2) If the tie-break
eliminates C, the vote [C,D] will be transformed into a vote for D, and thus
D will be elected. (3) If the tie-break eliminates D, then C will be elected,
analogously, in the next iteration. In summary, the algorithm reports either
[A,D] or [A,C] as the election result but not, for example, [A,B] or [B,D].
If the number of second-preference votes is used as a tie-breaker, then B is
eliminated first (case 1 above).
The standard STV algorithm has three choice points that produce non-
determinism. Different variants of STV resolve them in different way:
1. Who is eliminated if several candidates have the same minimal number
of first preferences (line 18)?
2. Who is elected if several candidates have reached the quota (line 23)?
3. How are the votes chosen that are deleted when an elected candidate
has more than quote votes (line 27)?
Choice points (1) and (2) are typically handled – to some extent at least
– by defining various kinds of tie-break rules. They can also be handled
by declaring all weakest candidates eliminated resp. declaring all strongest
candidates elected. That, however, is not always possible (there may not
be enough open seats). And it can affect the election result in unexpected
ways.
Choice point (3) can be eliminated using the notion of fractional votes.
Instead of erasing a fraction of the votes that needs to be chosen, the same
fraction of each vote is erased and the remaining fraction remains in the
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ballot box. This is done in many versions of STV used in real-world elec-
tions.
The above considerations illustrate that the STV algorithm as presented
in this section is not only one but an entire family of vote counting algo-
rithms. There are a number of parameters to play with: the quota, the
choice of tie-breakers, placement of candidates once there are as many free
seats as remaining candidates.
There are further options that – we argue in Section 4.5.2 – lead to
election systems that can no longer be considered part of the STV family.
4.5.2 The CADE-STV Election Scheme
The bylaws of the Conference on Automated Deduction (CADE) specify an
algorithm for counting the ballots cast for the election of members to its
Board of Trustees [77]. The intention of the bylaws is to design a voting al-
gorithm that takes the voters’ preferences into account. The algorithm has
been implemented in Java and used by several CADE Presidents and Secre-
taries in elections for the CADE Board of Trustees. It has also been used by
TABLEAUX Steering Committee Presidents, including one of the authors,
for the election of members to the TABLEAUX Steering Committee.
Pseudo-code for the CADE-STV scheme is included in the CADE by-
laws [77], making it an interesting target for formal analysis. CADE-STV
differs from the standard version of STV (shown in Figure 4.7) in several
ways:
Quota Instead of the Droop quota, CADE-STV uses a quota of 50% of
the votes – independently of the number of seats to be filled. That is,
line 5 in Fig. 4.7 is changed to “Q := round(V/2)”.
Empty seats CADE-STV does not fill seats that remain open at the end
of the main loop, i.e., lines 36–37 are removed, and “cc > S - e + 1”
in lines 10 is changed to “cc > 0”.
Restart Each time a candidates c reaches the quota Q of first-preference
votes and gets elected, the election for the next seat restarts with the
original ballot box – with the only exception that the elected candi-
date c is deleted. Thus, (a) the Q votes used to elect c are not erased
but are only changed by deleting c, and (b) weak candidates that have
been eliminated are “resurrected” and take part in the election again.
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That is, (a) the code for erasing votes (lines 26–29) is removed and
(b) replaced by code for resurrecting the eliminated candidates.
4.5.3 Applying Bounded Model Checking to
CADE-STV
As already explained in Section 4.4.2, we have applied SMT-based bounded
model checking to CADE-STV. There, we drew conclusion regarding the
applicability of bounded model checking and the use of Z3. In this section,
we report what can be concluded from the experiments w.r.t. properties of
CADE-STV.
First, the experiments validated that CADE-STV (like standard STV)
satisfies Criterion 2 (Def. 4.3.2). But since an exhaustive model search was
only done up to a small bound on the number of votes and number of
candidates, this does not constitute a full proof.
Second, running our bounded model checker on CADE-STV confirms
that, in difference to standard STV, CADE-STV does not satisfy Criterion 1
(Def. 4.3.1), which is closely related to proportional representation.
In addition, we have used SMT-based bounded model checking to check
the correctness ratio of CADE-STV voting instances. In this experiment,
we generated all possible ballot boxes for CADE-STV up to a certain size
and used Z3 to check if the CADE-STV counting results meet Criterion 1
for that instance.
As an example, the number of candidates is fixed to 4, the number of
vacant seats is varied from 1 to 3 and the number of voters is set from 3
to 5. The result of the experiment is shown in Tab. 4.1. All possible ballot
instances for 4 voters and 2 vacant seats are tested, while for others only
the first 100,000 ballot instances are checked. And when CADE-STV fails
to seat all the vacant seats, the voting instance is not counted in the correct
ratio.
For the one-vacant-seat case, the criterion is met by CADE-STV con-
stantly, because there is no difference between standard STV and CADE-
STV (unless no candidate reaches the quota, in which case standard STV
picks a random candidate while CADE-STV leaves the seat empty). When
there are more than two vacant seats, the criterion is unsatisfiable with
CADE-STV because there not enough ballots to support all elected can-
didates as the quota is 50%. For the two candidates case, CADE-STV
sometimes does not reuse the ballot when picking the second candidate,
and in these cases the criterion can be satisfied.
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Table 4.1: Test First STV Criterion on CADE-STV
Voters \Vacant Seats 1 2 3
3 100% 0% 0%
4 100% 87.2% 0%
5 100% 0% 0%
4.5.4 Effects of the Differences between CADE-STV
and Standard STV
Effects of Restart
To illustrate the effect of the restart mechanism in CADE-STV on the
election result, we consider an example:
Example 4.5.2. Let us run CADE-STV on Example 4.3.1. First, we com-
pute the majority quota Q = 3. In the first iteration, A has three first prefer-
ences, so that A is the majority winner and is seated. Since CADE-STV uses
restart, A’s votes are not deleted but are redistributed at the end of the first
iteration. Now the ballot box contains [B,D], [B,D], [B,D], [D,C], [C,D].
Following the algorithm, we observe that now B is the majority candidate
with 3 first preference votes and is seated. The election is over, and the
election result is [A,B] (which is different from the possible results [A,D]
or [A,C] of standard STV).
Indeed, our bounded model checker finds smaller counter examples than
the one shown in Example 4.5.2, but these are not as illustrative.
The effect of the differences between standard STV and CADE-STV is
further clarified by the following theorem and its corollary: in certain cases,
there is no proportional representation in the election results computed by
CADE-STV. See also Example 4.5.3 below.
Theorem 4.5.1
If a majority of voters vote in exactly the same way with ballot [c1, . . . , ck],
then CADE-STV will elect the candidates c1, . . . , ck preferred by that ma-
jority in order of the majority’s preference.
Proof. Since a majority of voters choose c1 as their first preference, no other
candidate can meet the “majority quota”. Thus c1 is elected in the first
round. When redistributing the ballots, each of the majority of ballots
with c1 as first preference have c2 as second preference. All become first
preferences for c2. Thus candidate c2 is guaranteed to have a majority of
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first preferences and is elected in round two, and so on until all vacancies
are filled.
Corollary 1
If the electorate consists of two diametrically opposed camps that vote for
their candidates only, in some fixed order, then the camp with a majority
will always get their candidates elected and the camp with a minority will
never get their candidate elected.
Standard STV does not use the restart mechanism and so it will elect
the first ranked candidate of the majority, but will then reuse only the
surplus votes and not all votes as done by CADE-STV. Thus the second
preference from the majority is not necessarily the second person elected.
Consequently, majorities do not rule outright in standard STV.
Effects of High Quota and No Filling of Empty Seats
No matter how many candidates there are and how many seats need to
be filled, a candidate can only be seated by CADE-STV if he or she accu-
mulates more than 50% of the votes. Any candidate with less than 50%
of the vote is defeated. Thus, CADE-STV obviously violates the fill-all-
seats criterion. But because of the high quota it also prevents proportional
representation as candidates supported by a large minority can neither be
elected via reaching the quota nor via filling seats left empty at the end of
the main loop.
In fact, if the high quota of 50% and no filling of empty seats were
the only changes w.r.t. standard STV, only a single candidate could be
elected because more than 50% of the votes would be used up by electing
that candidate. CADE-STV requires the restart mechanism to elect further
candidates.
Example 4.5.3. Assume there are 100 seats and two parties nominat-
ing candidates A1, . . . , A100 and B1, . . . , B100, respectively. Further as-
sume that there are 51% of A-voters and 49% of B-voters. All A-voters
vote [A1, . . . , A100] and B-voters vote [B1, . . . , B100]. Standard STV elects
A1, . . . , A51, B1, . . . , B49, i.e., the result is a perfect proportional represen-
tation.
With a quota of 50% and no filling of empty seats, only A1 gets elected
and then nothing further happens, which is clearly undesirable. But CADE-
STV also uses the restart mechanism, therefore, like standard STV, it fills
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all seats. The result is different, however, because the votes used to elect
A1, . . . , A51 do not get erased. CADE-STV produces the election result
[A1, ..., A100].
The above example again shows that the majority can rule with CADE-
STV and there is no proportional representation in that case (Corollary 1).
4.5.5 Observations on the History of CADE-STV
We discuss the history of the CADE-STV scheme because it illustrates the
problem of evolving an election scheme without using formally specified
semantic criteria and a formal definition of the input to the scheme. It
is publicly known that there were lots of discussions among the CADE
Trustees over a long period of evolving CADE-STV. But we do not know
what the non-public deliberations actually where. The following is based
on our interpretation of the publicly available material.
The Violation of Proportional Representation
The CADE-STV voting scheme is the result of a long discussion among the
board of trustees that took place in the years 1994–1996. David A. Plaisted
published various concerns about the existing voting scheme which can be
found on his homepage [99].
One of Plaisted’s concerns was that a minority supporting candidates
standing for re-election could re-elect these candidates against the wishes of
the majority as that majority is not sufficiently coordinated in its behaviour
to elect alternative candidates [99]:
Of course, one of the main purposes of a democratic scheme
is to permit the membership to vote a change in the leader-
ship if there is a need for this. However, the new bylaws make
this more difficult in several ways. The problem is that those
who are unsatisfied with the scheme will tend to split their votes
among many candidates (unless they are so disgusted as to put
the trustee candidates at the very bottom of the list), but those
who are satisfied will tend to vote for the trustee nominees. This
means that the trustee nominees tend to be elected even if only
a minority is happy with the scheme.
We believe that because of Plaisted’s concerns the board introduced the
high 50% quota and did not include a mechanism for filling seats that
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remain empty. On first sight, this seems good because it solves the problem
illustrated in Plaisted’s scenario. But, as explained above, this deviation
from the standard STV setup not only violates the fill-all-seats criterion but
also the goal of proportional representation (see Example 4.5.3). Thus, the
CADE-STV scheme protects the majority at the expense of the minority.
Also, as explained above, if the high quota and the remaining empty
seats were the only changes, only a single candidate could be elected. So,
in effect, one was forced to change the algorithm further. The result was
that the restart mechanism was added to the algorithm, that reuses the
original ballot box for each seat and does not erase votes (because then
more candidates can be elected, see Example 4.5.3).
There would have been a different solution than using a restart that
would have solved Plaisted’s problem without restricting proportional rep-
resentation as much: One could have used Standard STV with an additional
rule that – before the main algorithm is started – anybody who does not ap-
pear (with arbitrary preference) on at least 50% of the votes is immediately
eliminated.
Example 4.5.4. Using the same input ballots as in Example 4.5.3, the al-
gorithm would then elect [A1, ..., A51], which still suppresses the B minority,
but at least gives the A party only those seats that are proportional to the
A votes.
Well-formedness and Interpretation of Input
Apparently, during some CADE elections, there was some confusion about
the meaning of not listing a candidate at all on a ballot and how that should
be translated into input for the CADE-STV voting scheme.
The instruction was given to the voters that not listing a candidate is
the same as giving that candidate the lowest possible preference. But that
is not the correct interpretation. It is easy to see that for both standard
STV and CADE-STV, there is a difference between giving a candidate the
lowest possible preference and not listing the candidate at all. For example,
if there are candidates A,B,C, then [A,B] is different from [A,B,C]. When
candidates A and B get eliminated, [A,B,C] turns into a vote for C and
may help to elect C, which [A,B] does not. One could transform a ballot
of the form [A,B] into an input vote [A,B,C] (and, thus, make them equal
by definition). But that only works if a single candidate is missing from
the ballot. If more are missing, they would have to be put in the same
spot on the ballot, which is not possible. Indeed, CADE-STV does not
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work correctly if input votes contain candidates with equal preference, i.e.,
if the pre-condition that a vote is a partial linear order is violated. As that
pre-condition was never clearly specified, fixing the problem in CADE-STV
was a lengthy process that took several years.
This shows that not formalising the pre-conditions which the input must
satisfy is problematic. Besides the possibility of errors or unintended be-
haviour of the algorithm, it is important that the voters understand how
their ballot is transformed into input for the algorithm.
4.6 Conclusion
We have discussed semantic criteria to formalize desired properties of voting
schemes. Formal specification and verification do not provide a mechanism
for deciding which properties are desirable for a particular vote. But they
are methods for the analysis and development of voting schemes.
Our case study demonstrates the importance of formal criteria both
for analysis of voting schemes and their evolution and the development
process. Semantic criteria need to be explicitly stated. A discussion of
voting schemes using anecdotal descriptions of individual voting scenarios
is not a good basis for making electoral laws.
Furthermore, we demonstrated that SMT solvers are well-suited to dis-
cover bugs in voting schemes. In particular, we have shown that the formal-
isation of semantic criteria in first-order logic over the theories of integers
and arrays is a good choice for SMT-based analysis.
An addition example of applying SMT solvers to the Norwegian and
Australian examples (discussed in Chapter 3) is given in Appendix A.1
Chapter 5
Measuring Voter Lines1
5.1 Introduction
The question of how to improve the voters’ experience when going to
the polls is of central importance to many electoral management bodies
(EMBs). Good voter experience is often associated with an efficient and
professionally organized electoral process, which in turn is expected to lead
to elevated levels of voter participation, voter satisfaction, and also trust in
the overall election and its outcome. In a recently published report by the
US Presidential Commission on Election Administration on the American
Voting Experience [16], for example, one of the recommendations calls for
state-of-the-art techniques to assure efficient management of polling places,
including tools the Commission is publicizing and recommending for the ef-
ficient allocation of polling place resources. Such state-of-the-art techniques
can be roughly divided into two categories: techniques that render polling
places more efficient and techniques that measure polling place efficiency.
Denmark, for example, uses digital voter registration systems to increase
efficiency: By presenting a voter registration with a machine readable bar-
code, voters can be quickly and efficiently checked of the electoral roll.
This chapter presents a state-of the-art technique for analyzing the effi-
ciency of a polling place by measuring the times voters are present in and
around a polling place. This analysis technique is called the white boxes-
or simply wb-technique. The results of the wb-technique are datasets from
which we can infer information, for example, when a voter arrived at the
polling place, or when he or she left. We conducted the experiments in three
1Based on “Measuring Voter Lines” [104], joint work with Carsten Schu¨rmann,
accepted and to appear in CeDEM16
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elections in Denmark: Danish local elections in 2013, European Parliament
election in 2014 and Danish general (parliamentary) election in 2015.
Using statistics, we can deduce valuable information that can assist
administrators in rendering polling places more efficient. Examples of the
effects of such a method include: Reallocating resources from one polling
station to another in the case of a demographic change; purchasing new
equipment, such as new ballot boxes, additional registration desks, voting
machines or curtains, with the goal to shorten long waiting times; it may
also lead to restructuring the layout of polling places to improve flow; or
collecting statistical information to quantify voting culture, for example,
how many voters skip out of a voting line and leave, how many return
again, and how many remain in the polling place after they cast the ballot
to wait for friends or chat with acquaintances.
With every redistribution of resources, there is some risk that the quality
of the election decreases instead of increases. For example, there are reports
from US elections, for example, that after gerrymandering some polling
places experienced extremely long waiting times, for example during the
2012 presidential election in Richland County [29]. The data that we collect
at polling places can be used to understand these problems better and
evaluate the effectiveness of counter measures. It can be used to justify
expenses towards more efficient polling place administration and to disarm
arguments based on circumstantial evidence, for example unsubstantiated
complaints about excessive waiting times.
In the US, there is a critical awareness that such data is invaluable. Per
recommendation of the CalTech/MIT voting project [109], several precincts
have already collected or are planning to collect queuing data the old fash-
ioned way, i.e. by having election officials count the number of people stand-
ing in line at regular intervals, or by handing out pieces of paper to voters
that are stamped with arrival and eventually also the departure times; and
by tracking individuals throughout the voting process, marking the arrival
times at individual service points. In this chapter we show that our wb-
technique, is on all accounts superior to the manual counting: It is more
reliable in that it is virtually free of human error; it is more consistent as
information is continuously recorded; it permits (at least in theory) the
reconstruction of the path of individual voters through the polling station
by trilateralization and it is unobtrusive, because sensors can be installed
in the polling place out of sight of the polling officials and voters. Fur-
thermore, in this chapter we show, that the wb-technique and the manually
collected data can be correlated. In this chapter we show, that it is possible
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to replace the manual collection of queuing data by a technological solution,
while improving the accuracy of the measurement.
Legal Concerns
According to Danish data protection agency Datatilsynet, media access
control (MAC) addresses are considered sensitive (personenfølsom) infor-
mation, which means that they are protected by national data protection
laws. It is illegal to record this information without prior permission of the
voter, unless permitted by Datatilsynet. Being aware of the privacy im-
plications for the voter, the DemTech project has applied and was granted
permission by the Danish data protection agency to record this data for
scientific purposes based on the Danish Data Protection Law (Personen-
datalov 2), Chapter 4, Paragraph 6, Section 5.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we describe the white
box-technique. The hardware and software that we chose to implement the
technique are described in Section 5.3. Security and privacy considera-
tions are discussed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. We describe a
pilot study with this technology that we conducted during the 2015 Danish
parliamentary election in Section 5.6. We deployed the technology in five
polling stations including three in Copenhagen and two in Aarhus. For one
polling place in Copenhagen, Holbergskolen, we conducted CalTech/MIT
style manual collection of inflow data, which we use to evaluate the qual-
ity of our method. Finally, we assess results and describe our preliminary
findings in Section 5.7. We conclude that the white box method provides a
precise and accurate information to measure waiting times in polling places.
5.2 White Boxes-technique
The basic idea behind this technique, is that mobile phones send out wireless
packets that can be recorded by a sensor for future analysis. Abstractly,
we can describe the data collected this way as a set of observations O, that
records wireless packets in the form of pairs
(p, t) ∈ O
where p denotes the identifier of a mobile phone and t the time at which
a wireless packet was observed. The sensors that record the packets sent
2https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/r0710.aspx?id=828
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out by mobile phones have only limited range. Therefore, it will become
necessary to deploy multiple sensors for one polling station, which entails,
that we will also have to combine multiple sets of observations O1, . . . , On
for our analysis. To compute for how long a mobile phone, aka voter was
present at a polling place, we have to combine the sets of observations and
compute the following presence relation:
(p, s, e) ∈ Presence(O)
where s (e) refers to the earliest (latest) time when (p, s) ((p, e)) was
recorded in O. In other words, we can compute precisely for how long
each device stayed in a polling place — by subtracting s from e.
Noise: In our pilot study that we describe below in Section 5.6, we
have observed that empirically collected data sets contain noise. This noise
may be due to other devices emitting wireless packets, such as, for exam-
ple, routers that are installed in the building hosting the polling station,
mobile phones of voting officials or people passing by without voting, or mo-
bile phones of voters that run out of batteries. We remove the noise from
the dataset using common statistical methods, in particular, one standard
deviation, which is defined as follows.
σ =
√
E[(T − µ)2]
where µ = E[T ] computes the expected value. Data outside the range of
[µ− σ, µ+ σ] is treated as noise.
Accuracy: Each sensor, will accurately record any wireless packet ob-
served within its range, assuming that the local clock of the sensor is con-
figured correctly. This has two consequences. First, if the waiting queue
extends outside the range of a sensors installed, it will not “see” the end of
a line, and conversely, a mobile phone may be detected while the voter is
still in progress of enqueuing. In the former case, it is important that the
voting officials can predict where the line will form and then use sufficiently
many sensors to monitor the queue.
Completeness: We note, that not every voter will carry a mobile phone
that emits packets. In our experience, this is not problematic, because of
the way lines are formed, as long as sufficiently many people in line carry
such a phone. Our data shows, that most commonly every third to fourth
voter (in extreme cases every eighth voter) carries such a phone. Naturally,
the more mobile phones are present in a voting place, the more accurate
our estimates for waiting times will become.
5.3. Implementation 101
Technology Range
RFID tracking < 1m
Bluetooth tracking ca. 10m
WiFi tracking < 100m
UTMS, GSM 800m− 40km
Table 5.1: Tracking Technologies
We also note, that the frequency with which mobile phones emit packets
depends very much on the phone’s operating system. This is because the
probe frequency, for example, for WiFi ranges from 4 packets per minute
to less than one.
We anticipate a future complication with the wb-technique when phones
come pre-configured with anonymization enabled. This technique hides the
device identifier of the phones during the probing phase. However, this is
currently not a concern, as only few phones have this feature enabled [97],
in part, because it is so inconvenient to enable it. All notification services,
email, messages, etc. must be disabled for this feature to work.
5.3 Implementation
Next, we describe our design choices for implementing the wb-technique, in
preparation for a real election.
5.3.1 Hardware
The first design choice is which kind of wireless packets we intend to record.
There are several options as outlined in Table 5.1. Among these options,
we have selected WiFi tracking: Most smartphones and smartwatches have
active WiFi on their phones, simply for convenience. This way the phone
will try to connect automatically to an access point at home or in the
office. When trying to connect, the smartphone periodically emits a probing
packet, which we will then record. The range of WiFi phones in the open
is around 100m, indoors between 10 and 20m and is therefore better than
Bluetooth, which has a much smaller range. In addition many more people
use their smartphones to connect to access points than have Bluetooth
enabled. We briefly also considered RFID tracking, but discarded this idea
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because of low range and security concerns. Recording UMTS or GSM
signals is in general illegal.
WiFi enabled devices usually transmit on 11 different channels. When
trying to connect to an access point they transmit a broadcast packet on
all channels, which means that for our system, it is sufficient to listen only
to one channel (channel 1) which uses a frequency of 2412 MHz. Note,
that the mobile phone has also Bluetooth enabled, there might be some
interference between WiFi and Bluetooth.
The second design choice is the particular technology that we shall use
to record wireless packets. There are many possibilities, ranging from small
computers (for example, Raspberry Pi) to routers. In preliminary experi-
ments, we used a TP link travel router TP-MR3020.3 These routers have
the advantage that we can install OpenWRT (a Linux derivative) on them.
They also come with a USB port, which we use to connect a USB drive
to record the data persistently, which we found worked well. We also used
USB drives in an earlier pilot Danish Municipal election 2013, without any
problems.
An alternative technology are 3G antennas, which we used for the Eu-
ropean parliament election 2014, where we encrypted and transmitted the
data directly to DemTech’s server. This had the advantage that in prin-
ciple, we could provide online queuing data information. However, the 3G
connection to the server was less reliable than expected, so that our data
collection was spotty at best.
One drawback of these sensors was that they needed to be connected to
an external power source, which means that the location for the sensors in
a polling place was largely determined by the location of power outlets.
For the 2015 Danish Parliamentary election we therefore started to look
for another technology and we chose the TP link travel router TP-MR13U4
and 16GB SanDisk Cruzer Fit USB Flash drives. This router comes with an
embedded battery large enough to power the sensor for 48 hours straight,
ample time to be deployed during an election. Just like with the TP-
MR3020, OpenWRT can be installed on this sensor and they can be pro-
grammed to start and stop collecting data at precise time points. Practically
speaking a polling station can be prepared the day before the election, and
the sensors can be collected after the polling station closes.
3http://www.tp-link.com/en/products/details/cat-4691_TL-MR3020.html
4http://wiki.openwrt.org/toh/tp-link/tl-mr13u
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5.3.2 Software
To prepare the routers, we flush the router’s firmware and replace it with
OpenWRT 5, an operating system based on the Linux kernel that is opti-
mized for network traffic management. Next, we set the wireless interface
of each sensor into passive mode, which means that the sensors can only
listen. One can think of the sensors as microphones, recording all wireless
traffic around them.
OpenWRT supports many of the common networking tools,in partic-
ular, tcpdump6 a tool that we configured to record wireless packets. We
configured the sensors in such a way that they would automatically start
recording packets at 08:00 and stop at 21:00 on the election day.
5.4 Security
We review the security of our system from the point of assets and vulnera-
bilities [15] in the polling places. In our experiments, the physical assets are
the routers and their respective USB drives. The physical assets’ integrity
can be violated due to unexpected damage to the sensors, for example,
through water, fire, or theft. As logical assets we refer to the router’s soft-
ware and the data collected on the USB flash drive.
Regarding the protection of the physical assets, there is little we can do
beyond physically securing them, because the sensors are not monitored.
During the experiments described below, we placed the routers in difficult
to access places and out of the voters sight.
We therefore direct the focus of this security analysis on the integrity
and security of the logical assets. Here, we even assume that the sensor
itself is under the adversary’s control, and therefore as the primary security
mechanism we protect all data on the USB flash drive, by encrypting the
relevant partition on the drive. The key for decrypting the flash drive was
not stored on the sensor, but kept in our office.
As a secondary security mechanism, we restrict the attack surface of
each sensor: the only way to access it is by attaching network cable and
logging in through ssh.
The only personnel authorized to access are the system administrators,
who are usually not in field. A system administrator has all keys and
5https://openwrt.org/
6http://www.tcpdump.org/
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thus has the access to all critical data. We argue that the system is secure
keeping in mind that an attacker could easily record the same wireless traffic
without having to breach the security measures that we have put into place.
Next, we’ll address the protection of the collected data. Each recorded
packet contains identifying information about the identity of the mobile
phone, the so called MAC address. Even though it is possible to reset the
MAC address of any such device, it is uncommon for users to do so. Note,
that for the purpose of this work, it is important, that
• MAC addresses are properly anonymized to protect the identity of
the voter,
• only data relevant to our experiments is kept, including anonymized
MAC addresses, time stamps, and signal noise ratios, and
• the anonymization of MAC addresses is deterministic, because we
need to correlate packets across multiple sensors.
For practical purposes, during the voting day, all data is recorded. Any
anonymization and analysis of the data is done post-election.
The data collected during this pilot must be classified as “sensitive”
because MAC addresses are considered personal data. To do an appropriate
security analysis of our design, we consider which possible adversary might
be interested in stealing the data we collect. An adversary may want
• to steal data out of curiosity,
• to gain access to recorded information,
• to discredit the election commission,
• or to interrupt the pilot.
It is therefore important to take the necessary technical and operational
security precautions. However, in general, the security threat is at most
moderate, as many polling places are within the range of wireless routers
that could be reprogrammed to collect similar kinds of information. Every
smart phone can be programmed to do the same.
We use disk encryption (AES based, SHA1, 256 bit) to deter attackers
and to secure the data stored on the USB drive on the sensor. The disk
encryption subsystem is part of the Linux kernel (dm -crypt). This way,
we can guarantee that all data on the USB drive is encrypted and thus
rendered useless for an attacker stealing it.
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5.5 Privacy
The MAC address for a network interface, is factory preset for each net-
worked device. This includes smartphones, but also standard networking
hardware that can be found in laptops and other computers. A MAC ad-
dress contains 6 octets, as shown in Figure 5.1, where the first 3 octets
identify the organization that issued this MAC. Using this and the remain-
ing 3 octets, it is possible to identify the device that owns the MAC.
Figure 5.1: MAC address
For most devices, in particular Apple’s iPhone or Android phones, the
MAC address can be reset by the user to any randomly chosen 6 octets 7.
For example c2:31:9d:d0:30:e8 is a valid MAC address. As each octet is 8
bit, there are 248 unique MAC addresses. Standard anonymization tech-
niques, for example, by computing the SHA256 digest for the MAC address
from a voter’s phone provide only low levels of security, because a sim-
ple dictionary attack would allow an adversary to relate the anonymized
identifier to the original MAC address. Therefore, we chose to use HMAC
(keyed-hash message authentication code) to hide the MAC addresses be-
fore we published the raw data, so that the HMAC key protects against
such a dictionary attack.
For reliability, when we use tcpdump to capture the wireless packets, we
do not filter out the packet header during recording. Instead, we store the
whole packet, and remove the packet’s body oﬄine. The secrecy of each
packet’s content depends on the type of security method used for wireless
communication, for example WEP, WPA, or WPA2. In addition, most
voters will not be able to connect to any of the local networks in the polling
station, which means that all the captured packets will only be handshake
beacons, instead of payload carrying network packets, which arise when
checking email or surfing the web.
Our security and privacy measures are not designed to protect against
inside attacks, which means if the keys are misused by an inside attacker,
the attacker may gain free access to the data on the USB drive and recover
7Some special MACs are reserved
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the original MAC addresses from the anonymized ones. If the attacker is
in possession of the secret key used to compute the HMAC, he will be able
to brute force the original MAC address.
5.6 Field Study
In this section we describe the 2015 pilot project, where we recorded network
traffic using the white boxes method and recorded them manually following
the CalTech/MIT style.
The general parliament election was held in Denmark on 18 June 2015
from 09:00 to 20:00 to elect the 179 members of the Folketing (Danish
parliament). We installed our white box technology in 5 polling places in
two cities, Aarhus and Copenhagen, and deployed in total 18 white boxes
with a minimum of 3 white boxes installed in each polling station. Out of
the 5 polling places, 3 were located in Copenhagen, namely Holbergskolen,
Bellahøj Skole and Islands Brygge Skolen, and 2 were located in Aarhus,
namely Møllevangskolen and Frederiksbjerg Hallerne.
5.6.1 Installation
The position for each white box in a polling place was carefully chosen, in an
effort to ensure that the combination of white boxes cover the entire polling
station and the area where there queues were expected to form. In some
polling places we placed white boxes in such a way to achieve a higher level
of redundancy, useful for the case sensor failure. As shown in Figure 5.2a,
3 sensors were placed in Holbergskolen polling place in Copenhagen, where
the bottom two sensors were placed to record the mobile devices before
voters go through the entrance (IND) and after they leave (UD). The small
circles mark the registration desks, the first service point. After registration,
the voters received a blank ballot and proceeded to the second service point,
waiting for an empty voting booth, marked in Figure 5.2a by a crossed out
circle. The queues formed alongside the building, along the dotted line in
the picture.
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(a) Holbergskolen (b) Islands Brygge Skolen
(c) Bellahøj Skole
Figure 5.2: Layout Maps of White Boxes in Copenhagen
On the day before the election, we deployed five teams who visited one
of the five polling places each, and installed 3-4 sensors. The sensors were
programmed to record from 08:00 to 21:00. The sensors were completely
autonomous and did not require any servicing during election day. Each
team collected the sensors after close of polling station and returned them
to the lab for further processing.
5.6.2 Data Preprocessing
The data collected by each sensor consists of a list of packets. These lists
contain several millions of packets each. Each packet is described by a
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time stamp, an anonymized MAC address, and a value representing signal
strength.
Figure 5.3 depicts a plot of one of these sensors, before noise was re-
moved. The x axis describes time and the y axis the identifier of the mobile
phone, sorted in order of first appearance. As we can see, several sensors
leave long lines to the right; this may be due to routers in proximity to the
polling station being turned on, or other reasons.
First, we tweak the data a little:
1. We preprocess the data in the following format, summarizing all
observations at times t1...tn of the same identifier into one tuple
(p, {t1, . . . , tn}, l). l refers to the duration an identifier was within
scope of the polling station l = tn − t1.
2. We remove all tuples from this set, where l = 0.
3. We remove all tuples, where 60min < l.
4. We remove all tuples, recorded 30min before the polling station opens,
i.e. where t1 < 08:30.
5. We remove all tuples, recorded 30min after the polling station closes,
i.e. where 20:30 < tn.
6. We remove all tuples corresponding to spurious identifiers, where l <
1min.
7. We remove all tuples corresponding to transient identifiers, i.e. there
exists an i, such that 10min < ti+1 − ti.
8. Finally, we apply the noise removal techniques described earlier, which
significantly improved the overall quality of the data. With a running
average (deviation) µ (σ) of the duration l for 10 minute intervals
(empirically determined), we remove in addition all those tuples for
which l < µ− σ or µ+ σ < l.
It is also conceivable to preprocess the data set even further: For ex-
ample, for each wireless packet, we could determine the manufacturer in-
formation from the MAC address (before anonymization). Based on this
information, we could decide to keep or remove the tuple. This is possible,
because the first 24 bits of a MAC address identify the manufacturer as
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discussed in Section 5.5 (unless the MAC address was reset). There are
online inverse MAC-address lookup services.
When we black-listed the five common router manufacturers, and re-
moved all packets from those devices from our data set, we observed, that
our method produced nearly identical results. This means, that our data
processing step effectively removed all black-listed devices automatically.
We also observed, that our sensors sometimes behave erratically. The
sensor No.7’s unprocessed data depicted in Figure 5.3, for example, ap-
peared to have malfunctioned as it stopped recording packets for about one
hour. The damage could be mitigated, because the other sensors in polling
places worked well. We remark, that this was also the only malfunctioning
that we observed.
Figure 5.3: White Box No.7 Data
5.6.3 Devices
In Denmark, it is common practice to publish statistical information about
each election on the internet. The official election homepage [48], for ex-
ample, lists how many voters voted in each polling place. We use this in-
formation to approximate, how many voters carried a WiFi enabled mobile
phone (see Table 5.2). The overall penetration of smart phones in Denmark
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was 59% in 2013 8.
Polling Places Voters Devices Percentage
Holbergskolen 4997 1333 26.68%
Bellahøj Skole 5789 1942 33.55%
Islands Brygge Skolen 7931 3494 44.05%
Møllevangskolen 8043 3132 38.94%
Frederiksbjerg Hallerne 10578 3798 35.90%
Table 5.2: Device Capture Ratio
5.6.4 Queues
We now discuss how to interpret the data that we have collected using
the polling station at Islands Brygge Skolen as an example. The results
for the other polling places are given in Appendix A.2, Appendix A.3 and
Appendix A.4.
First, we visualize the data we have collected. As previously stated, our
data set consists of a set of tuples of the form (p, t1, tn, l), where p stands for
the anonymized identifier of each mobile phone, t1 the point in time when
the device was detected first, and tn when it was seen last. Below we refer
to this data set as D. l refers to the total voter’s waiting time (time spend
in the polling place). The graph in Figure 5.4 visualizes this — the vertical
axis ranges over device IDs ordered by t1, and the horizontal axis ranges
over time. For each device, we mark t1 by a blue and tn by a red dot.
Next, we describe two analysis techniques, for computing the average
time that voters spent in a polling place. First, we use the method of
averaging, which is described in Section 5.6.4, and second, we use a method
based on Little’s theorem [89] in Section 5.6.4.
Method based on averaging
With this method, we compute the running averages of the time spent in
a polling place, using a sliding window of 10 minutes, 30 minutes, and 1
hour, respectively:
8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_smartphone_
penetration
5.6. Field Study 111
Figure 5.4: Device Appearance in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
µlen(t) =
∑
l∈L l
|L|
where L is defined as {l|(p, t1, tn, l) ∈ D and t− len2 ≤ t1 ≤ t+ len2 } and len
is the size of the window. Figure 5.5 depicts a green, blue, and red graph
for the polling place at Islands Brygge Skolen representing the running
averages for a 10 minute, 30 minute, and one hour window, respectively.
The horizontal axis denotes time and ranges from 08:30 to 20:30. The
vertical axis denotes the average waiting time, in seconds.
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Figure 5.5: Average Time (Averaging Method) in Islands Brygge Skolen
Copenhagen
Method based on Little’s theorem
In queuing theory, Little’s theorem is widely applied. Little’s theorem
states [89]: ”The average number of customers in a system (over some
interval) is equal to their average arrival rate, multiplied by their average
time in the system.” Based on this theorem, we can compute the average
time the voters spent in the polling station as
µlen(t) =
Vlen(t)
λlen(t)
,
where len stands for the size of the window, as above. Vlen is the average
number of voters in the polling station at time t, and λlen is the arrival rate
also at time t.
The accumulated inflow values, outflow values, and their difference,
which corresponds to the number of voters present in the polling station
at a particular time, are plotted in Figure 5.6. The grey, green, and blue
graphs, correspond to inflow, outflow, and number of voters, respectively.
Figure 5.7 shows the average time voters spent in the Islands Brygge
Skolen polling station for any particular point in time during the voting
day. The color schemes are consistent with those used above, green refers
to a 10 minute window, blue to a 30 minute window, and red to a one hour
window.
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Figure 5.6: Device Flow in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
Figure 5.7: Average Time (Little’s Method) in Islands Brygge Skolen
Copenhagen
5.6.5 Manual Count
In order to validate our method, we conducted in addition to the automatic
method a manual count in parallel, following the CalTech/MIT recommen-
dations, for assessing waiting times in polling places. In this section, we
report which data we collected, and how to compare the white box method
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with the manual method. The CalTech/MIT recommendation proposes two
different kinds of manual data collection.
1. The first method asks an observer to follow and record the individual
activities of random voters throughout the polling station. This in-
cludes, arrival times, for example, at the end of the queue, or different
service points, and the departure of the voter from the polling station.
Table 5.3 depicts a fragment of the log that we manually recorded at
the polling station, Holbergskolen.
No. Description Check-in Arrival
registra-
tion
Leave
registra-
tion
Enter
booth
Leave
booth
Ballot
cast
16 green coat 10:51:40 10:53:00 10:53:15 10:53:24 10:54:09 10:54:14
17 purple jacket 10:59:45 11:00:35 11:00:51 11:00:57 11:02:00 11:02:11
18 lime jacket 11:10:06 11:10:58 11:11:20 11:11:30 11:12:22 11:12:28
19 red coat 11:19:10 11:19:24 11:19:40 11:19:48 11:20:26 11:20:28
20 white pants 11:28:10 11:28:30 11:28:44 11:28:46 11:29:16 11:29:20
Table 5.3: Example Data of Manual Count in Holbergskolen
2. The second method for data collection requires an observer to count
the number of arriving voters in 10 minute intervals. The two left-
most columns of Tables 5.5–5.7 display this information for 4 different
polling places. Due to a lack of observers, we were not able to record
this data for the polling station at Frederiksbjerg Hallerne.
Next, we discuss the comparison between the white box method and the
manual methods.
Queues
Here, we compare the data that we have collected in Holbergskolen using
the white box method to Table 5.3 above. From this data, we compute
the time that each voter spent in the polling place, by subtracting “check-
in time” from the “ballot cast time”. Using the averaging methods, we
compute the running averages using a window size of 30 minutes and one
hour, respectively. We remark that a window size of 10 minutes did not
provide usable information, in part because of a lack of observations. These
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two graphs are depicted in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9, using the colors light
blue (30 minutes), and gray (1 hour). The remaining three plots (green,
blue, and red) display the white box data for this polling place using the
averaging method (see Section 5.6.4) and Little’s method (see Section 5.6.4).
Figure 5.8: Comparison of White Box (Averaging Method) and Manual
Count in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
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Figure 5.9: Comparison of White Box (Little’s Method) and Manual Count
in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
Devices
Here, we compare the second type of data that we collected manually with
the data recorded using the white boxes. There is only one polling station,
namely Holbergskolen, for which we recorded inflow manually during the
whole day. Figure 5.10 depicts the inflow and outflow, recorded by our
sensors in green and gray, respectively, and the inflow recorded manually
in red. Note, that we did not record manually the outflow of voters from a
polling station.
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Figure 5.10: Device Flow in Polling Station Holbergskolen Copenhagen
including manual count
Figure 5.11 presents the same information but in a slightly different
form. The red plot describes the average percentages of voters who carried
a mobile phone, in 10 minute intervals.
Figure 5.11: Device Capture Ratio from 8:30 to 20:10 in Holbergskolen
Copenhagen
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In addition to the inflow collected from Holbergskolen (Table 5.4), we
also recorded the inflow for one hour period between 16:00 and 17:00 for
three further polling places, including Bellahøj Skole (Table 5.5), Islands
Brygge Skolen (Figure 5.6), and Møllevangskolen (Table 5.7). This allows
us to compare the inflows between all four polling places during this hour.
Time Voters Devices Percentage
. . . . . . . . . . . .
16:00 - 16:10 80 29 36.25%
16:10 - 16:20 74 25 33.78%
16:20 - 16:30 97 27 27.84%
16:30 - 16:40 102 14 13.73%
16:40 - 16:50 108 27 25.00%
16:50 - 17:00 112 33 29.46%
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 5.4: Device Capture Ratio in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
Time Voters Devices Percentage
16:10 - 16:20 90 28 31.11%
16:20 - 16:30 85 33 38.82%
16:30 - 16:40 132 42 31.82%
16:40 - 16:50 122 43 35.25%
16:50 - 17:00 118 47 39.83%
17:00 - 17:10 130 48 36.92%
Table 5.5: Device Capture Ratio in Bellahøj Skole Copenhagen
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Time Voters Devices Percentage
16:00 - 16:10 107 56 52.34%
16:10 - 16:20 183 77 42.08%
16:20 - 16:30 145 79 54.48%
16:30 - 16:40 200 84 42.00%
16:40 - 16:50 211 93 44.08%
16:50 - 17:00 193 88 45.60%
Table 5.6: Device Capture Ratio in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
Time Voters Devices Percentage
16:00 - 16:10 138 49 35.51%
16:10 - 16:20 160 64 40.00%
16:20 - 16:30 170 76 44.71%
16:30 - 16:40 173 76 43.93%
16:40 - 16:50 165 73 44.24%
16:50 - 17:00 201 83 41.29%
Table 5.7: Device Capture Ratio in Møllevangskolen Aarhus
5.7 Findings
This section describes some findings from the white box data.
1. The white box method provides a precise and accurate method to
collect information for measuring waiting times in polling places. We
have observed and recorded data in one polling station in two different
ways, using our white box method and a manual counting method.
Figure5.9 reports our observations. We can see that both data sets
(green and light blue) follow roughly the same trend, but that the au-
tomatic method recorded overall higher waiting times than the man-
ual method. We attribute this difference to our setup, where mobile
phones are detected earlier by our white box sensors because they
record mobile phones while they are approaching the polling station
and not just upon arrival. This can be compensated for by using more
sensors but with restricted range. To a lesser extent, it may also be
due to the inaccuracy inherent in manual data collection and the low
sampling rate.
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2. We can also refine the setup to collect more detailed data, for example,
by increasing the number of sensors, or by using location algorithms,
such as trilateralization. It might even be possible to track individual
mobile phones or to predict where a line will form. Such extensions
are however beyond the scope of this chapter.
3. Some polling places experienced an increase in waiting times between
16:00 and 18:00. For example, at Islands Brygge Skolen waiting time
doubled around 17:00. We suspect that this because many voters
voted after work. To alleviate these service bottlenecks, our find-
ings indicate that either more registration desks or more curtains are
needed.
4. Our findings also show that every polling station has a characteristic
service time. This is the minimal amount time a voter requires to tra-
verse the polling station. In the Islands Brygge Skolen polling station,
the minimal service time is around 200 seconds, whereas in Bellahøj
Skole, it is closer to 270 seconds. Factors that affect the service time
include polling station layout and processing speed. Election officials
may respond to such observations for future elections and monitor
effectiveness.
5. The white box data can also be used to analyze the percentages of the
voting populations, who have smartphones and this information can
be correlated with voter participation. It is also possible to conduct a
further statistical analysis, for example by correlating our data with
the official voter registration data.
6. In general, the averaging method and Little’s method provide very
similar results, although the latter appears to be more fine-grained.
In particular, the plots obtained by Little’s method in the Figures
above and the Appendix below show interesting periodic fluctuations,
that we will analyze in future work.
7. Not surprisingly, all polling places show a peak in waiting times at the
beginning of the voting day. We observed long queues forming outside
polling places, before they opened. After the voting had started, and
polling places had been operating at full capacity for a little while,
the waiting times dropped dramatically.
8. In Frederiksbjerg Hallerne (as shown in Appendix A.3, Figure A.10),
there is a dip in the graph around 10am, which coincides with the
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malfunction of sensor No. 7 placed at the entrance at the polling
place, as discussed in Figure 5.3. This means that area covered by our
sensors was somewhat smaller during this time, resulting in reduced
waiting times in this polling place.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Additional Example of SMT Solver:
Norwegian and Australian Election
We continue the study of election systems from Norway and Victoria state
of Australia discussed in Chapter 3. In this section, We show how these
properties presented in Chapter 3 can also be formulated with the method
for voting scheme analysis, which provides us another way of checking these
properties.
A.1.1 Norwegian Election
The related events in the logs of the vote collector server and the cleanser
are encoded into arrays.
1. Ballot denotes the ballot array from the vote collector server, where
each Ballot(i) := (id, v) is the tuple of stored ballot id and voter id;
2. Read denotes the read event array from the cleanser, where each
Read(i) := (id, v) is the read-in ballot id and voter id;
3. Accept denotes the accept event array, where each Accept(i) is the
accepted ballot id;
4. Reject denotes the reject event array, where each Reject(i) is the re-
jected ballot id.
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We use |A| to represent the length of the array A. We define (id, v) =
(id′, v′) if and only if id = id′ and v = v′. And also define (id, v)[1] := id
and (id, v)[2] := v.
Policy 1: The vote collector and the cleanser agree on which ballots actu-
ally exist. The formula states that each ballot must be read by the
cleanser and conversely that every ballot in the cleanser needs to be in
vote collector server. Furthermore since the order of ballots matters,
we wish to make sure that the ordering of any two ballots is preserved
between vote collector server and cleanser, where as in Chapter 3 we
separate the two requirements into two formulas.
(|Ballot | = |Read |) ∧ (∀i.(1 ≤ i ≤ |Ballot |)→ Ballot [i] = Read [i]))
Policy 2: Every read ballot must either be accepted or rejected later.
∀i.(1 ≤ i ≤ |Read |)→ (∃j.(Accept [j] = Read [i][1])∨(Reject [j] = Read [i][1]))
Policy 3: A ballot should not both be rejected and accepted.
∀i.(1 ≤ i ≤ |Accept |)→ (∀j.(1 ≤ j ≤ |Reject |)→ (Accept [i] 6= Reject [i]))
Policy 4: The next policy expresses only the last vote cast should be ac-
cepted. The policy requires that all earlier ballots from the same voter
must be rejected.
∀i, j.(1 ≤ i < j ≤ |Read |∧Read [i][2] = Read [j][2])→ ∃k.Reject [k] = Read [i][1]
Policy 5: For every voter who voted, at least one ballot is accepted.
∀i.(1 ≤ i ≤ |Ballot |)→ ∃j, k.Ballot [i][2] = Read [j][2]∧Ballot [j][1] = Accept [k]
A.1.2 Victoria State Election
In the same way as the Norwegian example, we encode the Victoria State of
Australia election logs from different agents into arrays. Each ballot’s serial
number is unique. The agents are client VPS, client EMV and the 5 MBB
peers. We show here that by including temporal order (time stamps) in the
array, temporal properties can be expressed without temporal operators.
1. RecExt denotes the receive external message event, where RecExt [i] :=
(t, id, ty), t is the time, id is the ballot id and ty is the message type;
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2. SendM denotes the send message event from either VPS(SendM [1])
or EVM (SendM [2]), where Send [i][j] := (t, id, ty) is defined same as
RecExt ;
3. RecRes denotes the client (VPS, RecRes [1] or EVM, RecRes [2]) that
receives the confirmation from the peers, where RecRes [i][j] := (t, id, peer, ty),
t is the time, id is the ballot id, peer is the MBB peer {1...5}, ty is
the response message type;
4. ValidSig denotes the client (VPS, ValidSig [1] or EVM, ValidSig [2])
that validates the signature, where ValidSig [i][j] := (t, id, peer) is the
same as defined above;
5. MetThld denotes the client (VPS, MetThld [1] or EVM, MetThld [2])
that check if that threshold is met, where MetThld [i][j] := (t, id) is
the same as defined above, t is the time, and id is the ballot id.
Policy 1: The first policy we show is that when a peer receives an external
messages, it must have originated from either from VPS or EVM.
t′ < t means time t′ is earlier than t.
∀i.(1 ≤ i ≤ 5)→
∀(t, id, ty) ∈ RecExt [i].∃(t′, id, ty) ∈ SendM [1] ∪ SendM [2].t′ < t
Policy 2: The second policy that we check is that the threshold is only met
if it is preceded by at least four (out of five) valid signature checks
from different peers. Formally we check that at least one of the five
possible scenarios are satisfied which is what the formula ϕ does.
Let ψ(t, id, c, ps) =
∧
p∈ps ∃(t′, id, p) ∈ ValidSig [c].t′ < t
Let peers = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
Let ϕ(c) = ∀(t, id) ∈ MetThld [c].∨p∈peers ψ(t, id, c, peers \ {p})
We check this policy, ϕ, for every client, i.e for both VPS and EVM.
ϕ(1) ∧ ϕ(2)
Policy 3: If a client validates a response from a peer, it should have first
received a response from that peer. First we define formula ϕ′(c) for
one client c.
∀(t, id, peer) ∈ ValidSig [c].∃(t′, id, peer, ty) ∈ RecRes [c].t′ < t
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We check this policy, ϕ′, for every client VPS and EVM in a way
similar to before.
ϕ′(1) ∧ ϕ′(2)
Policy 4: Any ballot that was audited on peer i, it should not be used later
for voting. If such a case occurs EVM should have logged ”error”.
∀(t, id, ”audit”) ∈ RecExt [i].
(∃(t′, id, ”startevm”) ∈ SendM [2] ∧ t′ > t
→ ∃(t′′, id, peer, ”error”) ∈ RecRes [2] ∧ t′′ > t′)
Policy 5: A voter cannot reuse a ballot, which will also incur a logged
error message by EVM.
∀(t, id, ”startevm”) ∈ sendM [2].(∃(t′, id, ”startevm”) ∈ SendM [2] ∧ t′ > t→
∃(t′′, id, peer, ”error”) ∈ RecRes [2] ∧ t′′ > t′)
A.2 Device Appearance
Figure A.1: Device Appearance in Bellahøj Skole Copenhagen
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Figure A.2: Device Appearance in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
Figure A.3: Device Appearance in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
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Figure A.4: Device Appearance in Møllevangskolen Aarhus
Figure A.5: Device Appearance in Frederiksbjerg Hallerne Aarhus
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A.3 Average Waiting Time via Averaging
Method
Figure A.6: Average Time (Averaging Method) in Bellahøj Skole Copen-
hagen
Figure A.7: Average Time (Averaging Method) in Holbergskolen Copen-
hagen
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Figure A.8: Average Time (Averaging Method) in Islands Brygge Skolen
Copenhagen
Figure A.9: Average Time (Averaging Method) in Møllevangskolen Aarhus
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Figure A.10: Average Time (Averaging Method) in Frederiksbjerg Hallerne
Aarhus
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A.4 Average Waiting Time via Little’s
Method
Figure A.11: Device Flow in Bellahøj Skole Copenhagen
Figure A.12: Average Time (Little’s Method) in Bellahøj Skole Copenhagen
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Figure A.13: Device Flow in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
Figure A.14: Average Time (Little’s Method) in Holbergskolen Copenhagen
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Figure A.15: Device Flow in Islands Brygge Skolen Copenhagen
Figure A.16: Average Time (Little’s Method) in Islands Brygge Skolen
Copenhagen
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Figure A.17: Device Flow in Møllevangskolen Aarhus
Figure A.18: Average Time (Little’s Method) in Møllevangskolen Aarhus
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Figure A.19: Device Flow in Frederiksbjerg Hallerne Aarhus
Figure A.20: Average Time (Little’s Method) in Frederiksbjerg Hallerne
Aarhus
